R1 pull_request_target; R2 fork pull_request on self-hosted without a same-repo/environment
gate; R3 outsider events (issue_comment, workflow_run, ...) on self-hosted; R0 unparseable.
PR mode in the 5-min sync posts windy-git/runner-guard on open PRs of public sneakyfree repos
that change a workflow (each status once). Nightly sweep (Windy 0 timer) over every public
repo: page + BOARD line on new hits + red windy-job heartbeat.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Grant via Boss 10-01: compute = Windy Mind (endpoint + key); do not call Veron Ollama directly.
Judged on lines a PR adds only (not the baseline tree), never blocks even in MODE=block,
windy-mind (the compute door) allowed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
secret-scan reports file:line/commit + lockbox KEY NAME or shape, never a value or fragment;
env-names lists variable names/length/hash only. Same shapes as secret-guard. Seeded-fake tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Windy Text 10-01: a live Twilio auth token sat in bridged-repo tests. Auth tokens are bare
32-hex, so they are matched only when assigned to a name containing token/secret/key/password;
hash is of the value alone. SECRET_GUARD_WARN_KINDS lets a new shape warn before it blocks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
scripts/public_secret_scan.py: every PUBLIC repo, every object (incl.
unreachable + PR refs), secret_shapes patterns, excused by the secret-guard
allow list. Output JSON with hash8 + location only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Private-key matches are only the BEGIN line (same hash everywhere), so they
are allowed by path+kind; everything else by hash. Real revoked tokens
(1354fc9b, d49dc2ba) are pinned by a test to never be allowed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New guard windy-git/secret-guard (warn-only) over EVERY text file: Telegram,
GitHub, AWS, Slack, Anthropic, OpenAI, Stripe live, Google API keys and
private-key blocks (scripts/secret_shapes.py, shared with the weekly public
scan). A finding carries "<kind> #<sha256[:8]>", never the value (house rule
10). Known fakes allowed BY HASH (ci/secret-guard-allow.yml). GUARDS_STATUS
gets a secrets column. Leak hunt 09-24: @Windy_0_bot token in a public fixture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
windy-search #96 "Boot smoke (no Docker)" passed but was hidden by the
image-build name filter. Negative lookbehind for no/no-/without.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
status_for(lane, whole_tree, grant=...): only lane-owned findings fail in
MODE=block; Grant-owned (ci/grant-owned.yml) post WARN. The bridge splits via
guards_report.split_grant; if the split cannot run it WARNs (never blocks).
Orchestrator 09-23: block compute-guard for lane-owned paths only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
deploy/release workflows run on the target host (real daemon) and are
disabled here (repo_unit DisabledWorkflows); one bounded query per process,
flag everything if it fails.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- bridge: BRIDGE_NO_DAEMON names image-build jobs whose name lacks docker
(default eternitas:ci/build); never posted, like the docker-named ones.
- ci-hygiene: flag docker build/buildx/run/compose, docker-compose and
docker/build-push-action in workflow steps ("needs docker") with the fix:
job services: + a no-Docker smoke test; the image builds at deploy.
- test_guards_report: owner column (14ed23a broke it).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Non-secret inputs git-ignored in windy-pro (models, linux-x64 portable
bundle, enter-monitor build) that build-desktop needs. Mounted :ro into
dind; valid_volumes allows only /ci-inputs/windy-pro; refresh-ci-inputs.sh
copies them from the frozen release clone (read-only on the source).
Invariant I-5 narrowed, not dropped: exactly that one path, read-only in
dind, no other service mounts it, still no docker socket (proven to fail
on :rw). Orchestrator-approved (option a). Applied in an idle window.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mirror kept its creation-time base forever. eternitas #167 was stacked
on fix/one-hallway, retargeted to main after #166 merged; ci.yml
(pull_request: branches [main]) then silently never ran for it, while
unfiltered workflows did. An edited event triggers nothing, so close the
stale mirror and open a fresh one on the new base (runs CI at once).
An unknown base is left alone, never guessed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Allow entries may carry matches: (regexes); then only matching lines are
allowed, so an allowed file can't smuggle in a new call. windy-pro #609
MindKeychain.jsx: openrouter.ai/auth? and /api/v1/auth/keys (BYOK key
acquisition via OAuth PKCE, no inference; successor of the MindPanel
allow, ADR-064). An inference call in the same file still flags (tested).
