compute-guard: WARN (never red) on NEW references to Veron Ollama :11434

Grant via Boss 10-01: compute = Windy Mind (endpoint + key); do not call Veron Ollama directly.
Judged on lines a PR adds only (not the baseline tree), never blocks even in MODE=block,
windy-mind (the compute door) allowed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

api/tests/test_compute_guard.py

@@ -229,3 +229,24 @@ def test_block_mode_never_blocks_grant_owned(monkeypatch):
     assert state == "success" and desc.startswith("⚠ WARN (Grant-owned, not blocking): 1") and f is g
     lane = cg.Finding("a.py", 3, "provider host", "x")
     assert cg.status_for([lane], whole_tree=True, grant=[g])[0] == "failure"
+
+
+def test_veron_ollama_warns_on_added_lines_and_never_blocks(monkeypatch):
+    hits = cg.scan_line("app/llm.py", 'OLLAMA = "http://192.168.1.73:11434/api/generate"')
+    assert [k for k, _ in hits] == ["veron ollama"]
+    assert cg.scan_line("app/llm.py", 'port = 114345') == []                # not the port
+    assert cg.scan_line("app/llm.py", "# was http://x:11434 (removed)") == []  # a comment is not a call
+    f = cg.Finding("app/llm.py", 7, "veron ollama", ":11434")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cg, "MODE", "block")
+    state, desc, _ = cg.status_for([f], whole_tree=False)
+    assert state == "success" and desc.startswith("⚠ WARN: new Veron Ollama ref app/llm.py:7")
+    assert "Windy Mind" in desc and len(desc) <= 140
+    hard = cg.Finding("app/llm.py", 1, "provider host", "api.openai.com")
+    assert cg.status_for([f, hard], whole_tree=False)[0] == "failure"       # a real violation still blocks
+
+
+def test_ollama_in_added_pr_lines_only():
+    diff = ("+++ b/svc/client.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@\n+import httpx\n"
+            "+URL = 'http://veron:11434/api/chat'\n")
+    got = cg.parse_added("some-repo", diff, [])
+    assert [(f.kind, f.line) for f in got] == [("veron ollama", 2)]

api/tests/test_lockbox_put.py

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+"""lockbox-put against a LOCAL fake lockbox repo only (never the real one)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+FAKE = "Zk3vQ8mT1pLw7Xn2Rb5Hd9Yc"  # synthetic
+
+
+def sh(*a, cwd=None):
+    return subprocess.run(a, cwd=cwd, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
+
+
+def make_remote(tmp_path):
+    work = tmp_path / "seed"
+    work.mkdir()
+    sh("git", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", cwd=work)
+    (work / "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md").write_text("# LOCKBOX\n\n- **`EXISTING_KEY`**: `abcdefgh12345678`\nOLD_ENV_KEY=whatever123456\n")
+    sh("git", "add", "-A", cwd=work)
+    sh("git", "-c", "user.name=t", "-c", "user.email=t@t", "commit", "-qm", "seed", cwd=work)
+    bare = tmp_path / "remote.git"
+    sh("git", "clone", "-q", "--bare", str(work), str(bare))
+    return bare
+
+
+def put(tmp_path, bare, key, content, mode=0o600):
+    f = tmp_path / "val"
+    f.write_text(content)
+    os.chmod(f, mode)
+    e = {**os.environ, "LOCKBOX_PUT_REPO": str(bare), "LOCKBOX_PUT_NO_PR": "1", "HOME": str(tmp_path / "h")}
+    (tmp_path / "h" / ".cache").mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(ROOT / "scripts" / "lockbox_put.py"), key, str(f), "--lane", "test", "--note", "n"],
+                       capture_output=True, text=True, env=e)
+    return r.returncode, r.stdout + r.stderr
+
+
+def test_appends_one_key_by_branch_and_never_echoes_value(tmp_path):
+    bare = make_remote(tmp_path)
+    rc, out = put(tmp_path, bare, "NEW_TEST_KEY", FAKE)
+    assert rc == 0 and "pushed branch lockbox-put/new_test_key-" in out
+    assert FAKE not in out and FAKE[:6] not in out
+    br = [b.strip() for b in sh("git", "branch", "--list", "lockbox-put/*", cwd=bare).stdout.splitlines()]
+    assert len(br) == 1
+    diff = sh("git", "diff", "--numstat", f"main..{br[0]}", cwd=bare).stdout.split()
+    assert diff[1] == "0" and diff[2] == "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md"  # additions only
+    content = sh("git", "show", f"{br[0]}:ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md", cwd=bare).stdout
+    assert f"- **`NEW_TEST_KEY`**: `{FAKE}`" in content and "EXISTING_KEY" in content
+    # main is untouched
+    assert FAKE not in sh("git", "show", "main:ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md", cwd=bare).stdout
+
+
+def test_refuses_existing_key_both_formats_and_bad_input(tmp_path):
+    bare = make_remote(tmp_path)
+    for k in ("EXISTING_KEY", "OLD_ENV_KEY"):
+        rc, out = put(tmp_path, bare, k, FAKE)
+        assert rc == 3 and "already exists" in out and FAKE not in out
+    assert put(tmp_path, bare, "lower_case", FAKE)[0] == 2
+    assert put(tmp_path, bare, "OK_KEY_1", FAKE, mode=0o644)[0] == 2        # not 0600
+    assert put(tmp_path, bare, "OK_KEY_2", "has space `tick`")[0] == 2        # unsafe value
+    assert not sh("git", "branch", "--list", "lockbox-put/*", cwd=bare).stdout.strip()  # nothing pushed
+
+
+def test_symlink_refused(tmp_path):
+    bare = make_remote(tmp_path)
+    real = tmp_path / "real"
+    real.write_text(FAKE)
+    os.chmod(real, 0o600)
+    link = tmp_path / "link"
+    link.symlink_to(real)
+    e = {**os.environ, "LOCKBOX_PUT_REPO": str(bare), "LOCKBOX_PUT_NO_PR": "1"}
+    r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(ROOT / "scripts" / "lockbox_put.py"), "SYM_KEY", str(link)],
+                       capture_output=True, text=True, env=e)
+    assert r.returncode == 2 and FAKE not in r.stdout + r.stderr

