All checks were successful
check / gate (push) Successful in 21s
REOPENS the agent path — but only because possession is now actually proven. EPT verification (api/app/ept.py): ES256 against Eternitas's published key set at /.well-known/eternitas-keys. algorithms=['ES256'] makes alg:none and algorithm confusion unrepresentable rather than merely unlikely; issuer and exp are enforced by the library; an unknown kid is refused. Order is deliberate: signature FIRST, trust lookup second. These EPTs live ~365 days and carry rev/tru baked in at issuance, so a year-old 'rev: false' proves nothing — revocation and band still come from a live lookup on every request. Found while building it: real EPTs put the passport in . The old code read /, which no genuine EPT carries — so real agents were never recognised and ONLY forged tokens ever authenticated. The bypass was not just a hole, it was the only thing that worked. Throttle (api/app/throttle.py): BAND_MULTIPLIER and rate_*_per_day were defined and read by nothing. Now enforced on repo.create and grant.create, counted against agent_actions (one source of truth, not a private counter that drifts from the audit log). Fails CLOSED — a limiter that fails open protects you until the moment something is wrong. Untrusted band is 403 read-only, not 429, because 'slow down' would be a lie. Tests: 14 behavioral, signing real ES256 tokens with a locally-generated key so they exercise the crypto path with no network dependency — genuine tokens accepted, and alg:none / foreign key / tampered payload / expired / wrong issuer / unknown kid / missing claims all refused. 74 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude (Fable 5) <noreply@anthropic.com>
170 lines
6.1 KiB
Python
170 lines
6.1 KiB
Python
"""EI-band velocity limits (G3.4) — throttle by trust, never by omission.
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`BAND_MULTIPLIER` and the `rate_*_per_day` settings existed since G0 and were
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**read by nothing**: a documented invariant with no implementation, which is the
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exact failure pattern the ecosystem audits kept finding. This module is the
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missing consumer.
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The doctrine (§0.6) is *capability-completeness*: an agent is never denied a
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capability it should have, it is **rate-limited by how much it has proven**.
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Platinum gets 10x, gold 4x, standard 1x, watch 0.5x, and untrusted is read-only.
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Counting is done against `agent_actions`, which is already the append-only record
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of every agent write. That is deliberate: a limiter with its own private counter
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disagrees with the audit log the moment either is restarted, and then nobody can
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say what actually happened. One source of truth, queried.
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**Fail-closed.** If the count cannot be taken, the action is refused. A limiter
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that fails open is decoration — it protects you right up until the moment
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something is wrong, which is the only moment it matters.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
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from sqlalchemy import func, select
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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from api.app.auth import BAND_MULTIPLIER, ActorType, Caller
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from api.app.config import Settings
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from api.app.errors import RepairPointer
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from api.app.models.core import AgentAction
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log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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WINDOW = timedelta(days=1)
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# action name -> the settings field holding its per-day base for a standard band
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ACTION_BASE: dict[str, str] = {
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"repo.create": "rate_repo_creates_per_day",
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"grant.create": "rate_grants_per_day",
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"push": "rate_pushes_per_day",
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"push.force": "rate_force_pushes_per_day",
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}
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def limit_for(settings: Settings, action: str, band: str | None) -> int:
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"""Effective per-day allowance. Unknown bands get the standard rate.
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Unknown-band handling is a real decision, not a default. Eternitas began
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emitting `unproven` on 2026-07-30 without it appearing in the documented
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enum. Treating an unrecognised band as untrusted would lock out every freshly
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hatched agent the day Eternitas adds a name; treating it as platinum would be
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a hole. Standard-with-no-bonus is the honest middle.
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"""
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base = getattr(settings, ACTION_BASE[action])
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mult = BAND_MULTIPLIER.get((band or "").lower(), 1.0)
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return int(base * mult)
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async def enforce(
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session: AsyncSession,
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settings: Settings,
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caller: Caller,
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action: str,
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) -> None:
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"""Raise 429 if this agent has spent its allowance. No-op for humans.
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Humans are governed by account tier and their own session; this is the
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agent-velocity control specifically (I-6: parity in capability, asymmetry in
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throttle).
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"""
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if caller.actor_type != ActorType.agent or not caller.passport:
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return
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if action not in ACTION_BASE: # unknown action = unlimited would be a hole
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raise RepairPointer(
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status_code=500,
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code="throttle_unknown_action",
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speak="Something went wrong on our side. Nothing was changed.",
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machine_cause=f"no rate base configured for action {action!r}",
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remediation_tool=None,
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)
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band = (caller.band or "").lower()
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# Untrusted is read-only. This is a capability decision, not a rate: it gets
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# a 403 with a different explanation, because "slow down" would be a lie.
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if BAND_MULTIPLIER.get(band, 1.0) <= 0:
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raise RepairPointer(
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status_code=403,
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code="agent_read_only",
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speak="That helper can look, but it isn't allowed to make changes yet.",
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machine_cause=f"passport {caller.passport} band={band!r} is read-only",
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remediation_tool=None,
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)
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allowed = limit_for(settings, action, band)
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since = datetime.now(UTC) - WINDOW
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try:
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used = (
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await session.execute(
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select(func.count())
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.select_from(AgentAction)
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.where(
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AgentAction.passport == caller.passport,
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AgentAction.action == action,
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AgentAction.result == "ok",
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AgentAction.ts >= since,
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)
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)
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).scalar_one()
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except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
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# FAIL CLOSED. A limiter that fails open protects you until the moment
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# something is wrong, which is the only moment it matters.
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log.warning("throttle count failed for %s/%s: %s", caller.passport, action, exc)
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raise RepairPointer(
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status_code=503,
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code="throttle_unavailable",
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speak="We couldn't check that helper's limits, so we didn't make the change.",
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machine_cause=f"agent_actions count failed: {type(exc).__name__}",
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remediation_tool=None,
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) from exc
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if used >= allowed:
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raise RepairPointer(
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status_code=429,
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code="agent_rate_limited",
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speak=(
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"That helper has done a lot in the last day, so we've paused it. "
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"It'll be able to continue shortly."
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),
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machine_cause=(
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f"passport {caller.passport} used {used}/{allowed} of {action} "
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f"in 24h (band={band or 'unknown'})"
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),
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remediation_tool=None,
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used=used,
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allowed=allowed,
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band=band or "unknown",
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)
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async def record(
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session: AsyncSession,
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caller: Caller,
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action: str,
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result: str = "ok",
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repo_id=None,
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) -> None:
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"""Append the action that was just allowed.
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Written AFTER the work succeeds, on purpose: counting attempts would let a
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failing agent exhaust its own allowance by retrying, turning a transient
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error into a lockout.
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"""
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if caller.actor_type != ActorType.agent or not caller.passport:
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return
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session.add(
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AgentAction(
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passport=caller.passport,
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repo_id=repo_id,
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action=action,
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ei_at_action=caller.band,
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result=result,
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)
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)
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await session.flush()
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