security: CI egress filter — jobs reach the internet, never Veron/LAN

Measured: an unprivileged job container inside the CI dind could open SSH,
Ollama and dev servers on Veron (192.168.1.73) and the rest of the LAN,
WireGuard and Tailscale — lateral movement for any malicious dependency,
no escape needed. egress.sh (idempotent; windygit-ci-egress.service at
boot) hooks the jobs bridge: runner<->dind, replies, DNS and public
egress allowed; RFC1918, CGNAT, link-local and the host itself dropped.
Verified from a job container: 6/6 private targets blocked, DNS,
internet and the public forge OK.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

deploy/runner/egress.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# CI egress filter (2026-09-23) — jobs reach the internet, never Grant's network.
+#
+# Measured before this existed: an ordinary (unprivileged) job container inside
+# the CI dind could open SSH, Ollama, and every dev server on Veron
+# (192.168.1.73:22/3000/3300/8080/11434) and anything else on the LAN, WireGuard
+# or Tailscale. No container escape needed — a malicious npm/pip dependency in
+# any first-party repo's CI could walk straight onto the fleet.
+#
+# All CI traffic leaves through the `windy-git-runner_jobs` bridge (dind NATs
+# its job containers onto it). This script, run at boot and after any runner
+# compose change, allows on that bridge:
+#   * traffic between the runners and dind (same bridge)
+#   * replies (ESTABLISHED/RELATED)
+#   * DNS (53) — Docker's embedded resolver forwards to the LAN router
+#   * everything public
+# and drops: RFC1918, CGNAT/Tailscale (100.64/10), link-local, and ANY packet
+# addressed to the host itself (INPUT), whatever interface IP it targets.
+# Idempotent: owned chains are flushed and rebuilt; hooks are added once.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+NET=windy-git-runner_jobs
+id=$(docker network inspect "$NET" --format '{{.Id}}')
+BR="br-${id:0:12}"
+ip link show "$BR" >/dev/null
+
+iptables -N WG-CI-EGRESS 2>/dev/null || iptables -F WG-CI-EGRESS
+iptables -A WG-CI-EGRESS -o "$BR" -j RETURN
+iptables -A WG-CI-EGRESS -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j RETURN
+iptables -A WG-CI-EGRESS -p udp --dport 53 -j RETURN
+iptables -A WG-CI-EGRESS -p tcp --dport 53 -j RETURN
+for cidr in 10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16 100.64.0.0/10 169.254.0.0/16; do
+  iptables -A WG-CI-EGRESS -d "$cidr" -j DROP
+done
+iptables -A WG-CI-EGRESS -j RETURN
+
+iptables -N WG-CI-INPUT 2>/dev/null || iptables -F WG-CI-INPUT
+iptables -A WG-CI-INPUT -m conntrack --ctstate ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j RETURN
+iptables -A WG-CI-INPUT -j DROP
+
+# Hooks: remove any stale ones (the bridge name changes if the network is
+# recreated), then add exactly one of each at the top.
+for chain in DOCKER-USER INPUT; do
+  target=$([ "$chain" = INPUT ] && echo WG-CI-INPUT || echo WG-CI-EGRESS)
+  while read -r rule; do
+    iptables -D $chain ${rule#-A $chain }
+  done < <(iptables -S "$chain" | grep -- "-j $target" || true)
+  iptables -I "$chain" 1 -i "$BR" -j "$target"
+done
+
+echo "ci egress filter active on $BR ($NET)"