api/tests/test_secret_guard.py

@@ -146,3 +146,11 @@ def test_warn_kinds_do_not_block(monkeypatch):
     assert sg.status_for([f], True)[0] == "success"
     monkeypatch.setattr(sg, "WARN_KINDS", set())
     assert sg.status_for([f], True)[0] == "failure"
+
+
+def test_pypi_token_shape_hash_only():
+    tok = "pypi-AgE" + "Ab1_-" * 20  # synthetic
+    got = ss.find(f"password = {tok}")
+    assert [k for k, _ in got] == ["pypi token"] and got[0][1] == ss.h8(tok)
+    assert tok not in repr(got)
+    assert ss.find("pypi-AgE-too-short") == []

api/tests/test_secret_scan.py

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+"""secret-scan + env-names: findings carry label/location/hash, NEVER a value or fragment."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+SCRIPTS = ROOT / "scripts"
+# Synthetic, random-looking, never real. FAKE_LB is in the fake lockbox; TWI matches a shape.
+FAKE_LB = "k7Xv2QpLm9RtZw4HnB8dYc3S"
+TWI = "9f3a7c1e5b2d48806a1f4e7d2c9b0835"
+
+
+def run(script, *args, env=None):
+    e = {**os.environ, **(env or {})}
+    r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(SCRIPTS / script), *args], capture_output=True, text=True, env=e)
+    return r.returncode, r.stdout + r.stderr
+
+
+def no_fragment(out: str, value: str, n: int = 6):
+    assert value not in out
+    for i in range(len(value) - n + 1):
+        assert value[i:i + n] not in out, f"fragment of the value leaked at {i}"
+
+
+def seeded(tmp_path):
+    lb = tmp_path / "lockbox.md"
+    lb.write_text(f"FAKE_VENDOR_API_KEY={FAKE_LB}\nNOTE: nothing here\n")
+    repo = tmp_path / "repo"
+    repo.mkdir()
+    g = lambda *a: subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *a], check=True, capture_output=True)  # noqa: E731
+    g("init", "-q", "-b", "main")
+    g("config", "user.email", "t@t")
+    g("config", "user.name", "t")
+    (repo / "app.py").write_text(f'KEY = "{FAKE_LB}"\nTWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN = "{TWI}"\n')
+    g("add", "-A")
+    g("commit", "-qm", "add secrets")
+    (repo / "app.py").write_text("KEY = None\n")  # removed from HEAD, still in history
+    g("commit", "-qam", "remove")
+    return lb, repo
+
+
+def test_tree_scan_labels_locations_no_value(tmp_path):
+    lb, repo = seeded(tmp_path)
+    (repo / "live.py").write_text(f'x = "{FAKE_LB}"\n')
+    rc, out = run("secret_scan.py", str(repo / "live.py"), env={"SECRET_SCAN_LOCKBOX_PATHS": str(lb)})
+    assert rc == 1
+    assert "live.py:1" in out and "lockbox:FAKE_VENDOR_API_KEY" in out
+    no_fragment(out, FAKE_LB)
+
+
+def test_history_finds_removed_secret_with_commit(tmp_path):
+    lb, repo = seeded(tmp_path)
+    rc, out = run("secret_scan.py", str(repo), "--history", env={"SECRET_SCAN_LOCKBOX_PATHS": str(lb)})
+    assert rc == 1
+    assert "app.py:1" in out and "commit=" in out and "lockbox:FAKE_VENDOR_API_KEY" in out
+    assert "app.py:2" in out and "32-hex secret assignment" in out
+    no_fragment(out, FAKE_LB)
+    no_fragment(out, TWI)
+
+
+def test_repo_flag_clones_scans_and_cleans_up(tmp_path):
+    lb, repo = seeded(tmp_path)
+    cache = tmp_path / "home"
+    (cache / ".cache").mkdir(parents=True)
+    rc, out = run("secret_scan.py", "--repo", str(repo),
+                  env={"SECRET_SCAN_LOCKBOX_PATHS": str(lb), "HOME": str(cache)})
+    assert rc == 1 and "app.py:1" in out
+    no_fragment(out, FAKE_LB)
+    assert not [p for p in (cache / ".cache").iterdir() if p.name.startswith("secret-scan-")]
+
+
+def test_clean_tree_and_bad_input(tmp_path):
+    (tmp_path / "ok.txt").write_text("hello world\n")
+    rc, out = run("secret_scan.py", str(tmp_path / "ok.txt"), "--no-lockbox")
+    assert rc == 0 and "0 finding(s)" in out
+    rc, out = run("secret_scan.py", str(tmp_path), "--history", "--no-lockbox")
+    assert rc == 2 and "needs a git repo" in out
+
+
+def test_env_names_never_prints_values(tmp_path):
+    a = tmp_path / "a.env"
+    b = tmp_path / "b.env"
+    a.write_text(f"# c\nexport DB_PASSWORD={FAKE_LB}\nTOKEN=\"{TWI}\"\nEMPTY=\nONLY_A=1\n")
+    b.write_text(f"DB_PASSWORD={FAKE_LB}\nTOKEN=different-value-here\nONLY_B=2\n")
+    rc, out = run("env_names.py", str(a), "--hash")
+    assert rc == 0 and "DB_PASSWORD" in out and "set" in out and "empty" in out and "len=24" in out
+    assert "sha256:" in out
+    no_fragment(out, FAKE_LB)
+    no_fragment(out, TWI, 7)
+    rc, out = run("env_names.py", str(a), "--compare", str(b))
+    assert "DB_PASSWORD" in out and "SAME" in out and "DIFFERENT" in out
+    assert "only-in-A" in out and "only-in-B" in out
+    no_fragment(out, FAKE_LB)
+    rc, out = run("env_names.py", str(tmp_path / "missing.env"))
+    assert rc == 2
+
+
+def test_shapes_are_the_guards_shapes():
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS))
+    import secret_scan as sc
+    import secret_shapes as ss
+    assert sc.ss is ss  # one source of shapes: a new guard shape is automatically a scan shape

ci/compute-guard-allow.yml

@@ -45,3 +45,8 @@ allow:
   - repo: windy-git
     paths: ["scripts/compute_guard.py", "ci/compute-guard-allow.yml"]
     reason: "The guard's own pattern list and this file."
+
+  - repo: windy-mind
+    paths: ["*"]
+    matches: [':11434']
+    reason: "Windy Mind IS the compute door (endpoint + key); it may call Ollama. Only the Ollama port is allowed here, any provider host/SDK in Mind still flags."

