REOPENS the agent path — but only because possession is now actually proven. EPT verification (api/app/ept.py): ES256 against Eternitas's published key set at /.well-known/eternitas-keys. algorithms=["ES256"] makes alg:none and algorithm confusion unrepresentable rather than merely unlikely; issuer and exp are enforced by the library; an unknown kid is refused. Order is deliberate: signature FIRST, trust lookup second. These EPTs live ~365 days and carry rev/tru baked in at issuance, so a year-old "rev: false" proves nothing — revocation and band still come from a live lookup on every request. Found while building it: real EPTs put the passport in the "sub" claim. The old code read "passport"/"sub_passport", which no genuine EPT carries — so real agents were never recognised and ONLY forged tokens ever authenticated. The bypass was not just a hole, it was the only thing that worked. Throttle (api/app/throttle.py): BAND_MULTIPLIER and rate_*_per_day were defined and read by nothing. Now enforced on repo.create and grant.create, counted against agent_actions (one source of truth, not a private counter that drifts from the audit log). Fails CLOSED — a limiter that fails open protects you until the moment something is wrong. Untrusted band is 403 read-only, not 429, because "slow down" would be a lie. Tests: 14 behavioral, signing real ES256 tokens with a locally-generated key so they exercise the crypto path with no network dependency — genuine tokens accepted, and alg:none / foreign key / tampered payload / expired / wrong issuer / unknown kid / missing claims all refused. 74 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
171 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
171 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
"""Behavioral tests for EPT verification and EI throttling.
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These sign real ES256 tokens with a locally-generated key and verify against a
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locally-served key set, so they exercise the ACTUAL crypto path with no network
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dependency and no reliance on Eternitas being reachable.
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This file exists because the suite it joins was ~86 "does the source contain
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this string" assertions and zero that ran the auth decision — which is how a
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live impersonation bypass passed every test on 2026-08-13.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import time
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import jwt
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import pytest
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
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from api.app import ept as ept_mod
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from api.app.auth import BAND_MULTIPLIER
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from api.app.config import Settings
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from api.app.ept import EptInvalid, verify_ept
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from api.app.throttle import ACTION_BASE, limit_for
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ISSUER = "eternitas.ai"
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KID = "test-key-1"
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@pytest.fixture
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def signing(monkeypatch):
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"""A real EC keypair; point the verifier's JWKS lookup at its public half."""
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key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
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class _FakeJWK:
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def __init__(self, k):
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self.key = k
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class _FakeClient:
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def __init__(self, *a, **kw):
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pass
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def get_signing_key_from_jwt(self, token):
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header = jwt.get_unverified_header(token)
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if header.get("kid") != KID:
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raise Exception(f"unknown kid {header.get('kid')!r}")
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return _FakeJWK(key.public_key())
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monkeypatch.setattr(ept_mod, "_jwks_client", None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(ept_mod, "PyJWKClient", _FakeClient)
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return key
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def _sign(key, claims, alg="ES256", kid=KID):
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return jwt.encode(claims, key, algorithm=alg, headers={"kid": kid, "typ": "EPT"})
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def _claims(**over):
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c = {
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"sub": "ET26-TEST-0001",
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"iss": ISSUER,
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"iat": int(time.time()) - 10,
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"exp": int(time.time()) + 3600,
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}
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c.update(over)
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return c
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# ---- the property that was broken ----------------------------------------
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def test_genuine_ept_is_accepted(signing):
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v = verify_ept(_sign(signing, _claims()), "https://api.eternitas.ai")
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assert v.passport == "ET26-TEST-0001"
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def test_passport_comes_from_sub_not_a_passport_claim(signing):
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"""Real EPTs put the passport in `sub`. The pre-fix code read `passport` /
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`sub_passport`, which no genuine EPT carries — so real agents were never
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recognised and only forged tokens ever worked."""
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tok = _sign(signing, _claims(sub="ET26-REAL-9999", passport="ET26-LIES-0000"))
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assert verify_ept(tok, "https://api.eternitas.ai").passport == "ET26-REAL-9999"
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def test_alg_none_is_refused(signing):
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"""The exact 2026-08-13 exploit."""
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import base64
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import json as _j
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def seg(d):
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return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(_j.dumps(d).encode()).rstrip(b"=").decode()
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forged = f"{seg({'alg':'none','typ':'EPT','kid':KID})}.{seg(_claims())}."
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with pytest.raises(EptInvalid):
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verify_ept(forged, "https://api.eternitas.ai")
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def test_signature_from_a_different_key_is_refused(signing):
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attacker = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
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with pytest.raises(EptInvalid):
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verify_ept(_sign(attacker, _claims()), "https://api.eternitas.ai")
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def test_tampered_payload_is_refused(signing):
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tok = _sign(signing, _claims())
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h, _p, s = tok.split(".")
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import base64
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import json as _j
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evil = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
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_j.dumps(_claims(sub="ET26-EVIL-0000")).encode()
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).rstrip(b"=").decode()
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with pytest.raises(EptInvalid):
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verify_ept(f"{h}.{evil}.{s}", "https://api.eternitas.ai")
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def test_expired_token_is_refused(signing):
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"""Genuinely signed, genuinely expired — proves exp is enforced rather than
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the token merely failing to parse."""
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tok = _sign(signing, _claims(exp=int(time.time()) - 5, iat=int(time.time()) - 100))
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with pytest.raises(EptInvalid):
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verify_ept(tok, "https://api.eternitas.ai")
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def test_wrong_issuer_is_refused(signing):
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"""Correctly signed by a trusted key but claiming another issuer."""
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with pytest.raises(EptInvalid):
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verify_ept(_sign(signing, _claims(iss="evil.example.com")), "https://api.eternitas.ai")
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def test_unknown_kid_is_refused(signing):
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with pytest.raises(EptInvalid):
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verify_ept(_sign(signing, _claims(), kid="attacker-key"), "https://api.eternitas.ai")
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def test_missing_required_claims_are_refused(signing):
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for missing in ("sub", "exp"):
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c = _claims()
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c.pop(missing)
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with pytest.raises(EptInvalid):
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verify_ept(_sign(signing, c), "https://api.eternitas.ai")
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def test_only_es256_is_ever_accepted():
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"""Widening this list reopens algorithm confusion."""
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assert ept_mod.ALGORITHMS == ["ES256"]
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# ---- the throttle that used to be dead code ------------------------------
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def test_band_multiplier_is_actually_consumed():
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"""BAND_MULTIPLIER was defined and read by nothing before this."""
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s = Settings()
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assert limit_for(s, "repo.create", "platinum") == s.rate_repo_creates_per_day * 10
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assert limit_for(s, "repo.create", "gold") == s.rate_repo_creates_per_day * 4
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assert limit_for(s, "repo.create", "standard") == s.rate_repo_creates_per_day
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assert limit_for(s, "repo.create", "watch") == s.rate_repo_creates_per_day // 2
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def test_unknown_band_gets_standard_not_unlimited_and_not_zero():
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s = Settings()
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assert limit_for(s, "repo.create", "a-band-invented-tomorrow") == s.rate_repo_creates_per_day
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assert limit_for(s, "repo.create", None) == s.rate_repo_creates_per_day
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def test_untrusted_band_is_read_only():
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assert BAND_MULTIPLIER["untrusted"] == 0
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def test_every_throttled_action_has_a_configured_base():
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s = Settings()
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for action, field in ACTION_BASE.items():
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assert getattr(s, field) > 0, f"{action} has no positive base rate"
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