Grant Whitmer
4a34b35441
Measured: an unprivileged job container inside the CI dind could open SSH, Ollama and dev servers on Veron (192.168.1.73) and the rest of the LAN, WireGuard and Tailscale — lateral movement for any malicious dependency, no escape needed. egress.sh (idempotent; windygit-ci-egress.service at boot) hooks the jobs bridge: runner<->dind, replies, DNS and public egress allowed; RFC1918, CGNAT, link-local and the host itself dropped. Verified from a job container: 6/6 private targets blocked, DNS, internet and the public forge OK. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
14 lines
432 B
Desktop File
14 lines
432 B
Desktop File
[Unit]
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Description=Windy Git - CI egress filter (jobs reach the internet, never the LAN/host)
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After=docker.service
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Requires=docker.service
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[Service]
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Type=oneshot
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RemainAfterExit=yes
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# The jobs network exists once the runner compose project is up; retry until it does.
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ExecStart=/bin/bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 60); do /srv/windygit/src/deploy/runner/egress.sh && exit 0; sleep 5; done; exit 1'
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[Install]
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WantedBy=multi-user.target
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