deploy/systemd/windygit-state-backup.service

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Windy Git nightly STATE backup (Postgres + Gitea config + repos -> encrypted restic in R2)
+After=network-online.target docker.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+WorkingDirectory=/srv/windygit/src
+# R2 credentials come from the .env; the restic password from /etc/windygit/restic.pass
+# (root 600; the same value lives in the lockbox as RESTIC_WINDYGIT_PASSWORD).
+EnvironmentFile=/srv/windygit/src/.env
+ExecStart=/bin/bash /srv/windygit/src/scripts/backup_state.sh
+Nice=10
+IOSchedulingClass=idle
+TimeoutStartSec=3h

deploy/systemd/windygit-state-backup.service.d/windy-job.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[Service]
+ExecStart=
+ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/windy-job windygit-state-backup 26h --expect "ok — state backed up" --owner 13 -- /bin/bash /srv/windygit/src/scripts/backup_state.sh

deploy/systemd/windygit-state-backup.timer

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Nightly Windy Git state backup
+
+[Timer]
+# 03:07 local, clear of the git-bundle backup at 04:17.
+OnCalendar=*-*-* 03:07:00
+Persistent=true
+RandomizedDelaySec=300
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=timers.target

docker-compose.yml

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ services:
 
   gitea:
     # G2.1 — PIN AN EXACT VERSION. Never `latest`. Record it in SUBSTRATE.md.
-    image: docker.io/gitea/gitea:1.24.6
+    image: docker.io/gitea/gitea:1.24.7
     environment:
       GITEA__database__DB_TYPE: postgres
       GITEA__database__HOST: db:5432

docs/RESTORE-DRILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Restoring Windy Git from the encrypted state backup
+
+What is backed up (`scripts/backup_state.sh`, restic repo `s3:…/windy-git-backups/restic`, tag `windygit-state`):
+both Postgres databases (`gitea`, `windygit`, custom-format dumps + globals), the whole Gitea data root
+(`/srv/windygit/git`: config, jwt, attachments, avatars, templates AND the bare repositories),
+`/srv/windygit/src/.env`, `deploy/runner/.env`, `/etc/cloudflared`, the windygit systemd drop-ins.
+NOT in it: the restic password itself (lockbox `RESTIC_WINDYGIT_PASSWORD`) and the R2 access key
+(scoped token `windy-git-r2-scoped`, lockbox). Never print either: use `lockbox-get KEY FILE`.
+
+## Drill (any machine with restic + docker; proven on Veron 2026-10-01, counts identical)
+    export RESTIC_PASSWORD_FILE=<0600 file from lockbox-get RESTIC_WINDYGIT_PASSWORD>
+    export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=… AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=…            # from lockbox-get, into env, not echoed
+    export RESTIC_REPOSITORY=s3:https://<R2 account>.r2.cloudflarestorage.com/windy-git-backups/restic
+    restic snapshots --tag windygit-state
+    restic restore latest --tag windygit-state --target /var/tmp/wg-drill
+    docker run -d --name wg-drill-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=<random> -e POSTGRES_USER=drill postgres:16-alpine
+    for db in gitea windygit; do
+      docker exec wg-drill-pg psql -U drill -d postgres -c "create database $db"
+      docker exec -i wg-drill-pg pg_restore -U drill -d $db --no-owner --no-privileges \
+        < /var/tmp/wg-drill/var/backups/windygit-state/$db.dump
+    done
+    # compare row counts with live (or with the last known): repository, issue, pull_request, "user",
+    # external_login_user, access_token, action_run, action_run_job
+    docker rm -f wg-drill-pg; rm -rf /var/tmp/wg-drill
+
+## Real disaster (Veron lost)
+1. New Linux host with Docker, a Cloudflare tunnel connector, the repo (`git clone` from GitHub: windy-git).
+2. `restic restore latest --tag windygit-state --target /` (puts /srv/windygit/git, the .env files, /etc/cloudflared back).
+3. `docker compose -p windy-git up -d db`, then pg_restore both dumps into it (as above, into the real db names/owner from `.env`).
+4. `docker compose -p windy-git up -d` + `deploy/runner` runners; re-register runners if the token changed.
+5. Verify: `/api/healthz`, Windy SSO login, `git ls-remote`, one CI run. GitHub is still the source of truth for code,
+   so repo content can also be re-synced from there; the database is what only this backup holds.
+Retention: 14 daily / 8 weekly / 6 monthly (prune on Sundays). Integrity: every run does `restic check --read-data-subset=2%`.

