Gitea rejects a null password with a bare 400. These accounts are never
password-authenticated — humans arrive via OIDC, agents via passport-bound
scoped tokens, local password sign-in is disabled server-wide — so we generate
a credential that is never stored, returned or recoverable. An unusable
password is safer than a blank one or a shared default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Alembic runs synchronously, so the container needs a sync driver. Without it
migrations fail on a fresh deploy while passing on any developer machine that
happens to have psycopg2 — exactly the class of gap that only appears in
production.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plane Windy Cloud does not have. Verified 2026-08-11: routes/storage.py and
its models contain ZERO occurrences of share/permission/acl/collaborat/seat/
version/snapshot/history/revision. This fills a hole rather than bolting onto
something that already had one.
- repos: create/list/get, repo_type required (I-7), reserved slugs, Gitea
reached ONLY through the membrane client (I-1)
- grants: human identity OR agent passport, exactly one enforced by a database
CHECK constraint; agent grants expire in 90 days by default
- versions: history in words a person recognises — no 'commit', no 'branch',
no 'repository' in any user-facing string (D-9/I-9), with a test that greps
the speak strings and fails on developer vocabulary
- private repos 404 rather than 403, so a stranger cannot learn one exists
Auth: three first-class caller classes (human OIDC / agent EPT / internal
service token), NO fourth, and no bypass env var — copied deliberately from the
desktop control server, the ecosystem's best Principle-#5 artifact.
G3.6 status-code law implemented: 400 and 404 REFUSE, 429/5xx retry then REFUSE.
A sibling maps 400/429 to 'unreachable' and soft-ALLOWS, which is inducible —
an attacker who wants the check skipped only has to make it rate-limit itself.
A test asserts resolve_passport has exactly one return path.
And I-8 applied to ourselves: G3.2's JWKS verifier does not exist yet, so the
human token path REFUSES in production rather than accepting an unverified JWT.
An unverified JWT is an authentication bypass, not a shortcut.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
VERIFIED END TO END from outside the network:
- create repo via API -> clone -> commit -> push -> read back over HTTPS
- 3 MB LFS object pushed through the tunnel, landed in R2 at lfs/34/2d/...
- NO local lfs/ directory on the host: I-3 confirmed by measurement
- /health/full: db, gitea and r2 all green
Adds strand G4A recording four traps that each cost a crash loop, with tests:
1. [lfs] STORAGE_TYPE creates a separate storage section that does not
inherit [storage] — crash loop, error names the symptom not the cause
2. storage backend != LFS enabled; LFS_START_SERVER is separate, and its
absence reads as a permissions error
3. Gitea env-to-ini SETS but never UNSETS — removing a compose var leaves the
line in the persisted app.ini, so repo config and prod config silently
disagree. Exactly the drift this cell exists to end.
4. R2 rejects the default S3 checksum algorithm
And G4A.5, which is architecture rather than a bug: an 8 MB non-LFS push died
with HTTP 524 at Cloudflare's ~100s limit. This makes the LFS threshold
load-bearing and REQUIRES G10 to serve model weights via presigned R2 URLs
rather than proxying blobs through the tunnel — client straight to R2, which is
what Hugging Face does and which takes Grant's home upstream out of the path.
G2.4: Gitea's MIT text and a NOTICE now travel with the repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Naming a storage type inside [lfs] creates a separate storage section that does
NOT inherit endpoint or credentials from [storage], so Gitea crash-looped on
'Endpoint: does not follow ip address or domain name standards' — an error that
names the symptom and not the cause. LFS inherits the [storage] defaults on its
own; avatars had already proved that by initialising correctly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three buckets created. S3 round-trip against R2 proven end to end
(PUT/GET/DELETE) before any of it was wired in.
Includes the R2 checksum trap: R2 rejects the algorithm S3 clients send by
default, and the resulting error reads like a credential problem and is not one.
