identity.login created a live hub session every 10 min and never ended it.
It now logs out with the token it got: retried on 5xx / no response
(8 x 15 s), 401/404/410 = already over, any other 4xx fails fast, and a
cleanup it can't finish is reported as identity.logout DOWN "CLEANUP
FAILED" (alerts + red run). The hub's /auth/logout revokes every refresh
token of the account (verified live), so the next run's logout heals a
leftover; no ledger needed. Proven end to end: login 200, logout 200,
10/10 checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the keyed marker from 1c3b5b0 with the ecosystem convention:
any X-Windy-Synthetic value marks the request synthetic; the flag lives in
a per-request contextvar, labels this request's rows, and is FORWARDED on
downstream calls (Eternitas trust lookup, Gitea API). The canary sends
"1". Rows are still recorded; the label separates, never suppresses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The canary deliberately sends forged tokens every 10 min; those refusal
rows read as attacks. It now sends X-Windy-Synthetic carrying a shared
secret (Gitea repo secret CANARY_SYNTHETIC_KEY = WINDYGIT_SYNTHETIC_KEY in
Veron .env); the API marks the row synthetic only on a constant-time
match, so an attacker cannot label their own refusals synthetic to hide.
synthetic is declared on forge.auth.failed (Telemetry Boss, UPDATE 3).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The EPT-shaped forgery is the one that matters after G3.2 — it is what
signature verification actually guards. The JWT-shaped one still exercises the
human gate. Both must_refuse; a 2xx on either pages.
Verified live: forged EPT -> 401 ept_invalid, forged JWT -> 503,
genuine EPT -> 200.
Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds must_refuse checks: a 2xx is the alarm, a 401/403/503 is health. The
forged alg:none agent token is probed every 10 min; if it ever returns 2xx the
canary goes red and pages. Proven both ways — 503 reads ok, a 200 endpoint
alarms 'ACCEPTED — this MUST be refused'. The security property is now enforced
by a running check, not assumed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An unwritable state path raised and took the whole canary down. That is the
worst possible trade for a monitoring tool: it reports nothing at all, and
reports it silently. State is an optimisation for transition detection; the
probing is the point.
Found by fat-fingering an env var, which is exactly how it would happen in
production.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Caught by TESTING the alert path instead of assuming it. Without an explicit
User-Agent, urllib sends 'Python-urllib/3.x' and Resend rejects it 403, while
the identical request via curl succeeds.
The failure mode this avoids is the worst one a canary has: it would have
detected every outage correctly and told nobody. Same bot-filtering trap as the
Gitea migrate call earlier today — worth recognising on sight.
Also prints the HTTP body on failure. '403 Forbidden' alone sends you hunting
for a bad key; the body names the real cause.
Verified: alert sent (200).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Today's outage is the whole design brief: /health returned 200 for the entire
hour that login was dead. A canary watching /health would have stayed green
while nobody in the ecosystem could sign in. So the login probe is here and it
is the one that matters.
Three rules it obeys:
- never green for something it did not prove (I-8)
- alert on TRANSITIONS, not every run — a canary people filter is a dead
canary, which is how the last one sat 37 days dead unnoticed
- run where the watched thing cannot take it down: Veron 1, never Kit 0
Two independent signals, so losing one still leaves the other: an email via
Resend on state change, and a non-zero exit that turns the CI run red in the
forge itself.
Alerts say what broke in human terms — 'a human can actually sign in' — rather
than only naming an endpoint.
Verified against production: 7/7 green including login at 17.1s; a forced 404
reports DOWN; a 1s threshold reports SLOW at 23.3s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>