scripts/backup_state.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Nightly STATE backup: everything git bundles do NOT hold (SOTU 10-01: 625 issues/PRs, users,
+# SSO links, CI history, settings lived on one unbacked-up host). Encrypted restic repo in R2.
+#   - Postgres: every database (custom-format dump, restore-listable) + globals
+#   - Gitea config/data (app.ini, jwt, attachments, avatars, templates) + the bare repositories
+#   - the deploy .env files, systemd drop-ins and the cloudflared tunnel config (needed to rebuild)
+# The restic password lives in /etc/windygit/restic.pass (root 600) AND the lockbox
+# (RESTIC_WINDYGIT_PASSWORD): a lost Veron must not lose the backups. NEVER echo env/values here.
+# Restore: docs/RESTORE-DRILL.md. Bounded: every docker exec runs under `timeout` (a hung
+# runc exec in the IO stall wedged the sync on 09-23).
+set -euo pipefail
+log() { echo "[backup_state $(date -u +%FT%TZ)] $*"; }
+: "${R2_ACCOUNT_ID:?}" "${R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID:?}" "${R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY:?}"
+PASSFILE="${RESTIC_PASSWORD_FILE:-/etc/windygit/restic.pass}"
+[[ -s "$PASSFILE" ]] || { log "FATAL: $PASSFILE missing/empty: refusing to report a backup that did not happen"; exit 1; }
+export RESTIC_PASSWORD_FILE="$PASSFILE"
+export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"
+export RESTIC_REPOSITORY="${RESTIC_REPOSITORY:-s3:https://${R2_ACCOUNT_ID}.r2.cloudflarestorage.com/${R2_BUCKET_BACKUPS:-windy-git-backups}/restic}"
+DB="${WG_DB_CONTAINER:-windy-git-db-1}"
+STAGE="${WG_STAGE:-/var/backups/windygit-state}"
+GIT_ROOT="${GIT_DATA_ROOT:-/srv/windygit/git}"
+umask 077
+mkdir -p "$STAGE"; chmod 700 "$STAGE"; rm -f "$STAGE"/*.dump "$STAGE"/globals.sql
+
+# systemd gives units no $HOME, and restic wants a cache dir: pin one.
+export RESTIC_CACHE_DIR="${RESTIC_CACHE_DIR:-/var/cache/windygit-restic}"; mkdir -p "$RESTIC_CACHE_DIR"
+if ! err=$(restic cat config 2>&1 >/dev/null); then
+  # only a MISSING repo may be initialised; any other error (auth, network, wrong password) must stop here
+  if grep -qiE "does not exist|is there a repository|unable to open config file" <<<"$err"; then
+    log "initialising restic repo"; restic init >/dev/null
+  else
+    log "FATAL: restic cannot open the repository: $(head -c 300 <<<"$err" | tr '\n' ' ')"; exit 1
+  fi
+fi
+
+PGU=$(timeout 30 docker exec "$DB" printenv POSTGRES_USER)
+[[ -n "$PGU" ]] || { log "FATAL: no POSTGRES_USER in $DB"; exit 1; }
+dbs=$(timeout 60 docker exec "$DB" psql -U "$PGU" -Atc "select datname from pg_database where not datistemplate and datname<>'postgres' order by 1")
+n=0
+for d in $dbs; do
+  timeout 600 docker exec "$DB" pg_dump -U "$PGU" -Fc "$d" > "$STAGE/$d.dump"
+  # a dump that cannot be listed is not a backup
+  timeout 120 docker exec -i "$DB" pg_restore -l < "$STAGE/$d.dump" >/dev/null
+  [[ $(stat -c%s "$STAGE/$d.dump") -gt 1000 ]] || { log "FATAL: $d dump suspiciously small"; exit 1; }
+  n=$((n+1)); log "dumped $d ($(stat -c%s "$STAGE/$d.dump") bytes)"
+done
+[[ $n -ge 1 ]] || { log "FATAL: no databases dumped"; exit 1; }
+timeout 120 docker exec "$DB" pg_dumpall -U "$PGU" --globals-only > "$STAGE/globals.sql"
+
+paths=("$STAGE" "$GIT_ROOT" /srv/windygit/src/.env /srv/windygit/src/deploy/runner/.env /etc/cloudflared)
+for p in /etc/systemd/system/windygit-*.service.d /etc/windygit; do [[ -e $p ]] && paths+=("$p"); done
+# restic.pass itself is excluded: the password never rides in its own backup
+snap=$(restic backup --tag windygit-state --host windygit-veron --quiet --json \
+  --exclude "$GIT_ROOT/gitea/log" --exclude "$GIT_ROOT/gitea/queues" --exclude "$GIT_ROOT/gitea/tmp" \
+  --exclude "$GIT_ROOT/gitea/indexers" --exclude "$GIT_ROOT/gitea/actions_log" --exclude /etc/windygit/restic.pass \
+  "${paths[@]}" | python3 -c 'import sys,json
+for l in sys.stdin:
+    d=json.loads(l)
+    if d.get("message_type")=="summary": print(d["snapshot_id"][:8])')
+[[ -n "$snap" ]] || { log "FATAL: restic produced no snapshot"; exit 1; }
+rm -f "$STAGE"/*.dump "$STAGE"/globals.sql
+restic check --read-data-subset=2% --quiet >/dev/null || { log "FATAL: restic check failed"; exit 1; }
+if [[ $(date +%u) == 7 ]]; then
+  restic forget --tag windygit-state --keep-daily 14 --keep-weekly 8 --keep-monthly 6 --prune --quiet >/dev/null
+fi
+echo "ok — state backed up ($n dbs, snapshot $snap)"

scripts/compute_guard.py

@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ JS_SDKS = (r"@anthropic-ai/sdk|openai|groq-sdk|@google/generative-ai|@google/gen
 
 RULES: list[tuple[str, re.Pattern]] = [
     ("provider host", re.compile("|".join(re.escape(h) for h in HOSTS))),
+    # Grant via Boss 10-01: compute = Windy Mind. A NEW reference to an Ollama port (Veron's :11434) is a
+    # direct call around Mind's metering/caps. WARN-only, never red, and only for lines a PR ADDS.
+    ("veron ollama", re.compile(r"(?::|%3[aA])11434(?![0-9])")),
     ("provider key", re.compile(r"\b(?:" + "|".join(KEYS) + r")\b")),
     ("provider SDK", re.compile(rf"^\s*(?:from|import)\s+(?:{PY_SDKS})(?:\s|\.|$|,)")),
     ("provider SDK", re.compile(rf"""(?:from\s+|require\(\s*|import\(\s*)['"](?:{JS_SDKS})(?:/[^'"]*)?['"]""")),
@@ -70,6 +73,9 @@ RULES: list[tuple[str, re.Pattern]] = [
     ("provider SDK dep", re.compile(rf'''^\s*"(?:{JS_SDKS})"\s*:''')),
     ("provider SDK dep", re.compile(rf'''^\s*["']?(?:{PY_SDKS.replace(chr(92) + ".", "-")})(?:\[[^\]]*\])?\s*(?:[<>=~!]=?|["',]|$)''')),
 ]
+# Kinds that never block (even in MODE=block) and are only judged on ADDED lines, never the baseline tree.
+WARN_ONLY_KINDS = {"veron ollama"}
+OLLAMA_MSG = "compute = Windy Mind (endpoint + key); do not call Veron's Ollama directly"
 DEP_FILES = re.compile(r"(^|/)(package\.json|requirements[^/]*\.txt|pyproject\.toml|setup\.cfg|Pipfile)$")
 
 # Never scanned: tests, docs, lockfiles, vendored/built code, CI config.
@@ -253,7 +259,8 @@ def check(repo: str, sha: str, default_branch: str, is_default_head: bool) -> li
     allow = load_allow()
     fp = _fingerprint(allow)
     if is_default_head:
-        return cached_scan(f"tree:{repo}:{sha}:{fp}", lambda: scan_tree(repo, bare, sha, allow))
+        return cached_scan(f"tree:{repo}:{sha}:{fp}",
+                           lambda: [f for f in scan_tree(repo, bare, sha, allow) if f.kind not in WARN_ONLY_KINDS])
     return cached_scan(
         f"pr:{repo}:{sha}:{fp}",
         lambda: scan_added(repo, bare, f"refs/heads/{default_branch}", sha, allow),
@@ -268,6 +275,11 @@ def status_for(findings: list[Finding], whole_tree: bool,
     Grant-owned code (ci/grant-owned.yml): always WARN, never red (orchestrator
     09-23: his desktop work is never blocked by us)."""
     scope = "in tree" if whole_tree else "added"
+    soft = [f for f in findings if f.kind in WARN_ONLY_KINDS]
+    findings = [f for f in findings if f.kind not in WARN_ONLY_KINDS]
+    if not findings and not grant and soft:
+        f = soft[0]
+        return "success", f"⚠ WARN: new Veron Ollama ref {f.path}:{f.line}. {OLLAMA_MSG}"[:140], f
     if not findings and grant:
         g, n = grant[0], len(grant)
         desc = (f"⚠ WARN (Grant-owned, not blocking): {n} direct AI-provider use{'s' if n > 1 else ''} "

