Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Kit OC5
4c76b1b12a canary: end the hub session the login probe opens (journey cleanup rule)
All checks were successful
check / gate (push) Successful in 32s
canary / probe (push) Successful in 12s
identity.login created a live hub session every 10 min and never ended it.
It now logs out with the token it got: retried on 5xx / no response
(8 x 15 s), 401/404/410 = already over, any other 4xx fails fast, and a
cleanup it can't finish is reported as identity.logout DOWN "CLEANUP
FAILED" (alerts + red run). The hub's /auth/logout revokes every refresh
token of the account (verified live), so the next run's logout heals a
leftover; no ledger needed. Proven end to end: login 200, logout 200,
10/10 checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 13:39:55 -04:00
eb27e63db3 telemetry: adopt the end-to-end synthetic convention (UPDATE 4)
All checks were successful
check / gate (push) Successful in 24s
canary / probe (push) Successful in 9s
Replaces the keyed marker from 1c3b5b0 with the ecosystem convention:
any X-Windy-Synthetic value marks the request synthetic; the flag lives in
a per-request contextvar, labels this request's rows, and is FORWARDED on
downstream calls (Eternitas trust lookup, Gitea API). The canary sends
"1". Rows are still recorded; the label separates, never suppresses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 12:06:51 -04:00
1c3b5b0638 telemetry: synthetic:true on canary refusals (keyed, not a bare flag)
All checks were successful
check / gate (push) Successful in 25s
canary / probe (push) Successful in 7s
The canary deliberately sends forged tokens every 10 min; those refusal
rows read as attacks. It now sends X-Windy-Synthetic carrying a shared
secret (Gitea repo secret CANARY_SYNTHETIC_KEY = WINDYGIT_SYNTHETIC_KEY in
Veron .env); the API marks the row synthetic only on a constant-time
match, so an attacker cannot label their own refusals synthetic to hide.
synthetic is declared on forge.auth.failed (Telemetry Boss, UPDATE 3).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 11:54:56 -04:00
Grant Whitmer
c96d1d3102 canary: guard both forgery shapes now that real verification is live
All checks were successful
check / gate (push) Successful in 20s
The EPT-shaped forgery is the one that matters after G3.2 — it is what
signature verification actually guards. The JWT-shaped one still exercises the
human gate. Both must_refuse; a 2xx on either pages.

Verified live: forged EPT -> 401 ept_invalid, forged JWT -> 503,
genuine EPT -> 200.

Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 23:13:44 -04:00
Grant Whitmer
85fa65a52b canary: continuously verify the forged-token bypass stays closed
All checks were successful
check / gate (push) Successful in 18s
Adds must_refuse checks: a 2xx is the alarm, a 401/403/503 is health. The
forged alg:none agent token is probed every 10 min; if it ever returns 2xx the
canary goes red and pages. Proven both ways — 503 reads ok, a 200 endpoint
alarms 'ACCEPTED — this MUST be refused'. The security property is now enforced
by a running check, not assumed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 22:52:56 -04:00
Grant Whitmer
ef3450d87b G7.6: never let bookkeeping kill the monitor
All checks were successful
check / gate (push) Successful in 18s
canary / probe (push) Successful in 26s
An unwritable state path raised and took the whole canary down. That is the
worst possible trade for a monitoring tool: it reports nothing at all, and
reports it silently. State is an optimisation for transition detection; the
probing is the point.

Found by fat-fingering an env var, which is exactly how it would happen in
production.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 15:42:58 -04:00
Grant Whitmer
fc1937560c G7.6: fix the alert path — urllib UA was rejected 403 by Resend
All checks were successful
check / gate (push) Successful in 18s
canary / probe (push) Successful in 22s
Caught by TESTING the alert path instead of assuming it. Without an explicit
User-Agent, urllib sends 'Python-urllib/3.x' and Resend rejects it 403, while
the identical request via curl succeeds.

The failure mode this avoids is the worst one a canary has: it would have
detected every outage correctly and told nobody. Same bot-filtering trap as the
Gitea migrate call earlier today — worth recognising on sight.

Also prints the HTTP body on failure. '403 Forbidden' alone sends you hunting
for a bad key; the body names the real cause.

Verified: alert sent (200).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 13:44:00 -04:00
Grant Whitmer
9a7030351b G7.6: fleet canary — probes what a user does, not what is cheap
All checks were successful
check / gate (push) Successful in 19s
Today's outage is the whole design brief: /health returned 200 for the entire
hour that login was dead. A canary watching /health would have stayed green
while nobody in the ecosystem could sign in. So the login probe is here and it
is the one that matters.

Three rules it obeys:
  - never green for something it did not prove (I-8)
  - alert on TRANSITIONS, not every run — a canary people filter is a dead
    canary, which is how the last one sat 37 days dead unnoticed
  - run where the watched thing cannot take it down: Veron 1, never Kit 0

Two independent signals, so losing one still leaves the other: an email via
Resend on state change, and a non-zero exit that turns the CI run red in the
forge itself.

Alerts say what broke in human terms — 'a human can actually sign in' — rather
than only naming an endpoint.

Verified against production: 7/7 green including login at 17.1s; a forced 404
reports DOWN; a 1s threshold reports SLOW at 23.3s.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 13:41:37 -04:00