Orchestrator-approved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Scans every bridged default branch with both guards; lane-owned vs
Grant-owned (ci/grant-owned.yml: windy-pro desktop paths + its desktop CI
jobs, attributed per job) so Grant's code never holds up a block.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bridge reads PR/default heads from GitHub after the sync's fetch; a
push in between isn't in the clone until the next cycle. Both guards logged
a CalledProcessError for it (windy-pro main 40 s after the fetch). Now
None = nothing posted this cycle; the next one scans it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
House rule 6 (09-23). The bridge now also posts windy-git/ci-hygiene on
every PR head (added lines) and default branch (whole files), scanning CI
workflows and Dockerfiles for: floating pip / uv pip installs (not -r,
not --no-deps, not exact pins), uv sync without --locked/--frozen,
npm install instead of npm ci (unless every package is exact-pinned),
yarn/pnpm without a frozen lockfile, :latest images and COPY lock* globs
(Windy Mail #147), and CI services publishing a HOST port (every job
shares one dind: Windy Mind runs 147/176 died on 5432). Warn-only;
CI_HYGIENE_MODE=block later. Allow-list ci/ci-hygiene-allow.yml (empty).
compute_guard's walker is now parameterised (line_fn / path_ok /
prefilter) so both guards share one scanner, cache and allow loader; the
bridge posts both through one _post_guard. Today: 95 issues in 21 repos;
windy-git, calendar, traveler, traveler-site clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Grant's rule (09-23): every model call goes through Windy Mind. The bridge
now posts windy-git/compute-guard on every PR head (lines the PR ADDS vs its
merge-base) and default-branch head (whole tree): provider hosts, provider
SDK imports/deps and raw provider key names. Warn-only: success + "⚠ WARN"
and a link to the first hit; COMPUTE_GUARD_MODE=block turns it red later.
Exceptions live in ci/compute-guard-allow.yml, each with a reason (Mind
itself, user-BYOK windy-agent / windy-code extension / windy-pro desktop +
MindPanel, windy-connect config writers). Tests, docs, comments, lockfiles,
vendored code and CI config are never scanned. Reads the sync's bare clones
(no docker exec); cached per (repo, sha, rules). Non-fatal; never a fake OK.
First cases = COMPUTE_BYPASS_AUDIT.md. Today on default branches: 38
findings in 3 repos (windy-chat audit #2, windy-pro account-server #3/#4,
windytalk reference/), 0 elsewhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Gitea 1.24 lists only picked-up jobs, so a queued PR showed NOTHING on
GitHub and lanes asked whether their push was lost (Windy Mind #131,
Windy Cloud today). The bridge now reads waiting jobs from the gitea DB
and posts pending where nothing newer was picked up; a queued re-run
supersedes the stale failure it replaces.
Only status 5 jobs whose runs-on labels a live runner has: blocked jobs
often end skipped and label-unrunnable jobs are cancelled unpicked, and
neither ever reaches /actions/tasks, so their pending would never resolve.
Lookup is bounded (30 s) and non-fatal: the IO-stall lesson.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Telemetry UPDATE 2 actor rule: agent/human rows without actor_id are
quarantined. Forge humans sign in only via Windy SSO, so Gitea's
external_login_user.external_id is their windy_identity_id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
git push never touches our API, so throttle.py can't see it. Gitea's
action table records every push; the 5-min sync-side emitter now reads
it and emits forge.push_velocity when an account crosses 60 pushes/1h,
500 pushes/24h (standard-band base) or 10 ref deletes/24h. One row per
account per rule per window while over; windyadmin (the sync) exempt.
Nothing sits in the push path and nothing is refused. HOLD until
Telemetry Boss declares the shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
identity.login created a live hub session every 10 min and never ended it.