scripts/drill_cross_host.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Cross-host restore drill on Windy 0: ONLY lockbox + R2, nothing from Veron. Values never printed.
+# Usage: bash drill_cross_host.sh   (needs lockbox keys RESTIC_WINDYGIT_PASSWORD, WINDYGIT_R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID, WINDYGIT_R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, WINDYGIT_R2_ENDPOINT)
+set -euo pipefail
+umask 077; W=$(mktemp -d ~/.cache/wg-xdrill.XXXXXX)
+trap 'docker rm -f wg-xdrill-pg >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; rm -rf "$W"' EXIT
+lockbox-get RESTIC_WINDYGIT_PASSWORD "$W/pw" >/dev/null
+lockbox-get WINDYGIT_R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID "$W/ak" >/dev/null; lockbox-get WINDYGIT_R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY "$W/sk" >/dev/null; lockbox-get WINDYGIT_R2_ENDPOINT "$W/ep" >/dev/null
+export RESTIC_PASSWORD_FILE="$W/pw" AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$(cat "$W/ak")" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$(cat "$W/sk")"
+export RESTIC_REPOSITORY="s3:$(cat "$W/ep")/windy-git-backups/restic"
+restic snapshots --tag windygit-state --compact | tail -3
+restic restore latest --tag windygit-state --target "$W/r" --include /var/backups/windygit-state --include /srv/windygit/git/gitea/conf --quiet
+ls -l "$W/r/var/backups/windygit-state" | awk 'NR>1{print $5, $NF}'
+docker run -d --name wg-xdrill-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD="$(python3 -c 'import secrets;print(secrets.token_hex(12))')" -e POSTGRES_USER=drill postgres:16-alpine >/dev/null
+for i in $(seq 1 30); do docker exec wg-xdrill-pg pg_isready -U drill >/dev/null 2>&1 && break; sleep 2; done
+for db in gitea windygit; do
+  docker exec wg-xdrill-pg psql -U drill -d postgres -qc "create database $db"
+  docker exec -i wg-xdrill-pg pg_restore -U drill -d $db --no-owner --no-privileges < "$W/r/var/backups/windygit-state/$db.dump" 2>&1 | grep -v "already exists" | head -2 || true
+done
+for t in repository issue pull_request '"user"' external_login_user action_run action_run_job; do
+  echo "$t restored=$(docker exec wg-xdrill-pg psql -U drill -d gitea -Atc "select count(*) from $t")"
+done
+echo "cross-host drill OK (cleaned up)"

scripts/env_names.py

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""env-names: list environment variable NAMES only (Boss ruling 10-01, house rule 10).
+
+  env-names <docker container | systemd unit | env file> [--host H] [--sudo] [--hash]
+  env-names A --compare B [--host H] [--host2 H2]
+
+Prints NAME, set|empty, and value LENGTH. Never a value or fragment. --hash adds sha256[:8]
+(compare two places for equality; a hash of a weak value can be guessed, so use it for
+real secrets only). --compare prints SAME / DIFFERENT / only-in-A / only-in-B per name
+(equality by full-value hash, nothing else shown). Values live in memory only.
+Targets: an existing file (dotenv style) | a docker container name | a systemd unit
+(Environment= + EnvironmentFile=; --sudo to read root-only files). --host runs the docker /
+systemctl / file read over ssh (alias from ~/.ssh/config).
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import shlex
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+KV = ("=",)
+
+
+def run(cmd: list[str], host: str | None, sudo: bool = False) -> tuple[int, str]:
+    if sudo:
+        cmd = ["sudo", "-n", *cmd]
+    if host:
+        cmd = ["ssh", "-o", "BatchMode=yes", "-o", "ConnectTimeout=10", host, shlex.join(cmd)]
+    r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, errors="ignore", timeout=60)
+    return r.returncode, r.stdout
+
+
+def parse_dotenv(text: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    out: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for raw in text.splitlines():
+        line = raw.strip()
+        if not line or line.startswith("#") or "=" not in line:
+            continue
+        if line.startswith("export "):
+            line = line[7:].lstrip()
+        k, v = line.split("=", 1)
+        k = k.strip()
+        v = v.strip()
+        if len(v) >= 2 and v[0] == v[-1] and v[0] in "\"'":
+            v = v[1:-1]
+        if k.replace("_", "").isalnum() and not k[0].isdigit():
+            out[k] = v
+    return out
+
+
+def from_file(path: str, host: str | None, sudo: bool) -> dict[str, str] | None:
+    if host or sudo:
+        rc, out = run(["cat", path], host, sudo)
+        return parse_dotenv(out) if rc == 0 else None
+    try:
+        with open(path, errors="ignore") as fh:
+            return parse_dotenv(fh.read())
+    except OSError:
+        return None
+
+
+def from_docker(name: str, host: str | None, sudo: bool) -> dict[str, str] | None:
+    rc, out = run(["docker", "inspect", "-f", "{{json .Config.Env}}", name], host, sudo)
+    if rc != 0 or not out.strip():
+        return None
+    try:
+        items = json.loads(out)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    return {k: v for k, _, v in (i.partition("=") for i in (items or []))}
+
+
+def from_systemd(unit: str, host: str | None, sudo: bool) -> dict[str, str] | None:
+    rc, out = run(["systemctl", "show", unit, "-p", "Environment", "-p", "EnvironmentFiles"], host)
+    if rc != 0 or "LoadState=not-found" in out:
+        return None
+    env: dict[str, str] = {}
+    files: list[str] = []
+    for line in out.splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("Environment="):
+            for tok in shlex.split(line[len("Environment="):]):
+                k, _, v = tok.partition("=")
+                env[k] = v
+        elif line.startswith("EnvironmentFiles="):
+            f = line[len("EnvironmentFiles="):].split(" (")[0].strip().lstrip("-")
+            if f:
+                files.append(f)
+    for f in files:  # later files override earlier, like systemd
+        d = from_file(f, host, sudo)
+        if d is None:
+            print(f"# note: EnvironmentFile {f} unreadable (try --sudo)", file=sys.stderr)
+        else:
+            env.update(d)
+    return env
+
+
+def load(target: str, host: str | None, sudo: bool) -> dict[str, str] | None:
+    if (not host and os.path.isfile(target)) or target.startswith(("/", "./", "~")):
+        return from_file(os.path.expanduser(target), host, sudo)
+    if target.endswith((".service", ".timer", ".socket")):
+        return from_systemd(target, host, sudo)
+    return from_docker(target, host, sudo) or from_systemd(target, host, sudo)
+
+
+def sh(v: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(v.encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def main(argv=None) -> int:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="env-names", description="env var NAMES only")
+    ap.add_argument("target")
+    ap.add_argument("--host")
+    ap.add_argument("--host2", help="ssh host for the --compare target")
+    ap.add_argument("--sudo", action="store_true")
+    ap.add_argument("--hash", action="store_true", help="add sha256[:8] per variable")
+    ap.add_argument("--compare", metavar="TARGET2")
+    a = ap.parse_args(argv)
+    env = load(a.target, a.host, a.sudo)
+    if env is None:
+        print(f"error: could not read {a.target!r} (file, docker container or systemd unit)")
+        return 2
+    if a.compare:
+        env2 = load(a.compare, a.host2 or a.host, a.sudo)
+        if env2 is None:
+            print(f"error: could not read {a.compare!r}")
+            return 2
+        for k in sorted(set(env) | set(env2)):
+            if k not in env2:
+                print(f"{k:<40} only-in-A")
+            elif k not in env:
+                print(f"{k:<40} only-in-B")
+            else:
+                print(f"{k:<40} {'SAME' if sh(env[k]) == sh(env2[k]) else 'DIFFERENT'}"
+                      f"  (len {len(env[k])} vs {len(env2[k])})")
+        return 0
+    for k in sorted(env):
+        v = env[k]
+        extra = f"  sha256:{sh(v)[:8]}" if a.hash and v else ""
+        print(f"{k:<40} {'set  ' if v else 'empty'}  len={len(v)}{extra}")
+    print(f"# {len(env)} variable(s); values never printed")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        sys.exit(main())
+    except Exception as e:  # never a traceback
+        print(f"error: {type(e).__name__}")
+        sys.exit(2)

