The human path refused every token in production (503 human_signin_not_ready) because no verifier existed. api/app/hub_jwt.py verifies hub access tokens against account.windyword.ai's JWKS: - RS256 only (closes alg:none and HS256-with-public-key confusion) - iss must be "windy-identity" — what hub ACCESS tokens carry (observed live); id_tokens (discovery-URL issuer) are not accepted as bearers - aud optional today, must name Windy Git when present; hub_require_aud flips it mandatory once the hub emits it. PyJWT's own aud check is off on purpose: it rejects ANY aud-bearing token when no audience is given. - type must be human; identity = windy_identity_id, never sub (per-row id) - production verifies even if require_verified_jwt is off 11 behavioral tests sign real RS256 tokens with a local key. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
130 lines
4.8 KiB
Python
130 lines
4.8 KiB
Python
"""Human token verification (G3.2) — hub access tokens from account.windyword.ai.
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Until this existed the human path refused every token in production (503
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`human_signin_not_ready`), because reading an unverified JWT's claims is an
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authentication bypass, not a shortcut. This module is what lets it say yes.
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The token it accepts is the hub's ACCESS token, as observed live 2026-09-23:
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header {alg: RS256, typ: JWT, kid: <published at /.well-known/jwks.json>}
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claims iss = "windy-identity" ← NOT the discovery doc's issuer URL
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type = "human", exp - iat = 900 s
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sub = per-row user id ← NOT the cross-product identity
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windy_identity_id = the Windy Account UUID (what Gitea's OIDC links on)
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no `aud` yet
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What it refuses, by construction:
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* **Anything but RS256.** One algorithm, never a list. Closes `alg: none` and
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HS256-with-the-public-key confusion.
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* **An unknown `kid`**, a wrong issuer, an expired token — library-checked.
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* **An id_token used as a bearer.** id_tokens carry iss = the discovery URL and
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aud = some relying party; they prove a login happened to *someone else's*
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client, not that this caller may act here.
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* **A non-human `type`.** An agent's authority comes from its EPT and a live
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Eternitas lookup, never from a hub token dressed as a person.
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* **A token with no `windy_identity_id`.** `sub` is a different namespace (the
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per-row user id); falling back to it would silently mint identities that
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match nothing Gitea knows.
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`aud` (SSO matrix, lane 8c): the hub will start emitting it once every
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consumer is ready. Today it is optional; when present it MUST name Windy Git.
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`hub_require_aud=True` makes it mandatory — flip it once the hub emits it.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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import jwt
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from jwt import PyJWKClient
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ALGORITHMS = ["RS256"] # exactly one. Never widen this list.
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_jwks_client: PyJWKClient | None = None
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_jwks_url: str | None = None
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class HubTokenInvalid(Exception):
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"""Not a valid, currently-signed hub access token for a human."""
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class VerifiedHuman:
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identity_id: str
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email: str | None
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expires_at: int | None
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def _client(base_url: str) -> PyJWKClient:
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"""Cached JWKS client; refetches on an unknown kid so rotation self-heals."""
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global _jwks_client, _jwks_url
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url = f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}/.well-known/jwks.json"
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if _jwks_client is None or _jwks_url != url:
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_jwks_client = PyJWKClient(url, cache_keys=True, lifespan=300)
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_jwks_url = url
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return _jwks_client
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def verify_hub_token(
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token: str,
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base_url: str,
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*,
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issuers: tuple[str, ...],
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audiences: tuple[str, ...],
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require_aud: bool,
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signing_key=None,
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) -> VerifiedHuman:
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"""Verify a hub access token. Raises HubTokenInvalid on ANY doubt.
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`signing_key` exists for tests only (a locally generated key, no network).
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"""
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try:
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key = (
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signing_key
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if signing_key is not None
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else _client(base_url).get_signing_key_from_jwt(token).key
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)
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - unknown kid, unreachable JWKS, malformed
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raise HubTokenInvalid(f"no usable signing key: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}") from exc
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try:
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claims = jwt.decode(
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token,
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key,
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algorithms=ALGORITHMS,
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issuer=list(issuers),
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options={
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"require": ["iss", "exp", "iat"],
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"verify_signature": True,
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"verify_exp": True,
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"verify_iss": True,
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# Checked by hand below: PyJWT rejects any token CARRYING aud
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# when no audience is passed, which would break the moment the
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# hub starts emitting it — the exact trap the SSO matrix names.
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"verify_aud": False,
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},
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)
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except jwt.PyJWTError as exc:
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raise HubTokenInvalid(f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}") from exc
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aud = claims.get("aud")
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if aud is None:
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if require_aud:
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raise HubTokenInvalid("token carries no aud and hub_require_aud is on")
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else:
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presented = {aud} if isinstance(aud, str) else set(aud) if isinstance(aud, list) else set()
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if not presented & set(audiences):
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raise HubTokenInvalid(f"aud {sorted(presented)} does not name Windy Git")
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if claims.get("type", "human") != "human":
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raise HubTokenInvalid(f"token type {claims.get('type')!r} is not a human access token")
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identity = claims.get("windy_identity_id") or claims.get("windyIdentityId")
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if not isinstance(identity, str) or not identity.strip():
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raise HubTokenInvalid("token carries no windy_identity_id")
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return VerifiedHuman(
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identity_id=identity, email=claims.get("email"), expires_at=claims.get("exp")
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)
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