It now logs out with the token it got: retried on 5xx / no response
(8 x 15 s), 401/404/410 = already over, any other 4xx fails fast, and a
cleanup it can't finish is reported as identity.logout DOWN "CLEANUP
FAILED" (alerts + red run). The hub's /auth/logout revokes every refresh
token of the account (verified live), so the next run's logout heals a
leftover; no ledger needed. Proven end to end: login 200, logout 200,
10/10 checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ledger answers 202 even when it quarantines rows. Both emitters now log
a warning with the reasons and report service.health.telemetry_quarantined
and telemetry_dropped (API: buffer overflow; sync: 0 by construction, since
a failed send keeps cursor + spool). HOLD until Telemetry Boss declares both
keys on windy-git's two service.health shapes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
b7a7e94 made the bridge read workflow files, which the strict fake Gitea
refused (7 red). The fake now serves contents (404 when absent), and new
tests cover: error posted with no runs, valid files add nothing, no repost,
.gitea/workflows wins over .github/workflows, and each workflow_problem
shape. pyyaml declared in dev extras (the bridge imports it).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A single GitHub TLS handshake timeout failed the whole sync, flipped its
windy-job heartbeat to ok:false and would page for nothing. Up to 3
attempts with backoff for URLError/timeout/reset; HTTP errors return
immediately as before. Test covers both.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the keyed marker from 1c3b5b0 with the ecosystem convention:
any X-Windy-Synthetic value marks the request synthetic; the flag lives in
a per-request contextvar, labels this request's rows, and is FORWARDED on
downstream calls (Eternitas trust lookup, Gitea API). The canary sends
"1". Rows are still recorded; the label separates, never suppresses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The canary deliberately sends forged tokens every 10 min; those refusal
rows read as attacks. It now sends X-Windy-Synthetic carrying a shared
secret (Gitea repo secret CANARY_SYNTHETIC_KEY = WINDYGIT_SYNTHETIC_KEY in
Veron .env); the API marks the row synthetic only on a constant-time
match, so an attacker cannot label their own refusals synthetic to hide.
synthetic is declared on forge.auth.failed (Telemetry Boss, UPDATE 3).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Membrane first: I-2 and MEMBRANE.v1 now list the windy-admin ledger
(POST /v1/events). api/app/telemetry.py: service.boot once per start
(commit_sha omitted when unknown, I-12), an hourly in-process
service.health with the shared keys (requests, errors_5xx/4xx,
refusals_4xx, p95_ms only when there was traffic), and one
forge.auth.failed row per refused request: declared 13-code enum,
http_status, caller class, route TEMPLATE (never the concrete path),
actor_type system with no actor_id (all-lanes rule). No token = nothing
sent or buffered; flush failures keep rows (bounded) and never raise.
Token from root-only /etc/windygit/telemetry.env (optional env_file).
8 behavioural tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
build-desktop, test-installer and reality-check still run on Windy Git
and stay visible there, but the bridge no longer posts them to GitHub, so
they cannot turn windy-pro's combined status red. Windy Git side only;
the desktop code is Grant's to fix. BRIDGE_NON_BLOCKING, per repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
kit-army-config (the lockbox) and every *-soul / anima repo carry
credentials; the nightly R2 bundles are unencrypted, so the R2 key was a
key to every secret. Excluded by name (BACKUP_EXCLUDE); they are backed up
encrypted by the Windy Drops lane (restic) and stay mirrored on Veron.
Behavioural test runs the script's own exclusion function.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seven HTTP-level tests through the real route: sha256= prefix and bare
digests accepted, digest of re-serialised JSON refused, forged/wrong-key/
missing signatures refused, unset secret -> 503, a revocation with a bad
signature never reaches the handler, the reachability ping never acts.
Mutation-checked: dropping the prefix strip fails the behavioral test
while the old string-grep invariant still passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- hub_jwt: aud list is ["windy_git"] (contract v1 array). Dropped
"windy-git": that is Gitea's OIDC client_id, so a forge id_token would
have passed the aud check. `type: human` is now REQUIRED (id_tokens have
none), which makes accepting the discovery-URL issuer safe.
- runner job ceiling 30m -> 90m: eternitas's serial pytest is ~50 min and
would have been killed mid-suite.
- eternitas (private) added to the GitHub status bridge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The human path refused every token in production (503
human_signin_not_ready) because no verifier existed. api/app/hub_jwt.py
verifies hub access tokens against account.windyword.ai's JWKS:
- RS256 only (closes alg:none and HS256-with-public-key confusion)
- iss must be "windy-identity" — what hub ACCESS tokens carry (observed
live); id_tokens (discovery-URL issuer) are not accepted as bearers
- aud optional today, must name Windy Git when present; hub_require_aud
flips it mandatory once the hub emits it. PyJWT's own aud check is off
on purpose: it rejects ANY aud-bearing token when no audience is given.
- type must be human; identity = windy_identity_id, never sub (per-row id)
- production verifies even if require_verified_jwt is off
11 behavioral tests sign real RS256 tokens with a local key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- deploy/runner/prune.sh + windygit-ci-prune.timer (6h): age-based prune
of the CI-only dind (containers, finished-job volumes, images/builder
cache >7d) plus a hard 60 GB cap. Only that daemon, over its own TCP
socket; never the host's Docker. It was 38 GB and unbounded — the same
class of growth that filled Kit 0 on 09-01.