scripts/install_secret_tools.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Install the shared hash-only secret tools on THIS machine (Windy 0): secret-scan + env-names.
+# Source of truth is this repo (scripts/); re-run after a pull to update.
+set -euo pipefail
+here=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
+dest="$HOME/.local/share/secret-tools"
+mkdir -p "$dest" "$HOME/.local/bin"
+cp "$here/secret_shapes.py" "$here/secret_scan.py" "$here/env_names.py" "$here/lockbox_put.py" "$dest/"
+for pair in "secret-scan:secret_scan.py" "env-names:env_names.py" "lockbox-put:lockbox_put.py"; do
+  n=${pair%%:*}; f=${pair##*:}
+  printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexec python3 "%s/%s" "$@"\n' "$dest" "$f" > "$HOME/.local/bin/$n"
+  chmod 755 "$HOME/.local/bin/$n"
+done
+echo "installed secret-scan, env-names and lockbox-put (shapes from secret_shapes.py, same as secret-guard)"

scripts/lockbox_put.py

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""lockbox-put: add ONE secret to the lockbox by PR, without anyone reading, printing or
+grepping the lockbox (Boss rule 10-01; Windy Hub ruling).
+
+  lockbox-put KEY FILE [--lane NAME] [--note TEXT]
+
+KEY  exact name, ^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,63}$ . FILE a 0600 file you own (not a symlink) whose
+content is the value (one line). Appends ONE line `- **`KEY`**: `<value>`` (the format
+lockbox-get reads) under a new heading at the END of ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md in a fresh temp clone,
+on a new branch, and opens a kit-army-config PR. Append-only: the diff is verified to be one
+file, additions only, before pushing. REFUSES if KEY already exists (a bool computed in
+memory; no line, value or location is ever printed). Reviewers see the KEY NAME + lane only
+if they look at the diff; the PR body never carries the value. Never echoes the value.
+Env (tests): LOCKBOX_PUT_REPO=<clone url/path>, LOCKBOX_PUT_NO_PR=1.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import datetime as dt
+import os
+import re
+import shutil
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+REPO = os.environ.get("LOCKBOX_PUT_REPO", "https://github.com/sneakyfree/kit-army-config.git")
+SLUG = "sneakyfree/kit-army-config"
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,63}$")
+VAL_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=:@%,-]{8,512}$")  # no backtick, quote, space or newline
+
+
+def die(msg: str, code: int = 2):
+    print(f"lockbox-put: {msg}")
+    sys.exit(code)
+
+
+def git(cwd: str, *a: str, quiet=True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
+    # stderr is dropped: git/gh errors can echo URLs; stdout only when we need it.
+    return subprocess.run(["git", "-C", cwd, *a], capture_output=True, text=True, errors="ignore")
+
+
+def key_exists(clone: str, key: str) -> bool:
+    """True if KEY is already defined anywhere lockbox-get reads. Bool only, nothing printed."""
+    pat_env = re.compile(r"^" + re.escape(key) + r"=")
+    pat_md = re.compile(r"^\s*[-*]?\s*\*\*`" + re.escape(key) + r"`\*\*\s*:")
+    paths = [Path(clone, "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md")] + [
+        Path(dp, f) for dp, _d, fs in os.walk(Path(clone, "secrets")) for f in fs if f.endswith(".env")]
+    for p in paths:
+        try:
+            with open(p, errors="ignore") as fh:
+                for line in fh:
+                    if pat_env.match(line) or pat_md.match(line):
+                        return True
+        except OSError:
+            continue
+    return False
+
+
+def main(argv=None) -> int:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="lockbox-put")
+    ap.add_argument("key")
+    ap.add_argument("file")
+    ap.add_argument("--lane", default=os.environ.get("LOCKBOX_LANE", "a lane"))
+    ap.add_argument("--note", default="")
+    a = ap.parse_args(argv)
+    if not KEY_RE.match(a.key):
+        die("KEY must match ^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,63}$")
+    try:
+        st = os.lstat(a.file)
+    except OSError:
+        die("FILE not found")
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+        die("FILE must be a regular file (not a symlink)")
+    if st.st_uid != os.getuid() or (st.st_mode & 0o077):
+        die("FILE must be owned by you and mode 0600")
+    with open(a.file) as fh:
+        value = fh.read().strip()
+    if not VAL_RE.match(value):
+        die("value must be one line of 8-512 chars from [A-Za-z0-9._~+/=:@%,-] (no spaces, quotes, backticks)")
+    note = re.sub(r"[`\n\r]", " ", a.note)[:160]
+    lane = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9 ._-]", "", a.lane)[:40]
+    tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="lockbox-put-", dir=str(Path.home() / ".cache") if (Path.home() / ".cache").is_dir() else None)
+    os.chmod(tmp, 0o700)
+    clone = os.path.join(tmp, "k")
+    try:
+        if subprocess.run(["git", "clone", "-q", "--depth", "1", REPO, clone],
+                          stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).returncode != 0:
+            die("clone failed (details withheld: URLs can carry tokens)")
+        if key_exists(clone, a.key):
+            die(f"{a.key} already exists: refusing to overwrite (append-only; pick a new KEY)", 3)
+        lb = Path(clone, "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md")
+        if not lb.is_file():
+            die("ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md not found in the repo")
+        today = dt.date.today().isoformat()
+        stamp = dt.datetime.now(dt.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d%H%M")
+        branch = f"lockbox-put/{a.key.lower()}-{stamp}"
+        with open(lb, "a") as fh:
+            fh.write(f"\n## 🗝️ {a.key} (added {today} by {lane} via lockbox-put)\n")
+            fh.write(f"- **`{a.key}`**: `{value}`\n")
+            if note:
+                fh.write(f"- **Note:** {note}\n")
+        git(clone, "checkout", "-q", "-b", branch)
+        git(clone, "add", "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md")
+        ns = git(clone, "diff", "--cached", "--numstat").stdout.split()
+        # numstat: <added> <deleted> <path>; exactly one file, no deletions
+        if len(ns) != 3 or ns[1] != "0" or ns[2] != "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md":
+            die("diff is not a pure append to ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md: aborting, nothing pushed")
+        msg = f"lockbox: add {a.key} (via lockbox-put, {lane})\n\nCo-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>"
+        if git(clone, "-c", "user.name=lockbox-put", "-c", "user.email=lockbox-put@windy.invalid",
+               "commit", "-q", "-m", msg).returncode != 0:
+            die("commit failed")
+        if git(clone, "push", "-q", "origin", branch).returncode != 0:
+            die("push failed (details withheld)")
+        if os.environ.get("LOCKBOX_PUT_NO_PR"):
+            print(f"ok: pushed branch {branch} ({a.key}); PR skipped")
+            return 0
+        body = (f"Adds exactly one key: `{a.key}` (by {lane}). Append-only, one file, no deletions "
+                f"(verified before push). Review by KEY NAME only; do not paste the value anywhere.\n\n"
+                f"{note}\n\n🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)")
+        r = subprocess.run(["gh", "pr", "create", "-R", SLUG, "--head", branch, "--base", "main",
+                            "--title", f"lockbox: add {a.key} ({lane})", "--body", body],
+                           capture_output=True, text=True)
+        if r.returncode != 0:
+            die("branch pushed but `gh pr create` failed; open the PR for the branch by hand")
+        print(f"ok: {a.key} added via PR {r.stdout.strip().splitlines()[-1]}")
+        return 0
+    finally:
+        shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        sys.exit(main())
+    except SystemExit:
+        raise
+    except Exception as e:  # never a traceback: it could carry data
+        print(f"lockbox-put: error: {type(e).__name__}")
+        sys.exit(2)