Records a NAMED DEBT in SUBSTRATE.md: the R2 credential is currently the
account-wide god token, because no available token can mint a scoped one. Gated
— it must be replaced before G7 puts CI runners on this host, since I-5 exists
precisely to keep untrusted job code away from broadly-scoped credentials.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Gitea was configured to connect as a 'gitea' DB user that never existed, so it
sat unconfigured behind a working tunnel. It now gets its OWN role and database
via a first-init script — I-1 says we never write Gitea's tables, and that is
better as a permission than as a promise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
cloudflared binds 127.0.0.1:2000 on the HOST. This process runs in a container
whose only route to the host is the bridge gateway (172.17.0.1), where nothing
is listening — so the check was permanently red regardless of what the tunnel
was actually doing.
Binding the metrics endpoint wider would have fixed the probe and made a
metrics bind failure capable of taking down ingress. That is a worse trade than
losing one row on a dashboard.
The check is not silently dropped: /health/full now carries a 'not_checked_here'
map naming the tunnel and where its health actually lives (systemd
windygit-tunnel). An observer should never have to wonder whether a missing
check means healthy or means forgotten.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
app.windygit.com / api.windygit.com / models.windygit.com are serving over
HTTPS with ZERO inbound ports open on Grant's network.
- tunnel 4e856c5d, 4 registered edge connections, systemd-managed and bounded
- three proxied single-level CNAMEs (Free Universal SSL covers them; a
two-level name would need ACM and would die in the TLS handshake)
- services bound to 127.0.0.1 with configurable host ports — Veron 1 is
Grant's workstation and 3000/3300 belong to other projects
- docs/RUNBOOK-VERON.md
I-12 PROVEN IN PRODUCTION: /version reports source=baked with a sha equal to
the deployed HEAD.
Also fixed: the tunnel health probe targeted localhost from inside a container,
so it was permanently red. A check that is always red is as useless as one that
is always green — it is how a fleet canary goes 37 days dead unnoticed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Veron 1 is Grant's workstation and already runs other projects on 3000 (node
dev server) and 3300 (nginx). A deploy must never fight a resident process for
a port, and nothing here needs to be reachable from the LAN — the Cloudflare
Tunnel runs on the host and reaches us over 127.0.0.1 (G1.6).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Strand G0 complete and VERIFIED against real Postgres, not asserted.
- FastAPI plane, fail-closed provider seams, repair-pointer error taxonomy
- migration 001: all 10 tables incl. repo_type NOT NULL and model_cards (I-7)
- 17 invariant tests, ruff clean, vocabulary audit clean
Two bugs found by RUNNING it that review would not have caught:
1. SQLAlchemy Enum persists .name, not .value — so RepoState.deleted_soft
and CreatedVia.imported would have written labels migration 001 never
declared, failing at runtime rather than at review. Pinned via
values_callable.
2. op.create_table asks each Enum to emit its own CREATE TYPE with no
checkfirst, so the second reference raised DuplicateObject and the
migration died halfway. Types are now created once, referenced with
create_type=False.
Proven live, with the hostile env var set:
- I-12: COMMIT_SHA=deadbeef... in the environment, /version reports real HEAD.
That env pin is the documented root cause of nine sibling services
misreporting their commit; here it is structurally ignored.
- I-8: three unconfigured providers -> status degraded, HTTP 503, each saying
'refusing to report healthy'. No mock, no false green.
- G0.4: upgrade -> downgrade -> upgrade round-trip clean (10 -> 0 -> 10).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stake in the ground for Windy Git — the version, permission and provenance
plane over Windy Cloud, and an agent-native code and model host.
Captures the 2026-08-11 vision session as nine locked decisions (D-1..D-9),
thirteen invariants (I-1..I-13), and thirteen strands (G0..G12) with atomic
codons and per-codon acceptance criteria.
Grounded in measurement, not estimate:
- 61 repos = 11 GB working trees, 0.63 GB git objects
- Veron 1: 24 cores / 251 GB / 978 GB free / load 1.52 / $0
- Kit 0: 4 vCPU / load 7.62 — disqualified on four independent grounds
- Windy Cloud storage confirmed to have ZERO sharing/permission/versioning
Every warning in the plan is a lesson a sibling cell already paid for in
production, cited to its source in the 2026-08-09 audits.
Apex windygit.com purchased 2026-08-11, zone 9d8637dc, active.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