- pr_status_bridge: jobs named *docker* are not posted. Job containers
have no daemon by design (I-5), so they are red on every commit; a
permanent red X teaches everyone to ignore red.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
windy-connect promoted from pull mirror to writable (release.yml, which
publishes to PyPI on tag push, disabled — the sync pushes tags).
windy-search was already writable; its scheduled drift-check is disabled
because it now runs as cron on Kit 0. Both added to BRIDGE_REPOS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Four runners x capacity 1 instead of one x capacity 4. Concurrent jobs in
one act_runner share /root/.cache/act; a refresh racing a copy killed 3 of
windy-chat's ~20 jobs at setup-node (lstat ... no such file). Separate
processes have separate caches. Same parallelism, same capped dind.
- Behavioral tests for pr_status_bridge (latest verdict wins, no reposting,
skipped never painted green, fork PRs never run, pagination, PR lifecycle).
- import_from_github.py reads IMPORT_GITEA_URL, not GITEA_BASE_URL: sourcing
the deploy .env pointed it at http://gitea:3000 and it died on DNS after the
mirror it replaces had already been deleted.
- CUTOVER.md: the private-repo CI path, onboarding steps, and the
/actions/tasks-hides-queued-runs trap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
windygit-tunnel had crash-looped ~91k times: another project's
cornercall-tunnel holds 127.0.0.1:2000, and cloudflared exits when it
cannot bind its metrics port. Ingress only survived because a stray
cloudflared.service ran the same config. That unit is now disabled and
/etc/cloudflared/config.yml uses metrics 127.0.0.1:2001.
Also add windy-git to the GitHub->Windy Git sync list; its self-hosted
copy was stuck 3 commits behind (only check + canary workflows, no
deploys, so syncing is safe).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The probe's own log was never retrievable through the jobs API, but the
question it asked was answered better by a direct comparison of two real
workflows on the same runner and image:
windy-git gate @postgres:5432 -> passes its migration round-trip
eternitas migrations @localhost:5432 -> failed
Also scopes test_g73 to workflows that actually run Python. It failed the probe
for not pinning a version when the probe only shelled out to psql — the test
being wrong rather than the workflow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The front end was 100% stock Gitea: green teacup, "Gitea: Git with a cup of
tea", "A painless, self-hosted Git service". G2.3 was specified in the plan with
an acceptance test and never executed, and nothing enforced it.
Now: Windy Git name, wind-mark logo, brand-blue accent, and a landing page that
says what this actually is. Uses Gitea's SUPPORTED surface (custom templates +
public assets) so upstream upgrades keep arriving — no source modified (D-2/I-1).
Two traps this cost, both now documented and tested:
1. GITEA__DEFAULT__APP_NAME does not work. Gitea reads APP_NAME from the TOP
LEVEL of app.ini; the env var created a literal [default] section that Gitea
ignores, so the installer's stock APP_NAME kept winning while the config
looked correct. The env-to-ini pass also APPENDED a second APP_NAME rather
than replacing the first — a new variant of the documented G4A.3 trap.
2. Cloudflare caches /assets/* for 6h and no token in this stack can purge, so
the new logo and CSS were invisible while being correct at origin. Brand
assets now carry a VERSION IN THE FILENAME; bump it on every change.
Committed with an idempotent apply.sh, because applying it straight to Veron's
disk first was itself the config-drift trap this project documents: a rebuild
would have silently reverted to stock Gitea.
85 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
I reintroduced the exact defect I had just criticised. ACTION_BASE listed
"push" and "push.force", but git push goes straight to Gitea over HTTPS and
never touches this API — so nothing records a push, a count would be zero
forever, and enforce() would look up a limit, count nothing, and allow
everything. A silent no-op wearing the costume of a control, made worse by a
config name that implies the protection exists.
Split into ACTION_BASE (actually enforced: repo.create, grant.create) and
NOT_ENFORCED_HERE (push, push.force) with the reason and the remedy written
down: enforcing push velocity needs a Gitea-side pre-receive or push webhook
reporting into agent_actions.
enforce("push") now raises rather than silently allowing, and a test asserts the
two sets stay disjoint.
Found by auditing whether the auth fix could be walked around — every
/api/v1/repos/* route does require a caller, and the only unauthenticated
endpoints are /health, /version and the HMAC-verified webhook.
83 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
/version went null after a deploy — the exact "service cannot name its own
commit" defect this project was built to prevent, caught by its own honesty
check.
Cause: the sed replaced "" with "" (a no-op when COMMIT_SHA is empty) and the
grep then matched that same empty string, so the guard verified nothing. A build
with no COMMIT_SHA passed and shipped a container reporting commit_sha: null.
Now the build fails loudly instead.
Second cause of the stale deploy, and it was mine: an earlier `git commit
--amend` + force-push rewrote history the Veron deploy checkout was already
sitting on, leaving it divergent so `git pull -q` failed SILENTLY (-q hid
"Need to specify how to reconcile divergent branches"). Two lessons: do not
force-push a branch a deploy checkout tracks, and do not pull with -q in a
deploy script.
Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
looks_like_ept used jwt.get_unverified_header, which validates the WHOLE token
and therefore rejects anything with a malformed signature segment. Routing
consequently depended on signature well-formedness: an EPT-shaped token with a
bad signature fell through to the HUMAN path, where it was refused for the wrong
reason and — with require_verified_jwt off (dev) — could have been read as a
human identity via its `sub` claim.
Now the header segment is decoded directly, so routing depends only on what the
token CLAIMS to be; whether it is authentic remains verify_ept's job.
Also routes alg:none to the EPT verifier regardless of typ, since a `none`
token is never valid for any caller. Both forged shapes now return 401
ept_invalid — the honest code — instead of 503 "feature not ready".
Found by noticing a forged EPT returned 503 where the verifier should have
answered 401, rather than accepting "it was refused, close enough".
80 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Monkeypatched httpx so resolve_passport sees a real revoked trust body
(status=revoked, band=unproven, allowed=[]) and must raise
PassportNotInGoodStanding — proving the WIRING, not just the decision. This is
the path that stops a validly-signed EPT that outlived its passport's
revocation (~365-day tokens).
Live-confirmed alongside: Eternitas refuses to mint EPTs for revoked bots
("credentials are not issued for non-active bots"), so the only exposure was a
pre-existing token — exactly what this now catches. The active agent's EPT still
returns 200. A fully-live revoked test would require revoking a real fleet
passport (destructive), so the wiring is proven deterministically instead.
79 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A revoked passport returns HTTP 200, status=revoked, band=unproven,
allowed_actions=[] (verified live 2026-08-13). resolve_passport keyed refusal
only on HTTP 4xx and band=="untrusted", so it returned band 'unproven' and the
agent was seated. Revocation was NOT enforced on the live auth path at all — and
now that agent auth actually works, a revoked agent could authenticate and act.
Extracts decide_trust(body) -> (band, actions) | raise. Only status=="active"
is allowed; revoked/suspended/frozen/unknown all refuse, fail-closed on the
field that carries the most consequential fact about an identity. The agent call
site turns that into a clean 403 passport_revoked.
This is the REAL revocation gate — the token cannot be un-issued, but its
standing is re-checked on every request, so revocation takes effect on the next
call with no webhook required. The Eternitas webhook remains useful for
invalidating locally-issued credentials/grants (G6.3, not built yet), but it was
never the primary gate and its being unwired is no longer a live exposure.
Behavioral tests: revoked body refused, active accepted, unknown/missing status
fails closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
REOPENS the agent path — but only because possession is now actually proven.
EPT verification (api/app/ept.py): ES256 against Eternitas's published key set
at /.well-known/eternitas-keys. algorithms=["ES256"] makes alg:none and
algorithm confusion unrepresentable rather than merely unlikely; issuer and exp
are enforced by the library; an unknown kid is refused.
Order is deliberate: signature FIRST, trust lookup second. These EPTs live ~365
days and carry rev/tru baked in at issuance, so a year-old "rev: false" proves
nothing — revocation and band still come from a live lookup on every request.
Found while building it: real EPTs put the passport in the "sub" claim. The old
code read "passport"/"sub_passport", which no genuine EPT carries — so real
agents were never recognised and ONLY forged tokens ever authenticated. The
bypass was not just a hole, it was the only thing that worked.
Throttle (api/app/throttle.py): BAND_MULTIPLIER and rate_*_per_day were defined
and read by nothing. Now enforced on repo.create and grant.create, counted
against agent_actions (one source of truth, not a private counter that drifts
from the audit log). Fails CLOSED — a limiter that fails open protects you until
the moment something is wrong. Untrusted band is 403 read-only, not 429, because
"slow down" would be a lie.
Tests: 14 behavioral, signing real ES256 tokens with a locally-generated key so
they exercise the crypto path with no network dependency — genuine tokens
accepted, and alg:none / foreign key / tampered payload / expired / wrong issuer
/ unknown kid / missing claims all refused. 74 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