scripts/secret_scan.py

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""secret-scan: hash-only secret finder. Boss ruling 10-01 after three lanes printed secrets
+into their own transcripts while hunting secrets (house rule 10).
+
+  secret-scan <path> [--history] [--repo <git url or path>] [--no-lockbox]
+
+Reports `file:line` (and the commit with --history), WHICH lockbox entry matched (the KEY
+NAME only) or which secret SHAPE matched (twilio, zai, aws, ...), plus a sha256[:8] of the
+token for allow-listing. It NEVER prints, logs or writes a value or any fragment of one
+(no context line, no masking). The lockbox is loaded in memory only. stdout only.
+Exit 0 = clean, 1 = findings, 2 = usage/error.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import os
+import re
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+import secret_shapes as ss  # noqa: E402  (the SAME shapes as secret-guard)
+
+HOME = Path.home()
+LOCKBOX_PATHS = [p for p in os.environ.get("SECRET_SCAN_LOCKBOX_PATHS", "").split(":") if p] or [
+    str(HOME / "kit-army-config" / "secrets"), str(HOME / "kit-army-config" / "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md")]
+# Extra shapes that are scan-only (not in the blocking guard): label, regex.
+EXTRA = [("zai key", re.compile(r"(?<![0-9a-f])[0-9a-f]{32}\.[A-Za-z0-9]{16}(?![A-Za-z0-9])"))]
+SKIP_DIRS = {".git", "node_modules", "vendor", "third_party", "__pycache__", ".venv"}
+MAX_BYTES = 5_000_000
+
+RUN = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_\-]{15,199}")
+UUID = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$")
+NAME = re.compile(r"[\s>*`|-]*([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]{2,60})\s*[=:|]")
+
+
+def h16(t: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(t.encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
+
+
+def cands(line: str):
+    """Token candidates: runs >=16 chars with a digit and a letter; git shas/uuids excluded."""
+    for chunk in re.split(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_\-.]+", line):
+        parts = [chunk, *chunk.split(".")] if "." in chunk else [chunk]
+        for p in parts:
+            for m in RUN.finditer(p):
+                t = m.group(0)
+                if not (re.search(r"\d", t) and re.search(r"[A-Za-z]", t)):
+                    continue
+                if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}|[0-9a-fA-F]{64}", t) or UUID.match(t.lower()):
+                    continue
+                yield t
+
+
+def load_lockbox() -> dict[str, set[str]]:
+    """{hash16: {key-name labels}}; values never leave this dict."""
+    out: dict[str, set[str]] = {}
+    files: list[str] = []
+    for p in LOCKBOX_PATHS:
+        if os.path.isdir(p):
+            for root, _d, fs in os.walk(p):
+                files += [os.path.join(root, f) for f in fs]
+        elif os.path.isfile(p):
+            files.append(p)
+    for f in files:
+        try:
+            with open(f, errors="ignore") as fh:
+                for line in fh:
+                    m = NAME.match(line)
+                    label = m.group(1) if m else "?"
+                    for t in cands(line):
+                        out.setdefault(h16(t), set()).add(label)
+        except OSError:
+            continue
+    return out
+
+
+def scan_line(line: str, lockbox: dict[str, set[str]]) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
+    """[(label, hash8)]: `shape:<kind>` and/or `lockbox:<NAMES>`. No value escapes."""
+    res: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+    for kind, h in ss.find(line):
+        res.append((f"shape:{kind}", h))
+    for kind, rx in EXTRA:
+        for m in rx.finditer(line):
+            res.append((f"shape:{kind}", ss.h8(m.group(0))))
+    for t in cands(line):
+        k = h16(t)
+        if k in lockbox:
+            names = sorted(n for n in lockbox[k])
+            res.append(("lockbox:" + ",".join(names)[:70], k[:8]))
+    return sorted(set(res))
+
+
+def is_text(path: Path) -> bool:
+    try:
+        with open(path, "rb") as fh:
+            return b"\0" not in fh.read(4096)
+    except OSError:
+        return False
+
+
+def scan_tree(root: Path, lockbox):
+    files = [root] if root.is_file() else [
+        Path(dp) / f for dp, dn, fn in os.walk(root) for f in fn
+        if not set(Path(dp).relative_to(root).parts) & SKIP_DIRS]
+    for p in sorted(files):
+        try:
+            if p.stat().st_size > MAX_BYTES or not is_text(p):
+                continue
+            with open(p, errors="ignore") as fh:
+                for n, line in enumerate(fh, 1):
+                    for label, h in scan_line(line, lockbox):
+                        yield (str(p), n, None, label, h)
+        except OSError:
+            continue
+
+
+def git(repo: str, *a: str) -> subprocess.Popen:
+    return subprocess.Popen(["git", "--git-dir", repo, *a], stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+                            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, text=True, errors="ignore")
+
+
+def scan_history(gitdir: str, lockbox):
+    """Every ADDED line on every ref (incl. PR refs). Oldest commit per (hash, file, line)."""
+    seen: dict[tuple, str] = {}
+    p = git(gitdir, "log", "--all", "-p", "-U0", "--no-color", "--format=@@C %h", "-a")
+    commit = path = None
+    ln = 0
+    for row in p.stdout:  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+        if row.startswith("@@C "):
+            commit = row[4:].strip()
+        elif row.startswith("+++ "):
+            path = row[6:].strip() if row.startswith("+++ b/") else None
+        elif row.startswith("@@ "):
+            m = re.search(r"\+(\d+)", row)
+            ln = int(m.group(1)) - 1 if m else 0
+        elif row.startswith("+") and path:
+            ln += 1
+            for label, h in scan_line(row[1:], lockbox):
+                seen[(label, h, path, ln)] = commit or "?"
+    p.wait()
+    for (label, h, path, ln), c in sorted(seen.items(), key=lambda x: (x[0][2], x[0][3])):
+        yield (path, ln, c, label, h)
+
+
+def resolve_gitdir(p: Path) -> str | None:
+    for cand in (p / ".git", p):
+        if (cand / "HEAD").exists() and ((cand / "objects").exists()):
+            return str(cand)
+    return None
+
+
+def main(argv=None) -> int:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="secret-scan", description=__doc__.split("\n\n")[1] if __doc__ else "")
+    ap.add_argument("path", nargs="?", help="file, directory, or git repo (with --history)")
+    ap.add_argument("--history", action="store_true", help="scan every added line in all git history")
+    ap.add_argument("--repo", help="git URL or path to scan (mirror-cloned to a temp dir, then deleted)")
+    ap.add_argument("--no-lockbox", action="store_true", help="shapes only")
+    a = ap.parse_args(argv)
+    if not (a.path or a.repo):
+        ap.print_usage()
+        return 2
+    lockbox = {} if a.no_lockbox else load_lockbox()
+    print(f"# secret-scan: {len(lockbox)} lockbox tokens in memory, values never printed", flush=True)
+    tmp = None
+    findings = 0
+    try:
+        if a.repo:
+            tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="secret-scan-", dir=str(HOME / ".cache") if (HOME / ".cache").is_dir() else None)
+            os.chmod(tmp, 0o700)
+            target = os.path.join(tmp, "r.git")
+            rc = subprocess.run(["git", "clone", "-q", "--mirror", a.repo, target],
+                                stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).returncode
+            if rc != 0:
+                print("error: clone failed (details withheld: URLs can carry tokens)")
+                return 2
+            a.history = True
+            gitdir = target
+        elif a.history:
+            gitdir = resolve_gitdir(Path(a.path))
+            if not gitdir:
+                print("error: --history needs a git repo path")
+                return 2
+        if a.history:
+            for path, ln, c, label, h in scan_history(gitdir, lockbox):
+                findings += 1
+                print(f"{path}:{ln}  commit={c}  {label} #{h}")
+        else:
+            for path, ln, _c, label, h in scan_tree(Path(a.path), lockbox):
+                findings += 1
+                print(f"{path}:{ln}  {label} #{h}")
+    finally:
+        if tmp:
+            shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+    print(f"# {findings} finding(s)")
+    return 1 if findings else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        sys.exit(main())
+    except KeyboardInterrupt:
+        sys.exit(130)
+    except Exception as e:  # never a traceback: it could carry data
+        print(f"error: {type(e).__name__}")
+        sys.exit(2)

scripts/secret_shapes.py

@@ -23,13 +23,14 @@ PATTERNS: list[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]]] = [
     ("twilio sid/api key", re.compile(r"\b(?:AC|SK)[0-9a-f]{32}\b")),
     ("32-hex secret assignment", re.compile(
         r"(?i)\b[a-z0-9_.-]*(?:token|secret|key|password)[a-z0-9_.-]*[\"']?\s*[:=]\s*[\"']?(?P<v>(?<![0-9a-f])[0-9a-f]{32}(?![0-9a-f]))")),
+    ("pypi token", re.compile(r"\bpypi-AgE[A-Za-z0-9_-]{50,}")),
     ("private key block", re.compile(r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |ENCRYPTED )?PRIVATE KEY-----")),
 ]
 
 # git grep -E (POSIX ERE) prefilter: cheap superset of PATTERNS.
 PREFILTER = ("[0-9]{8,10}:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}|gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|github_pat_|(AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}"
              "|xox[abprs]-|sk-ant-|sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32}|sk-proj-|[rs]k_live_|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}"
-             "|-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|(AC|SK)[0-9a-f]{32}|[0-9a-fA-F]{32}")
+             "|-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|(AC|SK)[0-9a-f]{32}|[0-9a-fA-F]{32}|pypi-AgE")
 
 
 def h8(value: str | bytes) -> str: