Merge pull request #1 from sneakyfree/veron-ollama-warn

compute-guard: WARN on new Veron Ollama (:11434) references

.gitea/workflows/check.yml

@@ -51,9 +51,10 @@ jobs:
       - name: install
         run: |
           python3 --version
-          python3 -m venv .venv
-          .venv/bin/pip install -q --upgrade pip
-          .venv/bin/pip install -e ".[dev]"
+          # From uv.lock, never floating: CI tests exactly what the image ships.
+          # --locked also FAILS if pyproject.toml changed without re-locking.
+          python3 -m pip install -q uv==0.12.5
+          uv sync --locked --extra dev
 
       - name: lint
         run: .venv/bin/ruff check api scripts

Dockerfile

@@ -10,10 +10,19 @@ WORKDIR /app
 RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git curl \
     && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
-COPY pyproject.toml ./
-RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -e .
-
+# Dependencies come from uv.lock, hash-pinned, never "latest at build time".
+# Floating installs meant a rebuild could ship different fastapi/starlette/
+# pydantic than CI tested (Windy Cloud's OpenAPI drift, 09-23). The lock was
+# cut to exactly what prod ran then. uv only exports; pip installs, so the
+# image layout (system python, uvicorn on PATH) is unchanged.
+COPY --from=ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.12.5 /uv /usr/local/bin/uv
+COPY pyproject.toml uv.lock ./
+RUN uv export --frozen --no-dev --no-emit-project -o /tmp/requirements.txt \
+ && pip install --no-cache-dir --require-hashes -r /tmp/requirements.txt \
+ && rm /tmp/requirements.txt
 COPY api ./api
+RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --no-deps -e .
+
 COPY alembic ./alembic
 COPY alembic.ini ./
 COPY scripts ./scripts

api/tests/test_canary_cleanup.py

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+"""The canary's login probe must end the session it opens (journey cleanup rule)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import io
+import sys
+import urllib.error
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("canary", ROOT / "scripts" / "canary.py")
+canary = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)
+sys.modules["canary"] = canary  # dataclasses resolve their module by name
+_spec.loader.exec_module(canary)
+
+
+class _Resp:
+    def __init__(self, status=200, body=b"{}"):
+        self.status, self._body = status, body
+
+    def read(self):
+        return self._body
+
+    def __enter__(self):
+        return self
+
+    def __exit__(self, *a):
+        return False
+
+
+def _err(code):
+    return urllib.error.HTTPError(canary.LOGOUT_URL, code, "x", {}, io.BytesIO(b""))
+
+
+def _script(monkeypatch, outcomes):
+    calls = []
+
+    def fake(req, timeout=None):
+        calls.append((req.get_method(), req.full_url, req.get_header("Authorization")))
+        o = outcomes.pop(0)
+        if isinstance(o, Exception):
+            raise o
+        return o
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(canary.urllib.request, "urlopen", fake)
+    return calls
+
+
+def test_logout_ends_the_session(monkeypatch):
+    calls = _script(monkeypatch, [_Resp(200)])
+    r = canary.logout("tok", sleep=lambda s: None)
+    assert r.status == "ok"
+    assert calls == [("POST", canary.LOGOUT_URL, "Bearer tok")]
+
+
+def test_5xx_and_no_response_are_retried_then_succeed(monkeypatch):
+    calls = _script(monkeypatch, [_err(502), OSError("reset"), _Resp(200)])
+    assert canary.logout("tok", sleep=lambda s: None).status == "ok"
+    assert len(calls) == 3
+
+
+def test_already_over_counts_as_done(monkeypatch):
+    _script(monkeypatch, [_err(401)])
+    assert canary.logout("tok", sleep=lambda s: None).status == "ok"
+
+
+def test_other_4xx_fails_fast_and_honestly(monkeypatch):
+    calls = _script(monkeypatch, [_err(400)])
+    r = canary.logout("tok", sleep=lambda s: None)
+    assert r.status == "down" and r.detail.startswith("CLEANUP FAILED") and len(calls) == 1
+
+
+def test_retries_are_bounded_and_reported(monkeypatch):
+    calls = _script(monkeypatch, [_err(503)] * 8)
+    r = canary.logout("tok", attempts=8, sleep=lambda s: None)
+    assert r.status == "down" and "CLEANUP FAILED after 8 tries" in r.detail and len(calls) == 8
+
+
+def test_login_probe_logs_out_with_the_token_it_got(monkeypatch):
+    calls = _script(monkeypatch, [_Resp(200, b'{"token": "abc"}'), _Resp(200)])
+    c = canary.Check("identity.login", "https://account.windyword.ai/api/v1/auth/login", "x",
+                     method="POST", body={"email": "e", "password": "p"},
+                     after=canary._logout_after_login)
+    r = canary._probe(c)
+    assert r.status == "ok" and [f.status for f in r.followups] == ["ok"]
+    assert calls[1] == ("POST", canary.LOGOUT_URL, "Bearer abc")
+
+
+def test_login_without_token_is_a_cleanup_failure_not_a_pass():
+    [f] = canary._logout_after_login(b"{}")
+    assert f.status == "down" and "CLEANUP FAILED" in f.detail

api/tests/test_ci_hygiene.py

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+"""CI hygiene guard (house rule 6): lockfile-only installs, no host-port services."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "scripts"))
+_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("ci_hygiene", ROOT / "scripts" / "ci_hygiene.py")
+hy = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)
+sys.modules["ci_hygiene"] = hy
+_spec.loader.exec_module(hy)
+
+WF = ".github/workflows/ci.yml"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("path, text", [
+    (WF, "          .venv/bin/pip install -e \".[dev]\""),          # windy-git's own, before e64a1b5
+    ("Dockerfile", "RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -e ."),              # windy-git image, before e64a1b5
+    (WF, "      - run: uv pip install -e \".[dev]\""),                # WindyCloud #109's CI
+    (WF, "        run: pip install fastapi uvicorn"),
+    (WF, "      - run: uv sync --all-extras"),                         # windy-mind style, not locked
+    (WF, "      - run: npm install"),                                  # windy-drops / windytalk
+    (WF, "      - run: npm install --no-save --no-audit --no-fund jsdom"),  # windy-pro reality-check
+    (WF, "      - run: yarn install"),
+    (WF, "      - run: cd web && pnpm install"),
+    ("docker/api.Dockerfile", "RUN apt-get update && pip install requests"),
+])
+def test_floating_installs_are_flagged(path, text):
+    assert [k for k, _ in hy.scan_line(path, text)] == ["floating install"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("path, text", [
+    (WF, "          python3 -m pip install -q uv==0.12.5"),            # exact tool pin
+    (WF, "          uv sync --locked --extra dev"),
+    (WF, "      - run: uv sync --frozen"),
+    (WF, "      - run: npm ci"),
+    (WF, "      - run: npm install --no-save jsdom@24.1.0"),
+    (WF, "      - run: pip install -r requirements.lock --require-hashes"),
+    (WF, "      - run: pip install -r requirements.txt"),
+    ("Dockerfile", " && pip install --no-cache-dir --require-hashes -r /tmp/requirements.txt \\\\"),
+    ("Dockerfile", "RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --no-deps -e ."),       # project only, deps from the lock
+    (WF, "          .venv/bin/pip install -q --upgrade pip"),
+    (WF, "      - run: yarn install --frozen-lockfile"),
+    (WF, "      # - run: npm install   (commented out)"),
+    (WF, "      - run: echo 'pip is great'"),
+])
+def test_locked_or_pinned_installs_pass(path, text):
+    assert hy.scan_line(path, text) == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("text, port", [
+    ("          - 5432:5432", "5432"),          # windy-mind / eternitas (collided 09-23)
+    ("          - '15432:5432'", "15432"),      # WindyCloud
+    ('          - "6379:6379"', "6379"),
+])
+def test_services_publishing_a_host_port_are_flagged(text, port):
+    [(kind, match)] = hy.scan_line(WF, text)
+    assert kind == "host port" and port in match
+
+
+def test_host_port_rule_is_for_workflows_only():
+    assert hy.scan_line("docker-compose.yml", "      - 5432:5432") == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("path, ok", [
+    (".github/workflows/ci.yml", True), (".gitea/workflows/check.yaml", True),
+    ("Dockerfile", True), ("api/Dockerfile.prod", True), ("docker/web.Dockerfile", True),
+    ("scripts/setup.sh", False), ("README.md", False), ("node_modules/x/Dockerfile", False),
+    (".github/lint/x.yml", False),
+])
+def test_scope_is_ci_workflows_and_dockerfiles(path, ok):
+    assert hy.path_ok(path) is ok
+
+
+def test_warn_mode_never_turns_red(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(hy, "MODE", "warn")
+    state, desc, f = hy.status_for([hy.cg.Finding(WF, 12, "floating install", "npm install (use npm ci)")], True)
+    assert state == "success" and desc.startswith("⚠ WARN (not blocking): 1 CI hygiene issue in CI/Dockerfiles")
+
+
+def test_allow_file_is_line_scoped_exceptions_only():
+    """Every exception is line-scoped (`matches`), so an allowed file can't hide a
+    NEW floating install or docker step. Today: windy-pro's if:false deploy job."""
+    allow = hy.cg.load_allow(hy.ALLOW_FILE)
+    assert [(e["repo"], e["paths"]) for e in allow] == [("windy-pro", [".github/workflows/ci.yml"])]
+    assert all(e.get("matches") for e in allow)
+    ok = "        run: docker build -f account-server/Dockerfile -t windy-pro:${{ github.sha }} ."
+    new = "        run: docker build -t windy-pro-api ."
+    assert hy.cg.allowed("windy-pro", WF, allow, ok)
+    assert not hy.cg.allowed("windy-pro", WF, allow, new)
+    assert not hy.cg.allowed("windy-chat", WF, allow, ok)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("path, text, want", [
+    ("Dockerfile", "COPY --from=ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:latest /uv /usr/local/bin/uv", "ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:latest"),  # Mail #147
+    ("Dockerfile", "FROM python:latest", "python:latest"),
+    ("Dockerfile", "FROM --platform=linux/amd64 node:latest AS web", "node:latest"),
+    (WF, "        image: postgres:latest", "postgres:latest"),
+    (WF, "      - uses: docker://ghcr.io/foo/bar:latest", "ghcr.io/foo/bar:latest"),
+])
+def test_latest_images_are_flagged(path, text, want):
+    hits = hy.scan_line(path, text)
+    assert ("floating image", want) in hits
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("text", [
+    "COPY pyproject.toml uv.lock* ./",       # Windy Mail #147
+    "COPY package.json package-lock.json* ./",
+])
+def test_optional_lock_globs_are_flagged(text):
+    assert [k for k, _ in hy.scan_line("Dockerfile", text)] == ["optional lock"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("path, text", [
+    ("Dockerfile", "COPY --from=ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.12.5 /uv /usr/local/bin/uv"),
+    ("Dockerfile", "FROM python:3.12-slim"),
+    ("Dockerfile", "COPY pyproject.toml uv.lock ./"),
+    ("Dockerfile", "COPY src/*.py ./src/"),
+    ("Dockerfile", "RUN echo latest release notes"),
+])
+def test_pinned_images_and_real_locks_pass(path, text):
+    assert hy.scan_line(path, text) == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("text", [
+    "      - run: docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.ci.yml build",  # eternitas ci/build
+    "        run: docker build -t windy-mail .",
+    "      - run: docker-compose up -d",
+    "        run: docker buildx build --load .",
+    "      - uses: docker/build-push-action@v6",
+])
+def test_docker_in_ci_is_flagged_with_the_fix(text):
+    hits = hy.scan_line(WF, text)
+    assert [k for k, _ in hits] == ["needs docker"]
+    assert "no-Docker smoke test" in hits[0][1]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("path, text", [
+    ("Dockerfile", "RUN docker build ."),                     # not a workflow
+    (WF, "        run: ssh host 'docker compose up -d'"),      # remote host has a daemon
+    (WF, "      # docker compose build"),                     # comment
+    (WF, "        run: echo docker build"),
+])
+def test_docker_not_flagged_outside_ci_steps(path, text):
+    assert [k for k, _ in hy.scan_line(path, text) if k == "needs docker"] == []
+
+
+def test_needs_docker_skips_workflows_disabled_on_windy_git(monkeypatch):
+    """deploy.yml runs on the target host (a real daemon); Gitea has it disabled here."""
+    F = hy.cg.Finding
+    monkeypatch.setattr(hy, "_DISABLED", {"eternitas": {"deploy.yml"}})
+    got = hy._runs_here("Eternitas", [
+        F(".github/workflows/deploy.yml", 70, "needs docker", "docker compose in CI"),
+        F(".github/workflows/ci.yml", 176, "needs docker", "docker compose in CI"),
+        F(".github/workflows/deploy.yml", 12, "floating install", "npm install"),
+    ])
+    assert [(f.path.rsplit("/", 1)[1], f.kind) for f in got] == [
+        ("ci.yml", "needs docker"), ("deploy.yml", "floating install")]
+    assert hy._runs_here("eternitas", None) is None

api/tests/test_compute_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+"""Compute guard: Windy Mind is the only door to AI compute (warn-only today)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("compute_guard", ROOT / "scripts" / "compute_guard.py")
+cg = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)
+sys.modules["compute_guard"] = cg
+_spec.loader.exec_module(cg)
+
+ALLOW = cg.load_allow(ROOT / "ci" / "compute-guard-allow.yml")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "path, text, kind",
+    [
+        # audit #1 (windy-search, closed) and #2 (windy-chat, live): the shapes they had
+        ("service/app/anthropic_client.py", 'URL = "https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages"', "provider host"),
+        ("service/app/config.py", 'token = os.environ["ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN"]', "provider key"),
+        ("services/agent-roster/lib/llm.js", "const url = 'https://api.groq.com/openai/v1/chat/completions'", "provider host"),
+        ("docker-compose.yml", "      GROQ_API_KEY: ${GROQ_API_KEY}", "provider key"),
+        # audit #3/#4 (windy-pro account-server)
+        ("account-server/src/routes/transcription.ts", "const r = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/audio/transcriptions'", "provider host"),
+        ("account-server/src/config.ts", "openaiKey: process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY,", "provider key"),
+        # SDKs and deps
+        ("app/llm.py", "from anthropic import Anthropic", "provider SDK"),
+        ("app/llm.py", "import openai", "provider SDK"),
+        ("app/llm.py", "import google.generativeai as genai", "provider SDK"),
+        ("src/ai.ts", 'import Anthropic from "@anthropic-ai/sdk";', "provider SDK"),
+        ("src/ai.js", "const Groq = require('groq-sdk')", "provider SDK"),
+        ("package.json", '    "openai": "^4.52.0",', "provider SDK dep"),
+        ("requirements.txt", "anthropic>=0.40", "provider SDK dep"),
+        ("pyproject.toml", '  "google-generativeai>=0.8",', "provider SDK dep"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_audit_shapes_are_flagged(path, text, kind):
+    assert kind in [k for k, _ in cg.scan_line(path, text)]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "path, text",
+    [
+        ("app/mind.py", 'MIND = "https://mind.windyword.ai/v1/chat/completions"'),  # the door itself
+        ("app/models.py", "openai_compatible = True  # Mind speaks the OpenAI wire format"),
+        ("app/x.py", "from app.openai_shim import x"),  # a local module, not the SDK
+        ("package.json", '    "openai-types-lite": "1.0.0",'),  # a different package
+        ("README.txt", "set OPENAI_API_KEY"),  # scanned-by-rule, excluded by SKIP separately
+    ],
+)
+def test_near_misses_are_not_flagged(path, text):
+    if cg.SKIP.search(path):
+        return
+    assert cg.scan_line(path, text) == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "path",
+    ["tests/test_llm.py", "api/tests/x.py", "src/ai.test.ts", "web/foo.spec.js", "docs/setup.md",
+     "README.md", "package-lock.json", "uv.lock", "node_modules/openai/index.js", ".github/workflows/ci.yml",
+     "conftest.py", "app/llm_test.py"],
+)
+def test_tests_docs_lockfiles_vendored_ci_are_never_scanned(path):
+    assert cg.SKIP.search(path)
+
+
+def test_allow_list_needs_a_reason_per_entry(tmp_path):
+    bad = tmp_path / "a.yml"
+    bad.write_text("allow:\n  - repo: x\n    paths: ['*']\n")
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        cg.load_allow(bad)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "repo, path, ok",
+    [
+        ("windy-mind", "app/providers/anthropic.py", True),
+        ("windy-agent", "agent/providers.py", True),
+        ("windy-code", "extensions/windy-ai/src/aiProvider.ts", True),
+        ("windy-code", "web/server/llm.ts", False),  # BYOK is the extension only
+        ("windy-connect", "backend/src/writers/claude_code.py", True),
+        ("windy-chat", "services/agent-roster/lib/llm.js", False),  # audit #2: must be flagged
+        ("windy-pro", "account-server/src/routes/translations.ts", False),
+    ],
+)
+def test_allow_list_entries(repo, path, ok):
+    assert cg.allowed(repo, path, ALLOW) is ok
+
+
+DIFF = """diff --git a/app/llm.py b/app/llm.py
+--- a/app/llm.py
++++ b/app/llm.py
+@@ -10,0 +11,2 @@
++import anthropic
++client = anthropic.Anthropic()
+diff --git a/tests/test_llm.py b/tests/test_llm.py
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/test_llm.py
+@@ -0,0 +1 @@
++import anthropic
+@@ -40 +42 @@
+-x = 1
++x = 2
+"""
+
+
+def test_only_added_non_test_lines_are_findings():
+    fs = cg.parse_added("windy-chat", DIFF, ALLOW)
+    assert [(f.path, f.line, f.kind) for f in fs] == [("app/llm.py", 11, "provider SDK")]
+
+
+def _repo(tmp_path, files: dict[str, str]) -> tuple[Path, str]:
+    work = tmp_path / "w"
+    work.mkdir()
+    run = lambda *a: subprocess.run(["git", *a], cwd=work, check=True, capture_output=True)  # noqa: E731
+    run("init", "-q", "-b", "main")
+    for p, text in files.items():
+        (work / p).parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        (work / p).write_text(text)
+    run("add", "-A")
+    run("-c", "user.email=t@t", "-c", "user.name=t", "commit", "-qm", "x")
+    bare = tmp_path / "r.git"
+    subprocess.run(["git", "clone", "-q", "--bare", str(work), str(bare)], check=True)
+    sha = subprocess.run(["git", "--git-dir", str(bare), "rev-parse", "main"],
+                         capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout.strip()
+    return bare, sha
+
+
+def test_tree_scan_on_a_real_git_repo(tmp_path):
+    bare, sha = _repo(tmp_path, {
+        "app/llm.py": "import os\nKEY = os.environ['OPENAI_API_KEY']\n",
+        "app/ok.py": "MIND = 'https://mind.windyword.ai'\n",
+        "tests/test_llm.py": "import anthropic\n",
+        "docs/x.md": "api.anthropic.com\n",
+    })
+    fs = cg.scan_tree("windy-chat", bare, sha, ALLOW)
+    assert [(f.path, f.line, f.kind) for f in fs] == [("app/llm.py", 2, "provider key")]
+
+
+def test_warn_mode_never_turns_red(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cg, "MODE", "warn")
+    state, desc, f = cg.status_for([cg.Finding("a.py", 3, "provider host", "api.openai.com")], whole_tree=False)
+    assert state == "success" and desc.startswith("⚠ WARN (not blocking): 1 direct AI-provider use added")
+    assert "a.py:3" in desc and f.path == "a.py"
+
+
+def test_block_mode_fails(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cg, "MODE", "block")
+    state, desc, _ = cg.status_for([cg.Finding("a.py", 3, "provider host", "x")], whole_tree=True)
+    assert state == "failure" and desc.startswith("BLOCKED")
+
+
+def test_clean_is_ok():
+    assert cg.status_for([], whole_tree=True)[:2] == (
+        "success", "OK: no direct AI-provider use in tree (Windy Mind is the only door)")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "text",
+    [
+        "    # The ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN setting was removed on 2026-09-23 ON PURPOSE",  # windy-search
+        "# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=",
+        "  // fallback used to call https://api.groq.com directly",
+        " * @see https://api.openai.com/v1/audio",
+        "<!-- api.anthropic.com -->",
+    ],
+)
+def test_comments_are_not_calls(text):
+    assert cg.scan_line("service/app/config.py", text) == []
+
+
+def test_code_with_a_trailing_comment_still_counts():
+    assert cg.scan_line("a.js", "fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1') // TODO move to Mind")
+
+
+def test_windy_pro_desktop_is_byok_but_the_account_server_is_not():
+    assert cg.allowed("windy-pro", "src/client/desktop/main.js", ALLOW)
+    assert not cg.allowed("windy-pro", "account-server/src/routes/translations.ts", ALLOW)
+
+
+def test_a_commit_not_fetched_yet_is_skipped_not_an_error(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    bare, sha = _repo(tmp_path, {"app/llm.py": "import anthropic\n"})
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cg, "WORK", tmp_path)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cg, "CACHE", tmp_path / "cache.json")
+    (tmp_path / "windy-chat.git").symlink_to(bare)
+    assert cg.check("windy-chat", "f" * 40, "main", True) is None     # pushed after the fetch
+    assert [f.kind for f in cg.check("windy-chat", sha, "main", True)] == ["provider SDK"]
+
+
+KEYCHAIN = "src/client/web/src/pages/panels/MindKeychain.jsx"
+
+
+def test_scoped_allow_admits_only_the_oauth_endpoints():
+    ok = [
+        "    window.location.href = `https://openrouter.ai/auth?callback_url=${encodeURIComponent(callback)}`",
+        "    const res = await fetch('https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/auth/keys', {",
+    ]
+    for line in ok:
+        assert cg.allowed("windy-pro", KEYCHAIN, ALLOW, line)
+    # an inference call smuggled into the same file still flags
+    assert not cg.allowed("windy-pro", KEYCHAIN, ALLOW,
+                          "  await fetch('https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions', {")
+    # a scoped entry never allows a line it can't see
+    assert not cg.allowed("windy-pro", KEYCHAIN, ALLOW)
+
+
+def test_scoped_allow_in_a_real_diff():
+    diff = f"""--- /dev/null
++++ b/{KEYCHAIN}
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++  window.location.href = `https://openrouter.ai/auth?callback_url=x`
++  const res = await fetch('https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/auth/keys', {{
++  await fetch('https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions', {{
+"""
+    fs = cg.parse_added("windy-pro", diff, ALLOW)
+    assert [(f.line, f.match) for f in fs] == [(3, "openrouter.ai")]
+
+
+def test_block_mode_never_blocks_grant_owned(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cg, "MODE", "block")
+    g = cg.Finding("src/client/desktop/x.js", 9, "provider host", "api.openai.com")
+    state, desc, f = cg.status_for([], whole_tree=True, grant=[g])
+    assert state == "success" and desc.startswith("⚠ WARN (Grant-owned, not blocking): 1") and f is g
+    lane = cg.Finding("a.py", 3, "provider host", "x")
+    assert cg.status_for([lane], whole_tree=True, grant=[g])[0] == "failure"
+
+
+def test_veron_ollama_warns_on_added_lines_and_never_blocks(monkeypatch):
+    hits = cg.scan_line("app/llm.py", 'OLLAMA = "http://192.168.1.73:11434/api/generate"')
+    assert [k for k, _ in hits] == ["veron ollama"]
+    assert cg.scan_line("app/llm.py", 'port = 114345') == []                # not the port
+    assert cg.scan_line("app/llm.py", "# was http://x:11434 (removed)") == []  # a comment is not a call
+    f = cg.Finding("app/llm.py", 7, "veron ollama", ":11434")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(cg, "MODE", "block")
+    state, desc, _ = cg.status_for([f], whole_tree=False)
+    assert state == "success" and desc.startswith("⚠ WARN: new Veron Ollama ref app/llm.py:7")
+    assert "Windy Mind" in desc and len(desc) <= 140
+    hard = cg.Finding("app/llm.py", 1, "provider host", "api.openai.com")
+    assert cg.status_for([f, hard], whole_tree=False)[0] == "failure"       # a real violation still blocks
+
+
+def test_ollama_in_added_pr_lines_only():
+    diff = ("+++ b/svc/client.py\n@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@\n+import httpx\n"
+            "+URL = 'http://veron:11434/api/chat'\n")
+    got = cg.parse_added("some-repo", diff, [])
+    assert [(f.kind, f.line) for f in got] == [("veron ollama", 2)]

api/tests/test_guards_report.py

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+"""guards_report: job attribution and the Grant-owned split."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "scripts"))
+_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("guards_report", ROOT / "scripts" / "guards_report.py")
+gr = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)
+sys.modules["guards_report"] = gr
+_spec.loader.exec_module(gr)
+
+OWNED = yaml.safe_load((ROOT / "ci" / "grant-owned.yml").read_text())["grant_owned"]
+WF = """name: CI
+on:
+  push:
+jobs:
+  reality-check:
+    runs-on: x
+    steps:
+      - run: npm install jsdom
+  test-backend:
+    runs-on: x
+    steps:
+      - run: pip install pytest
+"""
+
+
+def test_job_of_attributes_lines_to_their_job():
+    assert gr.job_of(WF, 3) is None            # `on:` block, not a job
+    assert gr.job_of(WF, 8) == "reality-check"
+    assert gr.job_of(WF, 12) == "test-backend"
+
+
+def test_windy_pro_desktop_jobs_and_paths_are_grant_owned():
+    ci = ".github/workflows/ci.yml"
+    assert gr.grant_owned("windy-pro", ci, "reality-check", OWNED)
+    assert gr.grant_owned("windy-pro", ci, "build-electron", OWNED)
+    assert not gr.grant_owned("windy-pro", ci, "test-backend", OWNED)       # server side: 8c
+    assert gr.grant_owned("windy-pro", ".github/workflows/release-mac.yml", None, OWNED)
+    assert gr.grant_owned("windy-pro", "src/client/desktop/main.js", None, OWNED)
+    assert not gr.grant_owned("windy-pro", "services/account-server/Dockerfile", None, OWNED)
+    assert not gr.grant_owned("windy-chat", "src/client/desktop/main.js", None, OWNED)
+
+
+def test_render_splits_lane_and_grant_counts():
+    F = gr.cg.Finding
+    res = {"windy-pro": {"sha": "a" * 40, "compute": [],
+                         "hygiene": [(F("ci.yml", 8, "floating install", "npm install"), "reality-check", True),
+                                     (F("ci.yml", 12, "floating install", "pip x"), "test-backend", False)]},
+           "windy-git": {"sha": "b" * 40, "compute": [], "hygiene": []}}
+    md = gr.render(res)
+    assert "| ci-hygiene (house rule 6) | 1 | 1 | ❌ not yet |" in md
+    assert "| compute-guard (Mind is the only door) | 0 | 0 | ✅ YES |" in md
+    assert "| windy-git | Windy Git | bbbbbbb | 0 | 0 | 0 | clean ✅ |" in md
+    assert "| windy-pro | Windy Hub | aaaaaaa |" in md  # owner = session to message
+    assert "(job reality-check)" in md
+
+
+def test_windy_pro_root_env_example_is_grant_owned_but_not_the_account_servers():
+    assert gr.grant_owned("windy-pro", ".env.example", None, OWNED)
+    assert not gr.grant_owned("windy-pro", "account-server/.env.example", None, OWNED)
+
+
+def test_split_grant_sends_desktop_code_to_grant(monkeypatch):
+    F = gr.cg.Finding
+    fs = [F("src/client/desktop/main.js", 3, "provider host", "x"),
+          F("account-server/src/llm.ts", 5, "provider host", "y")]
+    lane, grant = gr.split_grant("windy-pro", "a" * 40, fs)
+    assert [f.path for f in grant] == ["src/client/desktop/main.js"]
+    assert [f.path for f in lane] == ["account-server/src/llm.ts"]
+    assert gr.split_grant("windy-chat", "a" * 40, fs) == (fs, [])

api/tests/test_invariants.py

@@ -425,9 +425,28 @@ def test_i05_jobs_get_a_network_per_job_not_a_shared_bridge():
 
 
 def test_i05_jobs_cannot_bind_mount_from_the_daemon_host():
-    cfg = (ROOT / "deploy" / "runner" / "config.yaml").read_text()
-    assert "valid_volumes: []" in cfg
-    assert 'docker_host: "-"' in cfg
+    """Narrowed 2026-09-23 (orchestrator-approved): a job may bind-mount EXACTLY
+    one daemon path, windy-pro's non-secret build inputs, and only because dind
+    itself has that path READ-ONLY. Anything more (a second path, a writable
+    one, a glob) reopens the host to CI code. Still no docker socket for jobs."""
+    import re
+
+    import yaml
+
+    rd = ROOT / "deploy" / "runner"
+    cfg = yaml.safe_load((rd / "config.yaml").read_text())
+    allowed = cfg["container"]["valid_volumes"]
+    assert allowed in ([], ["/ci-inputs/windy-pro"]), f"I-5: jobs may mount nothing else: {allowed}"
+    assert cfg["container"]["docker_host"] == "-"
+    if allowed:
+        compose = yaml.safe_load((rd / "docker-compose.yml").read_text())
+        binds = [v for v in compose["services"]["dind"]["volumes"] if v.startswith("/")]
+        assert binds == ["/home/user1-gpu/ci-inputs/windy-pro:/ci-inputs/windy-pro:ro"], (
+            f"I-5: dind's only host bind must be the ci-inputs path, READ-ONLY: {binds}")
+        for name, svc in compose["services"].items():
+            if name != "dind":
+                for v in svc.get("volumes") or []:
+                    assert not re.match(r"^/home/user1-gpu/ci-inputs", v), f"I-5: {name} mounts ci-inputs"
 
 
 def test_i05_no_ci_container_can_reach_the_forge_network():

api/tests/test_lockbox_put.py

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+"""lockbox-put against a LOCAL fake lockbox repo only (never the real one)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+FAKE = "Zk3vQ8mT1pLw7Xn2Rb5Hd9Yc"  # synthetic
+
+
+def sh(*a, cwd=None):
+    return subprocess.run(a, cwd=cwd, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
+
+
+def make_remote(tmp_path):
+    work = tmp_path / "seed"
+    work.mkdir()
+    sh("git", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", cwd=work)
+    (work / "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md").write_text("# LOCKBOX\n\n- **`EXISTING_KEY`**: `abcdefgh12345678`\nOLD_ENV_KEY=whatever123456\n")
+    sh("git", "add", "-A", cwd=work)
+    sh("git", "-c", "user.name=t", "-c", "user.email=t@t", "commit", "-qm", "seed", cwd=work)
+    bare = tmp_path / "remote.git"
+    sh("git", "clone", "-q", "--bare", str(work), str(bare))
+    return bare
+
+
+def put(tmp_path, bare, key, content, mode=0o600):
+    f = tmp_path / "val"
+    f.write_text(content)
+    os.chmod(f, mode)
+    e = {**os.environ, "LOCKBOX_PUT_REPO": str(bare), "LOCKBOX_PUT_NO_PR": "1", "HOME": str(tmp_path / "h")}
+    (tmp_path / "h" / ".cache").mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(ROOT / "scripts" / "lockbox_put.py"), key, str(f), "--lane", "test", "--note", "n"],
+                       capture_output=True, text=True, env=e)
+    return r.returncode, r.stdout + r.stderr
+
+
+def test_appends_one_key_by_branch_and_never_echoes_value(tmp_path):
+    bare = make_remote(tmp_path)
+    rc, out = put(tmp_path, bare, "NEW_TEST_KEY", FAKE)
+    assert rc == 0 and "pushed branch lockbox-put/new_test_key-" in out
+    assert FAKE not in out and FAKE[:6] not in out
+    br = [b.strip() for b in sh("git", "branch", "--list", "lockbox-put/*", cwd=bare).stdout.splitlines()]
+    assert len(br) == 1
+    diff = sh("git", "diff", "--numstat", f"main..{br[0]}", cwd=bare).stdout.split()
+    assert diff[1] == "0" and diff[2] == "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md"  # additions only
+    content = sh("git", "show", f"{br[0]}:ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md", cwd=bare).stdout
+    assert f"- **`NEW_TEST_KEY`**: `{FAKE}`" in content and "EXISTING_KEY" in content
+    # main is untouched
+    assert FAKE not in sh("git", "show", "main:ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md", cwd=bare).stdout
+
+
+def test_refuses_existing_key_both_formats_and_bad_input(tmp_path):
+    bare = make_remote(tmp_path)
+    for k in ("EXISTING_KEY", "OLD_ENV_KEY"):
+        rc, out = put(tmp_path, bare, k, FAKE)
+        assert rc == 3 and "already exists" in out and FAKE not in out
+    assert put(tmp_path, bare, "lower_case", FAKE)[0] == 2
+    assert put(tmp_path, bare, "OK_KEY_1", FAKE, mode=0o644)[0] == 2        # not 0600
+    assert put(tmp_path, bare, "OK_KEY_2", "has space `tick`")[0] == 2        # unsafe value
+    assert not sh("git", "branch", "--list", "lockbox-put/*", cwd=bare).stdout.strip()  # nothing pushed
+
+
+def test_symlink_refused(tmp_path):
+    bare = make_remote(tmp_path)
+    real = tmp_path / "real"
+    real.write_text(FAKE)
+    os.chmod(real, 0o600)
+    link = tmp_path / "link"
+    link.symlink_to(real)
+    e = {**os.environ, "LOCKBOX_PUT_REPO": str(bare), "LOCKBOX_PUT_NO_PR": "1"}
+    r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(ROOT / "scripts" / "lockbox_put.py"), "SYM_KEY", str(link)],
+                       capture_output=True, text=True, env=e)
+    assert r.returncode == 2 and FAKE not in r.stdout + r.stderr

api/tests/test_pr_status_bridge.py

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import base64
 import importlib.util
+import sys
 from pathlib import Path
 
 import pytest
@@ -79,10 +80,11 @@ class Fake:
 
 @pytest.fixture
 def fake(monkeypatch):
-    def make(**kw):
+    def make(queued=(), **kw):
         f = Fake(**kw)
         monkeypatch.setattr(bridge, "gitea", f.gitea)
         monkeypatch.setattr(bridge, "github", f.github)
+        monkeypatch.setattr(bridge, "queued_jobs", lambda repo, sha: list(queued))
         return f
 
     return make
@@ -272,3 +274,190 @@ def test_gitea_dir_wins_over_github_dir(fake):
 )
 def test_workflow_problem(text, problem):
     assert bridge.workflow_problem(text) == problem
+
+
+def _q(n, wf, job):
+    return {"run_number": n, "workflow_id": wf, "name": job}
+
+
+def test_queued_job_shows_pending_instead_of_nothing(fake):
+    f = fake(queued=[_q(5, "ci.yml", "test")])
+    bridge.post_statuses("windy-chat", SHA)
+    assert [(p["context"], p["state"]) for p in f.posted] == [("windy-git/ci/test", "pending")]
+    assert f.posted[0]["target_url"].endswith("/actions/runs/5")
+
+
+def test_queued_rerun_supersedes_the_stale_failure(fake):
+    f = fake(runs=[_run(1, "ci.yml", "test", "failure", n=4)], queued=[_q(7, "ci.yml", "test")])
+    bridge.post_statuses("windy-chat", SHA)
+    assert [(p["context"], p["state"]) for p in f.posted] == [("windy-git/ci/test", "pending")]
+
+
+def test_older_queued_job_never_overrides_a_newer_verdict(fake):
+    f = fake(runs=[_run(1, "ci.yml", "test", "success", n=9)], queued=[_q(3, "ci.yml", "test")])
+    bridge.post_statuses("windy-chat", SHA)
+    assert [(p["context"], p["state"]) for p in f.posted] == [("windy-git/ci/test", "success")]
+
+
+def test_queued_docker_and_non_blocking_jobs_stay_unposted(fake):
+    f = fake(queued=[_q(2, "ci.yml", "docker-build"), _q(2, "ci.yml", "build-desktop")])
+    bridge.post_statuses("windy-pro", SHA)
+    assert f.posted == []
+
+
+def test_queued_lookup_refuses_unsafe_input():
+    assert bridge.queued_jobs("x'; drop table t;--", SHA) == []
+    assert bridge.queued_jobs("windy-chat", "not-a-sha") == []
+
+
+def _db(monkeypatch, jobs, labels):
+    import json as _json
+    import subprocess as _sp
+
+    payload = _json.dumps({"jobs": jobs, "labels": [_json.dumps(x) for x in labels]})
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        bridge.subprocess, "run",
+        lambda *a, **k: _sp.CompletedProcess(a, 0, stdout=payload, stderr=""),
+    )
+
+
+RUNNER = ["veron-1", "linux-x64", "self-hosted", "linux", "x64"]
+
+
+def test_only_jobs_a_runner_can_take_are_pending(monkeypatch):
+    # macos-latest is cancelled unpicked by the janitor: pending would never resolve.
+    _db(monkeypatch, [
+        {"run_number": 3, "workflow_id": "ci.yml", "name": "test", "runs_on": '["self-hosted","linux","x64"]'},
+        {"run_number": 3, "workflow_id": "ci.yml", "name": "mac", "runs_on": '["macos-latest"]'},
+    ], [RUNNER])
+    assert [j["name"] for j in bridge.queued_jobs("windy-chat", SHA)] == ["test"]
+
+
+def test_lookup_failure_is_non_fatal(monkeypatch):
+    import subprocess as _sp
+
+    def boom(*a, **k):
+        raise _sp.TimeoutExpired("docker", 30)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(bridge.subprocess, "run", boom)
+    assert bridge.queued_jobs("windy-chat", SHA) == []
+
+
+class _Guard:
+    def __init__(self, findings):
+        self.findings = findings
+
+    def check(self, repo, sha, default_branch, is_default_head):
+        return self.findings
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def status_for(findings, whole_tree, grant=()):
+        if not findings and grant:
+            return "success", f"GRANT-WARN {len(grant)}", grant[0]
+        if not findings:
+            return "success", "OK: clean", None
+        return "failure", f"BLOCK {len(findings)}", findings[0]
+
+
+class _F:
+    path, line = "app/llm.py", 7
+
+
+def test_guard_posts_warn_with_a_link_to_the_first_finding(fake, monkeypatch):
+    f = fake()
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "compute_guard", _Guard([_F()]))
+    bridge.post_compute_guard("windy-chat", SHA, "main", False)
+    assert [(p["context"], p["state"], p["description"]) for p in f.posted] == [
+        ("windy-git/compute-guard", "failure", "BLOCK 1")]
+    assert f.posted[0]["target_url"].endswith(f"/src/commit/{SHA}/app/llm.py#L7")
+
+
+def test_guard_same_status_is_not_reposted(fake, monkeypatch):
+    f = fake(statuses=[{"context": "windy-git/compute-guard", "state": "failure", "description": "BLOCK 1"}])
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "compute_guard", _Guard([_F()]))
+    bridge.post_compute_guard("windy-chat", SHA, "main", False)
+    assert f.posted == []
+
+
+def test_guard_that_cannot_run_posts_nothing(fake, monkeypatch):
+    f = fake()
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "compute_guard", _Guard(None))
+    bridge.post_compute_guard("windy-chat", SHA, "main", True)
+    assert f.posted == []
+
+
+def test_ci_hygiene_posts_under_its_own_context(fake, monkeypatch):
+    f = fake(statuses=[{"context": "windy-git/compute-guard", "state": "failure", "description": "BLOCK 1"}])
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "ci_hygiene", _Guard([_F()]))
+    bridge.post_ci_hygiene("windy-chat", SHA, "main", True)
+    # the compute-guard status with the same description must not suppress it
+    assert [(p["context"], p["description"]) for p in f.posted] == [("windy-git/ci-hygiene", "BLOCK 1")]
+
+
+def test_retargeted_pr_gets_a_fresh_mirror_on_the_new_base(fake):
+    # eternitas #167: stacked on fix/one-hallway, retargeted to main on GitHub.
+    gh = [{"number": 167, "title": "feat", "html_url": "u",
+           "head": {"ref": "feat/x", "sha": SHA, "repo": {"full_name": f"{bridge.GH_OWNER}/eternitas"}},
+           "base": {"ref": "main"}}]
+    wg = [{"number": 9, "title": "[GH#167] feat", "base": {"ref": "fix/one-hallway"}}]
+    f = fake(gh_prs=gh, wg_prs=wg)
+    assert bridge.sync_prs("eternitas") == [SHA]
+    assert f.closed == [f"/repos/{bridge.WG_OWNER}/eternitas/pulls/9"]
+    assert [(o["base"], o["head"]) for o in f.opened] == [("main", "feat/x")]
+
+
+def test_unchanged_base_leaves_the_mirror_alone(fake):
+    gh = [{"number": 5, "title": "t", "html_url": "u",
+           "head": {"ref": "b", "sha": SHA, "repo": {"full_name": f"{bridge.GH_OWNER}/windy-chat"}},
+           "base": {"ref": "main"}}]
+    f = fake(gh_prs=gh, wg_prs=[{"number": 3, "title": "[GH#5] t", "base": {"ref": "main"}}])
+    bridge.sync_prs("windy-chat")
+    assert f.closed == [] and f.opened == []
+
+
+def test_named_no_daemon_job_is_not_posted_for_that_repo_only(fake, monkeypatch):
+    """eternitas ci/build needs Docker but its name doesn't say so (option A, 09-23)."""
+    monkeypatch.setattr(bridge, "NO_DAEMON_NAMED", {"eternitas": {"ci/build"}})
+    runs = [_run(1, "ci.yml", "build", "failure"), _run(2, "ci.yml", "test", "success")]
+    f = fake(runs=runs)
+    bridge.post_statuses("eternitas", SHA)
+    assert [p["context"] for p in f.posted] == ["windy-git/ci/test"]
+    f2 = fake(runs=runs)
+    bridge.post_statuses("windy-chat", SHA)
+    assert sorted(p["context"] for p in f2.posted) == ["windy-git/ci/build", "windy-git/ci/test"]
+
+
+def test_default_no_daemon_named_is_empty():
+    """eternitas converted its ci/build to a no-Docker ci/smoke (#179); nothing left."""
+    assert bridge.NO_DAEMON_NAMED == {}
+
+
+def test_grant_owned_findings_never_block(fake, monkeypatch):
+    """Orchestrator 09-23: compute-guard blocks lane-owned code only."""
+    f = fake()
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "compute_guard", _Guard([_F()]))
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "guards_report",
+                        type("GR", (), {"split_grant": staticmethod(lambda r, s, fs: ([], list(fs)))}))
+    bridge.post_compute_guard("windy-pro", SHA, "main", True)
+    assert [(p["state"], p["description"]) for p in f.posted] == [("success", "GRANT-WARN 1")]
+
+
+def test_failed_grant_split_warns_instead_of_blocking(fake, monkeypatch):
+    def boom(*a):
+        raise RuntimeError("no bare clone")
+
+    f = fake()
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "compute_guard", _Guard([_F()]))
+    monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "guards_report", type("GR", (), {"split_grant": staticmethod(boom)}))
+    bridge.post_compute_guard("windy-pro", SHA, "main", True)
+    assert [p["state"] for p in f.posted] == ["success"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name, hidden", [
+    ("Docker Build", True), ("docker-build", True), ("Docker build", True), ("docker", True),
+    ("Boot smoke (no Docker)", False), ("smoke (no-docker)", False), ("boot without Docker", False),
+    ("smoke", False),
+])
+def test_no_docker_smoke_jobs_are_posted(name, hidden):
+    """windy-search #96: its replacement job says "no Docker" and was hidden."""
+    assert bridge.needs_daemon("windy-search", "ci", name) is hidden

api/tests/test_push_velocity.py

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+"""Push-velocity detection (scripts/telemetry_emit.py): detect + alert only.
+
+Driven through the real function with rows shaped like the Gitea query's.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "scripts"))
+_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("telemetry_emit", ROOT / "scripts" / "telemetry_emit.py")
+te = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)
+_spec.loader.exec_module(te)
+
+NOW = 1_800_000_000.0
+
+
+def row(login="agent-et26abcd1234", uid=7, p1h=0, p24h=0, d24h=0, repos=1, wid=None):
+    return {"uid": uid, "login": login, "wid": wid, "p1h": p1h, "p24h": p24h, "d24h": d24h, "repos": repos}
+
+
+def test_under_every_threshold_emits_nothing():
+    ev, keep = te.push_velocity_events([row(p1h=60, p24h=500, d24h=10)], NOW, {})
+    assert ev == [] and keep == {}
+
+
+def test_burst_emits_one_declared_row_with_the_passport():
+    ev, keep = te.push_velocity_events([row(p1h=61, p24h=61, repos=3)], NOW, {})
+    assert len(ev) == 1
+    e = ev[0]
+    assert e["event_type"] == "forge.push_velocity" and e["service"] == "forge"
+    assert e["actor_type"] == "agent" and e["actor_id"] == "ET26-ABCD-1234"
+    assert e["metadata"] == {
+        "rule": "pushes_1h", "window_s": 3600, "count": 61, "threshold": 60,
+        "repos": 3, "gitea_user_id": 7,
+    }
+    assert keep == {"7:pushes_1h": NOW}
+
+
+def test_still_over_is_reported_once_per_window_not_every_run():
+    _, keep = te.push_velocity_events([row(p1h=90)], NOW, {})
+    ev, keep = te.push_velocity_events([row(p1h=95)], NOW + 300, keep)
+    assert ev == [] and keep == {"7:pushes_1h": NOW}
+    ev, _ = te.push_velocity_events([row(p1h=95)], NOW + 3601, keep)
+    assert len(ev) == 1
+
+
+def test_dropping_back_under_rearms():
+    _, keep = te.push_velocity_events([row(p1h=90)], NOW, {})
+    _, keep = te.push_velocity_events([row(p1h=5)], NOW + 300, keep)
+    assert keep == {}
+    ev, _ = te.push_velocity_events([row(p1h=90)], NOW + 600, keep)
+    assert len(ev) == 1
+
+
+def test_the_sync_account_is_exempt():
+    ev, _ = te.push_velocity_events([row(login="windyadmin", uid=1, p1h=9999, p24h=9999)], NOW, {})
+    assert ev == []
+
+
+def test_sso_human_is_keyed_on_windy_identity_id():
+    ev, _ = te.push_velocity_events([row(login="u-5e1b9569abc", wid="5e1b9569-full-id", d24h=11)], NOW, {})
+    assert [(e["actor_type"], e["actor_id"], e["metadata"]["rule"]) for e in ev] == [
+        ("human", "5e1b9569-full-id", "ref_deletes_24h")
+    ]
+    assert "caller" not in ev[0]["metadata"]
+
+
+def test_no_provable_id_is_system_plus_caller_never_an_invented_id():
+    # UPDATE 2 actor rule: agent/human rows without an actor_id are quarantined.
+    for login in ("u-nolink", "agent-weird"):
+        ev, _ = te.push_velocity_events([row(login=login, p24h=501)], NOW, {})
+        assert ev[0]["actor_type"] == "system" and "actor_id" not in ev[0]
+        assert ev[0]["metadata"]["caller"] == "unknown"
+
+
+def test_passport_round_trip():
+    assert te.passport_from_login("agent-et26p1zgttp8") == "ET26-P1ZG-TTP8"
+    assert te.passport_from_login("u-abc") is None

api/tests/test_secret_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+"""Secret guard: shapes, hash-only findings, allow by hash."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "scripts"))
+_spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("secret_guard", ROOT / "scripts" / "secret_guard.py")
+sg = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)
+sys.modules["secret_guard"] = sg
+_spec.loader.exec_module(sg)
+ss = sg.ss
+
+# Synthetic shapes only: none of these is a real credential.
+TG = "1234567890:" + "A" * 35
+CASES = [
+    ("telegram bot token", f"TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN={TG}"),
+    ("github token", "token = 'ghp_" + "a1" * 18 + "'"),
+    ("aws access key", "aws_access_key_id = AKIA" + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP"),
+    ("slack token", "xoxb-" + "1234567890-abcdefghij"),
+    ("anthropic key", "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-" + "x" * 30),
+    ("openai key", "OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-proj-" + "y" * 40),
+    ("stripe live key", "STRIPE=sk_live_" + "z" * 24),
+    ("google api key", "key=AIza" + "B" * 35),
+    ("private key block", "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----"),
+]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("kind, text", CASES)
+def test_each_shape_is_found_and_only_its_hash_is_kept(kind, text):
+    hits = sg.scan_line("app.py", text)
+    assert [k for k, _ in hits] == [kind]
+    match = hits[0][1]
+    assert match.startswith(f"{kind} #") and len(match.rsplit("#", 1)[1]) == 8
+    # house rule 10: the value itself must never appear in a finding
+    secret = text.split("=", 1)[-1].strip(" '")
+    assert secret not in match
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("text", [
+    "sha512-" + "Q" * 86 + "==",           # lockfile integrity
+    "version: 12345678:abc",               # short, not a token
+    "sk-ant-short",                        # too short
+    "re_test_register_sends_verification", # windy-pro's fake Resend key
+    "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=",                  # a name, not a value
+])
+def test_non_secrets_are_not_flagged(text):
+    assert sg.scan_line("x", text) == []
+
+
+def test_anthropic_key_is_not_double_counted_as_openai():
+    assert [k for k, _ in sg.scan_line("x", "sk-ant-" + "q" * 40)] == ["anthropic key"]
+
+
+def test_allow_is_by_hash_only():
+    F = sg.cg.Finding
+    fake = F("tests/t.py", 3, "telegram bot token", f"telegram bot token #{ss.h8(TG)}")
+    real = F("tests/t.py", 9, "telegram bot token", "telegram bot token #deadbeef")
+    allow = {"windy-chat": {"hashes": {ss.h8(TG)}, "paths": []}}
+    assert sg._drop_allowed("windy-chat", [fake, real], allow) == [real]
+    assert sg._drop_allowed("windy-mail", [fake], allow) == [fake]
+
+
+def test_private_key_blocks_are_allowed_by_path_never_by_hash():
+    F = sg.cg.Finding
+    hdr = "private key block #" + ss.h8("-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----")
+    test_key = F("tests/keys/test.pem", 1, "private key block", hdr)
+    prod_key = F("deploy/prod.pem", 1, "private key block", hdr)
+    allow = {"r": {"hashes": {hdr.rsplit("#", 1)[1]}, "paths": [("tests/keys/*", {"private key block"})]}}
+    assert sg._drop_allowed("r", [test_key, prod_key], allow) == [prod_key]
+
+
+def test_path_allow_cannot_cover_real_token_kinds(tmp_path):
+    bad = tmp_path / "a.yml"
+    bad.write_text("allow:\n  - repo: r\n    paths: [tests/*]\n    kinds: [telegram bot token]\n    reason: no\n")
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        sg.load_allow(bad)
+
+
+def test_shipped_allow_file_never_excuses_the_real_leaked_tokens():
+    a = sg.load_allow()
+    every = set().union(*(v["hashes"] for v in a.values())) if a else set()
+    assert not {"1354fc9b", "d49dc2ba"} & every  # real (now revoked) credentials: remove, never allow
+
+
+def test_allow_file_loads_and_needs_reasons(tmp_path):
+    assert isinstance(sg.load_allow(), dict)
+    bad = tmp_path / "a.yml"
+    bad.write_text("allow:\n  - repo: r\n    hashes: [abcd1234]\n")
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError):
+        sg.load_allow(bad)
+
+
+def test_block_and_warn(monkeypatch):
+    f = sg.cg.Finding("a.py", 1, "github token", "github token #abcd1234")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sg, "MODE", "block")
+    assert sg.status_for([f], False)[0] == "failure"
+    assert sg.status_for([], False, grant=[f])[0] == "success"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sg, "MODE", "warn")
+    state, desc, _ = sg.status_for([f], True)
+    assert state == "success" and desc.startswith("⚠ WARN (not blocking): 1 secret-shaped string in tree")
+
+
+def test_public_scan_excuses_by_hash_and_by_path():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("public_secret_scan", ROOT / "scripts" / "public_secret_scan.py")
+    ps = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(ps)
+    allow = {"windy-agent": {"hashes": {"aaaa1111"}, "paths": [("tests/keys/*", {"private key block"})]}}
+    assert ps.excused("windy-agent", "openai key", "aaaa1111", ["tests/x.py"], allow)
+    assert not ps.excused("windy-agent", "telegram bot token", "1354fc9b", ["tests/test_log_redaction.py"], allow)
+    assert ps.excused("windy-agent", "private key block", "ffff0000", ["tests/keys/a.pem"], allow)
+    # a PEM header anywhere outside the allowed paths still counts
+    assert not ps.excused("windy-agent", "private key block", "ffff0000", ["tests/keys/a.pem", "deploy/k.pem"], allow)
+    assert not ps.excused("other", "openai key", "aaaa1111", ["x"], allow)
+
+
+HEX32 = "0123456789abcdef" * 2  # synthetic
+
+
+def test_twilio_shapes_hash_only_and_no_md5_noise():
+    kinds = lambda t: [k for k, _ in ss.find(t)]  # noqa: E731
+    assert kinds(f'TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN = "{HEX32}"') == ["32-hex secret assignment"]
+    assert kinds(f"auth_token: {HEX32}") == ["32-hex secret assignment"]
+    assert kinds("AC" + HEX32) == ["twilio sid/api key"]
+    assert kinds("SK" + HEX32) == ["twilio sid/api key"]
+    # plain md5 / uuid-without-dashes / a 64-hex sha256 are NOT secrets by shape
+    assert kinds(f"md5 = {HEX32}") == []
+    assert kinds(f"checksum_key = {HEX32}{HEX32}") == []
+    assert kinds(f"name = 'x{HEX32}'") == []
+    # the hash is of the value alone, so renaming the variable keeps the same allow hash
+    a = ss.find(f"A_TOKEN={HEX32}")[0][1]
+    b = ss.find(f"OTHER_SECRET: '{HEX32}'")[0][1]
+    assert a == b == ss.h8(HEX32)
+    assert HEX32 not in repr(ss.find(f"A_TOKEN={HEX32}"))
+
+
+def test_warn_kinds_do_not_block(monkeypatch):
+    f = sg.cg.Finding("a.py", 1, "32-hex secret assignment", "32-hex secret assignment #abcd1234")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sg, "MODE", "block")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sg, "WARN_KINDS", {"32-hex secret assignment"})
+    assert sg.status_for([f], True)[0] == "success"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(sg, "WARN_KINDS", set())
+    assert sg.status_for([f], True)[0] == "failure"
+
+
+def test_pypi_token_shape_hash_only():
+    tok = "pypi-AgE" + "Ab1_-" * 20  # synthetic
+    got = ss.find(f"password = {tok}")
+    assert [k for k, _ in got] == ["pypi token"] and got[0][1] == ss.h8(tok)
+    assert tok not in repr(got)
+    assert ss.find("pypi-AgE-too-short") == []

api/tests/test_secret_scan.py

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+"""secret-scan + env-names: findings carry label/location/hash, NEVER a value or fragment."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+SCRIPTS = ROOT / "scripts"
+# Synthetic, random-looking, never real. FAKE_LB is in the fake lockbox; TWI matches a shape.
+FAKE_LB = "k7Xv2QpLm9RtZw4HnB8dYc3S"
+TWI = "9f3a7c1e5b2d48806a1f4e7d2c9b0835"
+
+
+def run(script, *args, env=None):
+    e = {**os.environ, **(env or {})}
+    r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(SCRIPTS / script), *args], capture_output=True, text=True, env=e)
+    return r.returncode, r.stdout + r.stderr
+
+
+def no_fragment(out: str, value: str, n: int = 6):
+    assert value not in out
+    for i in range(len(value) - n + 1):
+        assert value[i:i + n] not in out, f"fragment of the value leaked at {i}"
+
+
+def seeded(tmp_path):
+    lb = tmp_path / "lockbox.md"
+    lb.write_text(f"FAKE_VENDOR_API_KEY={FAKE_LB}\nNOTE: nothing here\n")
+    repo = tmp_path / "repo"
+    repo.mkdir()
+    g = lambda *a: subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *a], check=True, capture_output=True)  # noqa: E731
+    g("init", "-q", "-b", "main")
+    g("config", "user.email", "t@t")
+    g("config", "user.name", "t")
+    (repo / "app.py").write_text(f'KEY = "{FAKE_LB}"\nTWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN = "{TWI}"\n')
+    g("add", "-A")
+    g("commit", "-qm", "add secrets")
+    (repo / "app.py").write_text("KEY = None\n")  # removed from HEAD, still in history
+    g("commit", "-qam", "remove")
+    return lb, repo
+
+
+def test_tree_scan_labels_locations_no_value(tmp_path):
+    lb, repo = seeded(tmp_path)
+    (repo / "live.py").write_text(f'x = "{FAKE_LB}"\n')
+    rc, out = run("secret_scan.py", str(repo / "live.py"), env={"SECRET_SCAN_LOCKBOX_PATHS": str(lb)})
+    assert rc == 1
+    assert "live.py:1" in out and "lockbox:FAKE_VENDOR_API_KEY" in out
+    no_fragment(out, FAKE_LB)
+
+
+def test_history_finds_removed_secret_with_commit(tmp_path):
+    lb, repo = seeded(tmp_path)
+    rc, out = run("secret_scan.py", str(repo), "--history", env={"SECRET_SCAN_LOCKBOX_PATHS": str(lb)})
+    assert rc == 1
+    assert "app.py:1" in out and "commit=" in out and "lockbox:FAKE_VENDOR_API_KEY" in out
+    assert "app.py:2" in out and "32-hex secret assignment" in out
+    no_fragment(out, FAKE_LB)
+    no_fragment(out, TWI)
+
+
+def test_repo_flag_clones_scans_and_cleans_up(tmp_path):
+    lb, repo = seeded(tmp_path)
+    cache = tmp_path / "home"
+    (cache / ".cache").mkdir(parents=True)
+    rc, out = run("secret_scan.py", "--repo", str(repo),
+                  env={"SECRET_SCAN_LOCKBOX_PATHS": str(lb), "HOME": str(cache)})
+    assert rc == 1 and "app.py:1" in out
+    no_fragment(out, FAKE_LB)
+    assert not [p for p in (cache / ".cache").iterdir() if p.name.startswith("secret-scan-")]
+
+
+def test_clean_tree_and_bad_input(tmp_path):
+    (tmp_path / "ok.txt").write_text("hello world\n")
+    rc, out = run("secret_scan.py", str(tmp_path / "ok.txt"), "--no-lockbox")
+    assert rc == 0 and "0 finding(s)" in out
+    rc, out = run("secret_scan.py", str(tmp_path), "--history", "--no-lockbox")
+    assert rc == 2 and "needs a git repo" in out
+
+
+def test_env_names_never_prints_values(tmp_path):
+    a = tmp_path / "a.env"
+    b = tmp_path / "b.env"
+    a.write_text(f"# c\nexport DB_PASSWORD={FAKE_LB}\nTOKEN=\"{TWI}\"\nEMPTY=\nONLY_A=1\n")
+    b.write_text(f"DB_PASSWORD={FAKE_LB}\nTOKEN=different-value-here\nONLY_B=2\n")
+    rc, out = run("env_names.py", str(a), "--hash")
+    assert rc == 0 and "DB_PASSWORD" in out and "set" in out and "empty" in out and "len=24" in out
+    assert "sha256:" in out
+    no_fragment(out, FAKE_LB)
+    no_fragment(out, TWI, 7)
+    rc, out = run("env_names.py", str(a), "--compare", str(b))
+    assert "DB_PASSWORD" in out and "SAME" in out and "DIFFERENT" in out
+    assert "only-in-A" in out and "only-in-B" in out
+    no_fragment(out, FAKE_LB)
+    rc, out = run("env_names.py", str(tmp_path / "missing.env"))
+    assert rc == 2
+
+
+def test_shapes_are_the_guards_shapes():
+    sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS))
+    import secret_scan as sc
+    import secret_shapes as ss
+    assert sc.ss is ss  # one source of shapes: a new guard shape is automatically a scan shape

ci/ci-hygiene-allow.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# CI hygiene allow-list: installs that may float, or services that may publish
+# a host port. House rule 6 (09-23): installs come from a lockfile. Every entry
+# is an exception and MUST say why. Paths are fnmatch globs from the repo root.
+# Owner: Windy Git lane (13); changes go through the orchestrator.
+allow:
+  - repo: windy-pro
+    paths: [".github/workflows/ci.yml"]
+    # ONLY the old deploy job's two docker lines. That job is `if: false`
+    # (CD boundary, 2026-07), and the compose line runs ON windyword.ai inside
+    # the ssh string. Any other docker step in ci.yml still flags.
+    matches: ['docker build -f account-server/Dockerfile -t windy-pro:', 'docker compose down && docker compose up -d --build']
+    reason: "needs-docker false positive: the deploy job is if: false and its compose runs on the remote host over ssh. Added with the needs-docker rule (orchestrator option A, 09-23)."
+

ci/compute-guard-allow.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+# Compute guard allow-list: code that MAY talk to an AI provider directly.
+# Windy Mind is the ONLY door to AI compute (Grant, 2026-09-23). Every entry
+# here is an exception to that rule and MUST say why. Paths are fnmatch globs
+# relative to the repo root. Owner of this file: Windy Git lane (13); changes
+# go through the orchestrator. Source of the first entries: COMPUTE_BYPASS_AUDIT.md.
+allow:
+  - repo: windy-mind
+    paths: ["*"]
+    reason: "Windy Mind IS the door: provider clients belong here by definition."
+
+  - repo: windy-agent
+    paths: ["*"]
+    reason: >-
+      User BYOK: self-hosted agents call providers on the USER's own keys.
+      Mind stays opt-in there, or every self-hosted user's inference lands on
+      Grant's bill (no-cloud-cost-liability rule; audit #7).
+
+  - repo: windy-code
+    paths: ["extensions/windy-ai/*"]
+    reason: "User BYOK AI extension: the user's own provider keys; Mind is one opt-in provider (audit #8)."
+
+  - repo: windy-connect
+    paths: ["*writers/*"]
+    reason: "Writes client configs that NAME the user's own provider env vars; makes no provider calls (audit #11)."
+
+  - repo: windy-pro
+    paths: ["src/client/desktop/*"]
+    reason: >-
+      User BYOK desktop client: cloud STT/translate keys come from what the USER
+      enters (renderer localStorage -> electron-store; env var only for dev), and
+      the CSP line allows exactly those user-keyed hosts (audit #10). The
+      account-server is NOT covered: server-side calls go through Mind.
+
+  - repo: windy-pro
+    paths: ["src/client/web/src/pages/panels/MindPanel.jsx"]
+    reason: "Validates the USER's own OpenRouter key for BYOK (audit #10); spends no house money."
+
+  - repo: windy-pro
+    paths: ["src/client/web/src/pages/panels/MindKeychain.jsx"]
+    # ONLY these two endpoints: any other openrouter.ai call in this file (e.g.
+    # /api/v1/chat, i.e. inference) still flags. Orchestrator-approved 09-23.
+    matches: ['openrouter\.ai/auth\?', 'openrouter\.ai/api/v1/auth/keys']
+    reason: "BYOK key acquisition via OpenRouter OAuth PKCE; no inference; successor of MindPanel allow (ADR-064)."
+
+  - repo: windy-git
+    paths: ["scripts/compute_guard.py", "ci/compute-guard-allow.yml"]
+    reason: "The guard's own pattern list and this file."
+
+  - repo: windy-mind
+    paths: ["*"]
+    matches: [':11434']
+    reason: "Windy Mind IS the compute door (endpoint + key); it may call Ollama. Only the Ollama port is allowed here, any provider host/SDK in Mind still flags."

ci/grant-owned.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# Code Grant owns directly (orchestrator, 09-23): guard findings here are listed
+# SEPARATELY in the guards status page and never hold up "block". Changes to
+# these files are proposals for Grant / Windy Word 44, not a lane's fix.
+grant_owned:
+  - repo: windy-pro
+    reason: "Windy Word desktop (Electron) + its release/installer builds: Grant's, built from the Mac mini."
+    paths:
+      - "src/client/desktop/*"
+      # ROOT .env.example only (exact path): documents the desktop app's BYOK dev
+      # fallback keys; the hub reads neither (8c, 09-23). account-server/.env.example
+      # is NOT matched and stays the hub lane's.
+      - ".env.example"
+      - "installer-v2/*"
+      - ".github/workflows/build-windows.yml"
+      - ".github/workflows/release-mac.yml"
+      - ".github/workflows/build-installer.yml"
+      - ".github/workflows/build-offline-installers.yml"
+    jobs:
+      ".github/workflows/ci.yml": [reality-check, build-desktop, test-installer, build-electron]

ci/secret-guard-allow.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# Secret guard allow-list: KNOWN FAKE values that look like secrets (test
+# fixtures, docs). Allowed BY HASH (sha256[:8] of the value), so a real secret
+# in the same file still flags. Private-key blocks (the match is only the BEGIN
+# line, same hash everywhere) are allowed by PATH + kind instead.
+# Every entry MUST say why. Owner: Windy Git lane (13); changes via the orchestrator.
+# Triage 09-24 (values never printed): each hash checked against every version of
+# the lockbox; fakes judged by impossible length for the kind (real Anthropic keys
+# ~108 chars, OpenAI 51 or 160+), fake-words, or identity with upstream public
+# fixtures. NOT allowed, remove instead: 1354fc9b (old @Windy_0_bot token) and
+# d49dc2ba (old Anthropic key), both real and revoked, in public windy-agent.
+allow:
+  - repo: windy-code
+    hashes: [ac9265e5, 46eb1235]
+    reason: "Upstream microsoft/vscode terminalEnvironment.test.ts fixtures (identical hash upstream; public)."
+  - repo: windy-code
+    paths: ["build/azure-pipelines/common/publish.ts"]
+    kinds: [private key block]
+    reason: "Upstream VS Code build script (PEM header string in code, not a key)."
+  - repo: windy-agent
+    hashes: [a9235a6d, dd6a2baa, 02c362d8, a6f6ff79, f7503b21, d0c94833, 4ab092e3, e3aa1eb8, 833382ee]
+    reason: "Redaction/sanitizer test fixtures; lengths impossible for real Anthropic/OpenAI keys; never in the lockbox."
+  - repo: windy-agent
+    hashes: [89bd408f, b8c94b72, bf23cdf5, d1d85dfe, e3e07f06]
+    reason: "09-24 #395 replacement fixtures (each contains FAKE; token-SHAPED on purpose so redaction tests prove real tokens are scrubbed); verified by Windy Agent sha-for-sha against every lockbox version: never real. Weekly scan 09-28."
+  - repo: windy-agent
+    paths: ["tests/test_agent_keys.py"]
+    kinds: [private key block]
+    reason: "Test-generated key material for agent-key tests."
+  - repo: windy-mind
+    hashes: [f8a630b2]
+    reason: "Provider test fixture (27 chars; a real Anthropic key is ~108)."
+  - repo: windy-pro
+    hashes: [756de8d8, 7828319d, 1a5d44a2]
+    reason: ".env.production.example placeholder + crash-summary test fixtures (AWS doc EXAMPLE key shape, short fake Slack token)."
+  - repo: windy-pro
+    paths: ["account-server/docs/oauth-providers.md"]
+    kinds: [private key block]
+    reason: "Docs show the PEM header format; no key material."
+  - repo: windytalk
+    hashes: [baf8656a]
+    reason: "Diagnostics redaction test fixture (fake-word in value)."
+  - repo: eternitas
+    paths: ["tests/golden_vectors/**", "tests/test_soul_vault_key_separation.py"]
+    kinds: [private key block]
+    reason: "Test vectors and throwaway keys for signature/vault tests."
+  - repo: windy-drops
+    paths: ["tools/conformance/test-keys/*"]
+    kinds: [private key block]
+    reason: "Conformance-suite test keys (named test-private.pem)."
+  - repo: windy-git
+    paths: ["api/tests/test_secret_guard.py"]
+    kinds: [private key block]
+    reason: "The guard's own test uses a PEM header string as a sample."
+  - repo: windy-code
+    hashes: ["23f32607"]
+    reason: "VS Code OSS extensions' package.json aiKey: Microsoft's public telemetry (App Insights) key, shipped in every VS Code build; not a Windy credential."
+  - repo: windytalk
+    hashes: ["c4189d79"]
+    reason: "apps/desktop/test/diagnostics.test.ts redaction fixture (hexSecret beside a fake sk-ant token); hash checked against the lockbox 10-01: not present."

deploy/branding/templates/home.tmpl

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
     <div class="wg-cta">
       {{if not .IsSigned}}
         <a class="ui primary button" href="{{AppSubUrl}}/user/login">Sign in with Windy</a>
+        <p class="wg-note" style="margin-top:.9rem;font-size:.95rem;opacity:.75">Invite only at launch: new accounts are not open yet.</p>
       {{else}}
         <a class="ui primary button" href="{{AppSubUrl}}/{{.SignedUser.Name}}?tab=repositories">Your repositories</a>
       {{end}}
@@ -18,8 +19,8 @@
       <p>Git and LFS over Windy Cloud storage. Source, weights and adapters live side by side.</p></div>
     <div class="wg-card"><h3>Agents are first-class</h3>
       <p>An agent signs in with its own Eternitas passport — not a human's borrowed token — and its work is attributable to it.</p></div>
-    <div class="wg-card"><h3>Your account, no second password</h3>
-      <p>Sign in with the Windy account you already have. Nothing new to remember.</p></div>
+    <div class="wg-card"><h3>Invite only, for now</h3>
+      <p>Windy Git accounts are by invitation while we launch. If you've been invited, you sign in with your Windy account, with no second password.</p></div>
     <div class="wg-card"><h3>Kept, and kept elsewhere</h3>
       <p>Every repository is bundled nightly to off-site storage, and the restore is rehearsed rather than assumed.</p></div>
   </div>

deploy/branding/templates/user/auth/link_account.tmpl

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+{{/* Windy Git override of Gitea 1.24.6 templates/user/auth/link_account.tmpl.
+     Forge registration is CLOSED at launch (Grant, 09-23), so a Windy account
+     with no forge account used to land on Gitea's raw "Registration is disabled"
+     error. That case now gets a plain invite-only page; every other case is
+     Gitea's template unchanged (re-diff it on Gitea upgrades). No change to who
+     can register. */}}
+{{if and .DisableRegistration (not .user_exists)}}
+{{template "base/head" .}}
+<div role="main" aria-label="Windy Git is invite-only" class="page-content user link-account">
+	<div class="ui middle very relaxed page grid">
+		<div class="column tw-my-5">
+			<div class="tw-flex tw-flex-col tw-gap-4 tw-max-w-2xl tw-m-auto">
+				<h4 class="ui top attached header center">Windy Git is invite-only while we launch</h4>
+				<div class="ui attached segment">
+					<p>You're signed in with your Windy account{{if or .user_name .email}} as <strong>{{or .user_name .email}}</strong>{{end}}. Nothing is wrong with it: Windy Git just isn't open to every account yet.</p>
+					<p>We'll let you know when it opens.</p>
+					<a class="ui primary button" href="https://app.windyword.ai/dashboard">Back to your dashboard</a>
+				</div>
+			</div>
+		</div>
+	</div>
+</div>
+{{template "base/footer" .}}
+{{else}}
+{{template "base/head" .}}
+<div role="main" aria-label="{{.Title}}" class="page-content user link-account">
+	<overflow-menu class="ui secondary pointing tabular top attached borderless menu secondary-nav">
+		<div class="overflow-menu-items tw-justify-center">
+			<!-- TODO handle .ShowRegistrationButton once other login bugs are fixed -->
+			{{if not .AllowOnlyInternalRegistration}}
+				<a class="item {{if not .user_exists}}active{{end}}"
+					data-tab="auth-link-signup-tab">
+					{{ctx.Locale.Tr "auth.oauth_signup_tab"}}
+				</a>
+			{{end}}
+			<a class="item {{if .user_exists}}active{{end}}"
+				data-tab="auth-link-signin-tab">
+				{{ctx.Locale.Tr "auth.oauth_signin_tab"}}
+			</a>
+		</div>
+	</overflow-menu>
+	<div class="ui middle very relaxed page grid">
+		<div class="column tw-my-5">
+			{{/* these styles are quite tricky but it needs to be the same as the signin page */}}
+			<div class="ui tab {{if not .user_exists}}active{{end}}" data-tab="auth-link-signup-tab">
+				<div class="tw-flex tw-flex-col tw-gap-4 tw-max-w-2xl tw-m-auto">
+				{{if .AutoRegistrationFailedPrompt}}<div class="ui message">{{.AutoRegistrationFailedPrompt}}</div>{{end}}
+				{{template "user/auth/signup_inner" .}}
+				</div>
+			</div>
+			<div class="ui tab {{if .user_exists}}active{{end}}" data-tab="auth-link-signin-tab">
+				<div class="tw-flex tw-flex-col tw-gap-4 tw-max-w-2xl tw-m-auto">
+				{{template "user/auth/signin_inner" .}}
+				</div>
+			</div>
+		</div>
+	</div>
+</div>
+
+{{template "base/footer" .}}
+{{end}}

deploy/runner/config.yaml

@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ container:
   privileged: false
   options:
   workdir_parent: /workspace
-  valid_volumes: []      # a job cannot bind-mount anything from the daemon host
+  # A job may bind-mount exactly ONE daemon path: the read-only windy-pro build
+  # inputs (mounted :ro into dind itself). Per-runner, not per-repo (act_runner
+  # limit): any windyadmin repo could mount it; it is non-secret and read-only.
+  valid_volumes: ["/ci-inputs/windy-pro"]
   docker_host: "-"       # do NOT expose the runner's own docker socket to jobs
   force_pull: false

deploy/runner/docker-compose.yml

@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ services:
       # A fresh volume: Sysbox shifts ownership to its own uid range. The old
       # `dind-storage` is kept untouched for the privileged rollback.
       - dind-storage-sysbox:/var/lib/docker
+      # READ-ONLY, non-secret build inputs for windy-pro's desktop jobs (models,
+      # linux-x64 portable bundle, enter-monitor build), copied from the frozen
+      # release clone by deploy/runner/refresh-ci-inputs.sh. Jobs may mount ONLY
+      # this path (config.yaml valid_volumes). Orchestrator-approved 09-23.
+      - /home/user1-gpu/ci-inputs/windy-pro:/ci-inputs/windy-pro:ro
     # G1.5 — bounded so a fork-bomb workflow cannot starve Grant's interactive
     # session. Veron 1 is his workstation, not a dedicated build box.
     cpus: 12.0            # 12 of 24 cores

deploy/runner/refresh-ci-inputs.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Refresh the READ-ONLY CI input cache for windy-pro desktop jobs from the FROZEN
+# release clone on Veron. Reads ~/windy-pro-release only; never writes to it.
+# Run when the release lane says engines / wheels / the portable bundle changed.
+# Linux inputs only: 3 models + requirements-bundle.txt, bundled-portable/linux-x64,
+# native/enter-monitor/build. Result is chmod a-w and mounted :ro into dind.
+set -euo pipefail
+SRC=/home/user1-gpu/windy-pro-release
+DST=/home/user1-gpu/ci-inputs/windy-pro
+models=$(ls "$SRC/extraResources/model" | grep -E '^windy-(nano|lite|core)-ct2$')
+[ "$(wc -w <<<"$models")" = 3 ] || { echo "expected 3 models, got: $models"; exit 1; }
+mkdir -p "$DST/extraResources/model" "$DST/bundled-portable" "$DST/native-enter-monitor-build"
+chmod -R u+w "$DST"
+R="ionice -c3 nice -n 19 rsync -a --delete"
+for m in $models; do $R "$SRC/extraResources/model/$m/" "$DST/extraResources/model/$m/"; done
+$R "$SRC/extraResources/requirements-bundle.txt" "$DST/extraResources/requirements-bundle.txt"
+$R "$SRC/bundled-portable/linux-x64/" "$DST/bundled-portable/linux-x64/"
+$R "$SRC/native/enter-monitor/build/" "$DST/native-enter-monitor-build/"
+date -u +%FT%TZ > "$DST/.refreshed-from-windy-pro-release"
+chmod -R a-w "$DST"
+du -sh --apparent-size "$DST"

deploy/systemd/windygit-state-backup.service

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Windy Git nightly STATE backup (Postgres + Gitea config + repos -> encrypted restic in R2)
+After=network-online.target docker.service
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+WorkingDirectory=/srv/windygit/src
+# R2 credentials come from the .env; the restic password from /etc/windygit/restic.pass
+# (root 600; the same value lives in the lockbox as RESTIC_WINDYGIT_PASSWORD).
+EnvironmentFile=/srv/windygit/src/.env
+ExecStart=/bin/bash /srv/windygit/src/scripts/backup_state.sh
+Nice=10
+IOSchedulingClass=idle
+TimeoutStartSec=3h

deploy/systemd/windygit-state-backup.service.d/windy-job.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[Service]
+ExecStart=
+ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/windy-job windygit-state-backup 26h --expect "ok — state backed up" --owner 13 -- /bin/bash /srv/windygit/src/scripts/backup_state.sh

deploy/systemd/windygit-state-backup.timer

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Nightly Windy Git state backup
+
+[Timer]
+# 03:07 local, clear of the git-bundle backup at 04:17.
+OnCalendar=*-*-* 03:07:00
+Persistent=true
+RandomizedDelaySec=300
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=timers.target

deploy/systemd/windygit-sync.service.d/compute-guard-block.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[Service]
+# Orchestrator 09-23: compute-guard BLOCKS lane-owned findings; Grant-owned (ci/grant-owned.yml) stay WARN.
+Environment=COMPUTE_GUARD_MODE=block

deploy/systemd/windygit-sync.service.d/secret-guard-block.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+[Service]
+# Orchestrator 09-24: secret-guard BLOCKS lane-owned findings; Grant-owned stay WARN.
+Environment=SECRET_GUARD_MODE=block

docker-compose.yml

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ services:
 
   gitea:
     # G2.1 — PIN AN EXACT VERSION. Never `latest`. Record it in SUBSTRATE.md.
-    image: docker.io/gitea/gitea:1.24.6
+    image: docker.io/gitea/gitea:1.24.7
     environment:
       GITEA__database__DB_TYPE: postgres
       GITEA__database__HOST: db:5432

docs/CUTOVER.md

@@ -110,7 +110,12 @@ their CI permanently, not a stopgap:
 - **Image-build jobs** (name matches `docker`) post nothing: job containers
   have no Docker daemon by design (I-5), so they are red on every commit. A
   rootless builder (BuildKit rootless / buildx in the capped dind) is the open
-  decision that would bring them back.
+  decision that would bring them back. Jobs that need Docker but are named otherwise go in
+  `BRIDGE_NO_DAEMON` (empty since eternitas converted to ci/smoke, #179). DECIDED 09-23 (orchestrator,
+  option A): lanes convert these jobs to no-Docker smoke tests (job `services:` +
+  start the app + curl /health); the real image build is the deploy step on the
+  target host. ci-hygiene flags docker build/compose/run in workflows ("needs docker").
+  No host Docker socket for CI without a separate decision.
 
 **Onboarding another private repo** — the promotion steps below, then:
 

docs/RESTORE-DRILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Restoring Windy Git from the encrypted state backup
+
+What is backed up (`scripts/backup_state.sh`, restic repo `s3:…/windy-git-backups/restic`, tag `windygit-state`):
+both Postgres databases (`gitea`, `windygit`, custom-format dumps + globals), the whole Gitea data root
+(`/srv/windygit/git`: config, jwt, attachments, avatars, templates AND the bare repositories),
+`/srv/windygit/src/.env`, `deploy/runner/.env`, `/etc/cloudflared`, the windygit systemd drop-ins.
+NOT in it: the restic password itself (lockbox `RESTIC_WINDYGIT_PASSWORD`) and the R2 access key
+(scoped token `windy-git-r2-scoped`, lockbox). Never print either: use `lockbox-get KEY FILE`.
+
+## Drill (any machine with restic + docker; proven on Veron 2026-10-01, counts identical)
+    export RESTIC_PASSWORD_FILE=<0600 file from lockbox-get RESTIC_WINDYGIT_PASSWORD>
+    export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=… AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=…            # from lockbox-get, into env, not echoed
+    export RESTIC_REPOSITORY=s3:https://<R2 account>.r2.cloudflarestorage.com/windy-git-backups/restic
+    restic snapshots --tag windygit-state
+    restic restore latest --tag windygit-state --target /var/tmp/wg-drill
+    docker run -d --name wg-drill-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=<random> -e POSTGRES_USER=drill postgres:16-alpine
+    for db in gitea windygit; do
+      docker exec wg-drill-pg psql -U drill -d postgres -c "create database $db"
+      docker exec -i wg-drill-pg pg_restore -U drill -d $db --no-owner --no-privileges \
+        < /var/tmp/wg-drill/var/backups/windygit-state/$db.dump
+    done
+    # compare row counts with live (or with the last known): repository, issue, pull_request, "user",
+    # external_login_user, access_token, action_run, action_run_job
+    docker rm -f wg-drill-pg; rm -rf /var/tmp/wg-drill
+
+## Real disaster (Veron lost)
+1. New Linux host with Docker, a Cloudflare tunnel connector, the repo (`git clone` from GitHub: windy-git).
+2. `restic restore latest --tag windygit-state --target /` (puts /srv/windygit/git, the .env files, /etc/cloudflared back).
+3. `docker compose -p windy-git up -d db`, then pg_restore both dumps into it (as above, into the real db names/owner from `.env`).
+4. `docker compose -p windy-git up -d` + `deploy/runner` runners; re-register runners if the token changed.
+5. Verify: `/api/healthz`, Windy SSO login, `git ls-remote`, one CI run. GitHub is still the source of truth for code,
+   so repo content can also be re-synced from there; the database is what only this backup holds.
+Retention: 14 daily / 8 weekly / 6 monthly (prune on Sundays). Integrity: every run does `restic check --read-data-subset=2%`.

docs/RUNBOOK-VERON.md

@@ -152,3 +152,16 @@ disqualifying the moment a stranger depends on it. **The trigger is not a date
 it is the first external push.** Move the control plane to a dedicated VPS (not
 Kit 0), keep Veron 1 as the runner. It is an rsync, a Postgres dump and three
 DNS record edits.
+
+## Re-run a PR's CI (Gitea 1.24 has no rerun API)
+
+```bash
+ssh wg-veron
+cd /srv/windygit/src && bash scripts/rerun_ci.sh <repo> <branch> <github-head-sha-prefix>
+```
+Moves the Windy Git branch back one commit; the next sync force-pushes the
+GitHub head again and Gitea re-fires every workflow for that event on the same
+commit. Guarded: refuses unless the branch is at the given sha, waits for a
+sync that starts AFTER the rewind, restores the branch itself on timeout.
+Don't use the web "Re-run" button: it needs a hub-SSO session as windyadmin,
+which is Grant's identity.

scripts/backup_state.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Nightly STATE backup: everything git bundles do NOT hold (SOTU 10-01: 625 issues/PRs, users,
+# SSO links, CI history, settings lived on one unbacked-up host). Encrypted restic repo in R2.
+#   - Postgres: every database (custom-format dump, restore-listable) + globals
+#   - Gitea config/data (app.ini, jwt, attachments, avatars, templates) + the bare repositories
+#   - the deploy .env files, systemd drop-ins and the cloudflared tunnel config (needed to rebuild)
+# The restic password lives in /etc/windygit/restic.pass (root 600) AND the lockbox
+# (RESTIC_WINDYGIT_PASSWORD): a lost Veron must not lose the backups. NEVER echo env/values here.
+# Restore: docs/RESTORE-DRILL.md. Bounded: every docker exec runs under `timeout` (a hung
+# runc exec in the IO stall wedged the sync on 09-23).
+set -euo pipefail
+log() { echo "[backup_state $(date -u +%FT%TZ)] $*"; }
+: "${R2_ACCOUNT_ID:?}" "${R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID:?}" "${R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY:?}"
+PASSFILE="${RESTIC_PASSWORD_FILE:-/etc/windygit/restic.pass}"
+[[ -s "$PASSFILE" ]] || { log "FATAL: $PASSFILE missing/empty: refusing to report a backup that did not happen"; exit 1; }
+export RESTIC_PASSWORD_FILE="$PASSFILE"
+export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"
+export RESTIC_REPOSITORY="${RESTIC_REPOSITORY:-s3:https://${R2_ACCOUNT_ID}.r2.cloudflarestorage.com/${R2_BUCKET_BACKUPS:-windy-git-backups}/restic}"
+DB="${WG_DB_CONTAINER:-windy-git-db-1}"
+STAGE="${WG_STAGE:-/var/backups/windygit-state}"
+GIT_ROOT="${GIT_DATA_ROOT:-/srv/windygit/git}"
+umask 077
+mkdir -p "$STAGE"; chmod 700 "$STAGE"; rm -f "$STAGE"/*.dump "$STAGE"/globals.sql
+
+# systemd gives units no $HOME, and restic wants a cache dir: pin one.
+export RESTIC_CACHE_DIR="${RESTIC_CACHE_DIR:-/var/cache/windygit-restic}"; mkdir -p "$RESTIC_CACHE_DIR"
+if ! err=$(restic cat config 2>&1 >/dev/null); then
+  # only a MISSING repo may be initialised; any other error (auth, network, wrong password) must stop here
+  if grep -qiE "does not exist|is there a repository|unable to open config file" <<<"$err"; then
+    log "initialising restic repo"; restic init >/dev/null
+  else
+    log "FATAL: restic cannot open the repository: $(head -c 300 <<<"$err" | tr '\n' ' ')"; exit 1
+  fi
+fi
+
+PGU=$(timeout 30 docker exec "$DB" printenv POSTGRES_USER)
+[[ -n "$PGU" ]] || { log "FATAL: no POSTGRES_USER in $DB"; exit 1; }
+dbs=$(timeout 60 docker exec "$DB" psql -U "$PGU" -Atc "select datname from pg_database where not datistemplate and datname<>'postgres' order by 1")
+n=0
+for d in $dbs; do
+  timeout 600 docker exec "$DB" pg_dump -U "$PGU" -Fc "$d" > "$STAGE/$d.dump"
+  # a dump that cannot be listed is not a backup
+  timeout 120 docker exec -i "$DB" pg_restore -l < "$STAGE/$d.dump" >/dev/null
+  [[ $(stat -c%s "$STAGE/$d.dump") -gt 1000 ]] || { log "FATAL: $d dump suspiciously small"; exit 1; }
+  n=$((n+1)); log "dumped $d ($(stat -c%s "$STAGE/$d.dump") bytes)"
+done
+[[ $n -ge 1 ]] || { log "FATAL: no databases dumped"; exit 1; }
+timeout 120 docker exec "$DB" pg_dumpall -U "$PGU" --globals-only > "$STAGE/globals.sql"
+
+paths=("$STAGE" "$GIT_ROOT" /srv/windygit/src/.env /srv/windygit/src/deploy/runner/.env /etc/cloudflared)
+for p in /etc/systemd/system/windygit-*.service.d /etc/windygit; do [[ -e $p ]] && paths+=("$p"); done
+# restic.pass itself is excluded: the password never rides in its own backup
+snap=$(restic backup --tag windygit-state --host windygit-veron --quiet --json \
+  --exclude "$GIT_ROOT/gitea/log" --exclude "$GIT_ROOT/gitea/queues" --exclude "$GIT_ROOT/gitea/tmp" \
+  --exclude "$GIT_ROOT/gitea/indexers" --exclude "$GIT_ROOT/gitea/actions_log" --exclude /etc/windygit/restic.pass \
+  "${paths[@]}" | python3 -c 'import sys,json
+for l in sys.stdin:
+    d=json.loads(l)
+    if d.get("message_type")=="summary": print(d["snapshot_id"][:8])')
+[[ -n "$snap" ]] || { log "FATAL: restic produced no snapshot"; exit 1; }
+rm -f "$STAGE"/*.dump "$STAGE"/globals.sql
+restic check --read-data-subset=2% --quiet >/dev/null || { log "FATAL: restic check failed"; exit 1; }
+if [[ $(date +%u) == 7 ]]; then
+  restic forget --tag windygit-state --keep-daily 14 --keep-weekly 8 --keep-monthly 6 --prune --quiet >/dev/null
+fi
+echo "ok — state backed up ($n dbs, snapshot $snap)"

scripts/canary.py

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ import sys
 import time
 import urllib.error
 import urllib.request
+from collections.abc import Callable
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 
 STATE_PATH = os.environ.get("CANARY_STATE", "canary-state.json")
@@ -46,6 +47,16 @@ ALERT_FROM = os.environ.get("CANARY_ALERT_FROM", "office@thewindstorm.uk")
 LOGIN_WARN_SECONDS = float(os.environ.get("CANARY_LOGIN_WARN_S", "35"))
 TIMEOUT = float(os.environ.get("CANARY_TIMEOUT_S", "60"))
 
+# Journey cleanup rule (orchestrator, 2026-09-23). The login probe creates a hub
+# session (access + refresh token) every run, so it must end it. The hub's
+# /auth/logout revokes the token AND every refresh token of the account
+# (verified live: access 401, refresh 401 after it). So the next successful
+# logout also heals anything a failed run left behind; no ledger needed.
+LOGOUT_URL = "https://account.windyword.ai/api/v1/auth/logout"
+LOGOUT_ATTEMPTS = 8       # retried on 5xx / no response only
+LOGOUT_GAP_S = 15.0
+LOGOUT_GONE = (401, 404, 410)  # the session is already over = done
+
 
 @dataclass
 class Result:
@@ -54,6 +65,7 @@ class Result:
     detail: str
     seconds: float = 0.0
     user_visible: str = ""
+    followups: list[Result] = field(default_factory=list)
 
 
 @dataclass
@@ -68,6 +80,8 @@ class Check:
     # When True this check INVERTS: a 2xx is a critical failure (a security
     # control opened) and a 401/403/503 is the healthy, expected outcome.
     must_refuse: bool = False
+    # Runs on a 2xx with the response body; returns follow-up results (cleanup).
+    after: Callable[[bytes], list[Result]] | None = None
 
 
 def _probe(c: Check) -> Result:
@@ -91,13 +105,18 @@ def _probe(c: Check) -> Result:
                               elapsed, c.what_it_proves)
             if r.status >= 400:
                 return Result(c.name, "down", f"HTTP {r.status}", elapsed, c.what_it_proves)
+            raw = r.read()
             warn = c.warn_seconds
             if warn and elapsed > warn:
-                return Result(
+                res = Result(
                     c.name, "slow", f"HTTP {r.status} in {elapsed:.1f}s (warn >{warn:.0f}s)",
                     elapsed, c.what_it_proves,
                 )
-            return Result(c.name, "ok", f"HTTP {r.status} in {elapsed:.1f}s", elapsed, c.what_it_proves)
+            else:
+                res = Result(c.name, "ok", f"HTTP {r.status} in {elapsed:.1f}s", elapsed, c.what_it_proves)
+            if c.after:
+                res.followups = c.after(raw)
+            return res
     except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
         if c.must_refuse and e.code in (401, 403, 503):
             return Result(c.name, "ok", f"correctly refused (HTTP {e.code})",
@@ -110,6 +129,52 @@ def _probe(c: Check) -> Result:
         )
 
 
+def logout(token: str, *, attempts: int = LOGOUT_ATTEMPTS, gap: float = LOGOUT_GAP_S,
+           sleep: Callable[[float], None] = time.sleep) -> Result:
+    """End the session the login probe opened. Honest: never ok unless proven."""
+    what = "the canary leaves no live session behind (journey cleanup rule)"
+    headers = {
+        "User-Agent": "windy-git-canary/1.0",
+        "X-Windy-Synthetic": "1",
+        "Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
+    }
+    start = time.monotonic()
+    last = "no attempt"
+    for i in range(attempts):
+        if i:
+            sleep(gap)
+        req = urllib.request.Request(LOGOUT_URL, data=b"", method="POST", headers=headers)
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as r:
+                return Result("identity.logout", "ok", f"session ended (HTTP {r.status})",
+                              time.monotonic() - start, what)
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
+            if e.code in LOGOUT_GONE:
+                return Result("identity.logout", "ok", f"session already over (HTTP {e.code})",
+                              time.monotonic() - start, what)
+            if e.code < 500:  # a 4xx won't change on retry: fail fast
+                return Result("identity.logout", "down", f"CLEANUP FAILED: HTTP {e.code}",
+                              time.monotonic() - start, what)
+            last = f"HTTP {e.code}"
+        except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001 — no response / timeout: retry
+            last = f"{type(e).__name__}"
+    return Result("identity.logout", "down",
+                  f"CLEANUP FAILED after {attempts} tries: {last} (next run's logout heals it)",
+                  time.monotonic() - start, what)
+
+
+def _logout_after_login(raw: bytes) -> list[Result]:
+    try:
+        token = (json.loads(raw or b"{}") or {}).get("token")
+    except ValueError:
+        token = None
+    if not token:
+        return [Result("identity.logout", "down",
+                       "CLEANUP FAILED: login returned no token to log out with",
+                       0.0, "the canary leaves no live session behind (journey cleanup rule)")]
+    return [logout(token)]
+
+
 def build_checks() -> list[Check]:
     checks = [
         Check(
@@ -187,6 +252,7 @@ def build_checks() -> list[Check]:
                 method="POST",
                 body={"email": email, "password": pw},
                 warn_seconds=LOGIN_WARN_SECONDS,
+                after=_logout_after_login,
             )
         )
     return checks
@@ -263,7 +329,10 @@ def main() -> int:
     args = ap.parse_args()
 
     previous = load_state()
-    results = [_probe(c) for c in build_checks()]
+    results = []
+    for c in build_checks():
+        r = _probe(c)
+        results += [r, *r.followups]
 
     print(f"windy canary — {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ', time.gmtime())}\n")
     for r in results:

scripts/ci_hygiene.py

@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""CI hygiene guard: installs come from a lockfile, never "latest" (house rule 6).
+
+A floating install lets CI test different versions than prod ships, and a
+rebuild silently changes prod. Windy Cloud's OpenAPI test failed on exactly
+that (fastapi 0.141.1 in CI vs 0.136.0 on the dev box) and all three Cloud
+cells floated in prod. Also flags services that publish a HOST port: every
+CI job shares one dind daemon, so two jobs publishing 5432 collide ("port is
+already allocated", Windy Mind runs 147/176).
+
+WARN-ONLY (`windy-git/ci-hygiene`, green + "⚠ WARN"); CI_HYGIENE_MODE=block
+turns it red once the lanes report clean. Scans CI workflow files and
+Dockerfiles only. PR heads: lines the PR adds. Default branch: every line.
+
+OK (not flagged):
+  pip / uv pip install  -r FILE (with or without --require-hashes), --no-deps,
+                        exact pins (tool==1.2.3), pip/setuptools/wheel upgrades
+  uv sync --locked | --frozen          npm ci
+  npm install pkg@1.2.3 (every package exact-pinned)
+  yarn install --frozen-lockfile / --immutable   pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
+Also flagged: `:latest` images (FROM / COPY --from / image: / docker://) and
+`COPY uv.lock* ...`-style globs that build without the lock (Windy Mail #147).
+Exceptions: ci/ci-hygiene-allow.yml, one reason per entry.
+
+  python3 scripts/ci_hygiene.py report [repo ...]
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import shlex
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+import compute_guard as cg  # noqa: E402  (shared walker, cache and allow-list loader)
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+ALLOW_FILE = Path(os.environ.get("CI_HYGIENE_ALLOW", ROOT / "ci" / "ci-hygiene-allow.yml"))
+MODE = os.environ.get("CI_HYGIENE_MODE", "warn")
+
+# CI workflow files and Dockerfiles; never vendored copies.
+INCLUDE = re.compile(r"(^|/)\.(github|gitea)/workflows/[^/]+\.ya?ml$|(^|/)(Dockerfile[^/]*|[^/]+\.Dockerfile)$")
+NEVER = re.compile(r"(^|/)(node_modules|vendor|third_party)/")
+PREFILTER = (r"pip3? install|pip install|uv sync|npm (install|i )|yarn install|pnpm install"
+             r"|^\s*-\s*['\"]?[0-9]+:[0-9]+|:latest|lock[^ ]*\*"
+             r"|docker[ -]compose|docker (build|buildx|run)|docker/build-push-action")
+
+TOOLING = {"pip", "setuptools", "wheel"}
+NO_DOCKER_FIX = "use job services: + a no-Docker smoke test; the image builds at deploy"
+DOCKER_FILE = re.compile(r"(^|/)(Dockerfile[^/]*|[^/]+\.Dockerfile)$")
+LATEST = re.compile(r"(?:^\s*FROM\s+(?:--platform=\S+\s+)?|--from=|image:\s*['\"]?|docker://)([\w./-]+):latest\b", re.I)
+LOCKNAME = re.compile(r"(uv\.lock|poetry\.lock|package-lock\.json|pnpm-lock\.yaml|yarn\.lock|requirements[^ ]*\.(txt|lock))", re.I)
+EXACT_PY = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+(\[[^\]]*\])?==[A-Za-z0-9.+!-]+$")
+EXACT_NPM = re.compile(r"^(@[^/@]+/)?[^/@]+@\d+\.\d+\.\d+([-+][0-9A-Za-z.-]+)?$")
+HOST_PORT = re.compile(r"^\s*-\s*['\"]?(\d{2,5}):(\d{2,5})['\"]?\s*(#.*)?$")
+PIP_VALUE_FLAGS = {"-c", "--constraint", "-i", "--index-url", "--extra-index-url", "-f",
+                   "--find-links", "--target", "-t", "--python", "--prefix", "--root", "--platform",
+                   "--python-version", "--implementation", "--abi", "--only-binary", "--no-binary"}
+
+
+def path_ok(path: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(INCLUDE.search(path)) and not NEVER.search(path)
+
+
+def _commands(text: str) -> list[list[str]]:
+    """Split a shell line into simple commands (&&, ||, ;, |), tokenized."""
+    out = []
+    for part in re.split(r"&&|\|\||;|\|", text):
+        try:
+            toks = shlex.split(part, comments=True)
+        except ValueError:
+            toks = part.split()
+        # Dockerfile RUN prefix / sudo / env-prefixed assignments
+        while toks and (toks[0] in ("RUN", "sudo", "exec", "-", "run:", "command:")
+                        or re.match(r"^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*=", toks[0])):
+            toks = toks[1:]
+        if toks:
+            out.append(toks)
+    return out
+
+
+def _pip_problem(args: list[str]) -> str | None:
+    if "-r" in args or "--requirement" in args or any(a.startswith("--requirement=") for a in args):
+        return None
+    if "--no-deps" in args:
+        return None
+    pkgs, skip = [], False
+    for a in args:
+        if skip:
+            skip = False
+            continue
+        if a in PIP_VALUE_FLAGS:
+            skip = True
+            continue
+        if a.startswith("-") and a not in ("-e", "--editable"):
+            continue
+        if a in ("-e", "--editable"):
+            continue
+        pkgs.append(a)
+    loose = [p for p in pkgs if not EXACT_PY.match(p) and p.split("[")[0].lower() not in TOOLING]
+    if loose:
+        return f"floating pip install: {' '.join(loose)[:40]}"
+    return None
+
+
+def scan_line(path: str, text: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
+    if cg.COMMENT.match(text):
+        return []
+    hits = []
+    if "/workflows/" in path and HOST_PORT.match(text):
+        hits.append(("host port", f"service publishes host port {HOST_PORT.match(text).group(1)} (shared dind)"))
+        return hits
+    # Windy Mail #147: a `:latest` build/tool image floats exactly like an
+    # unpinned package, and `COPY uv.lock* ./` builds WITHOUT the lock when it
+    # is missing instead of failing.
+    m = LATEST.search(text)
+    if m:
+        hits.append(("floating image", f"{m.group(1)}:latest"))
+    if DOCKER_FILE.search(path) and re.match(r"^\s*COPY\b", text, re.I):
+        globbed = [t for t in text.split() if "*" in t and LOCKNAME.search(t)]
+        if globbed:
+            hits.append(("optional lock", f"COPY {globbed[0]} (must fail if the lock is missing)"))
+    # Windy Git jobs get NO Docker daemon (I-5), so a docker build/compose/run
+    # step in CI can never pass here (orchestrator 09-23, option A). The real
+    # image build is the deploy step on the target host.
+    if "/workflows/" in path and re.search(r"uses:\s*['\"]?docker/build-push-action", text):
+        hits.append(("needs docker", "docker/build-push-action in CI (no Docker daemon on Windy Git; " + NO_DOCKER_FIX + ")"))
+    for toks in _commands(text):
+        low = [t.lower() for t in toks]
+        if "/workflows/" in path and (
+            low[:2] in (["docker", "build"], ["docker", "buildx"], ["docker", "run"], ["docker", "compose"])
+            or low[:1] == ["docker-compose"]
+        ):
+            hits.append(("needs docker", f"{' '.join(low[:2])} in CI (no Docker daemon on Windy Git; " + NO_DOCKER_FIX + ")"))
+            continue
+        # pip install / python -m pip install / uv pip install
+        for i in range(len(low) - 1):
+            if os.path.basename(low[i]) in ("pip", "pip3") and low[i + 1] == "install":
+                prob = _pip_problem(toks[i + 2:])
+                if prob:
+                    hits.append(("floating install", prob))
+                break
+        if low[:2] == ["uv", "sync"] and not ({"--locked", "--frozen"} & set(low)):
+            hits.append(("floating install", "uv sync without --locked/--frozen"))
+        if low[:1] == ["npm"] and len(low) > 1 and low[1] in ("install", "i", "add"):
+            pkgs = [t for t in toks[2:] if not t.startswith("-")]
+            if not pkgs or not all(EXACT_NPM.match(p) for p in pkgs):
+                hits.append(("floating install", f"npm {low[1]} {' '.join(pkgs)[:30]}".strip() + " (use npm ci)"))
+        if low[:2] == ["yarn", "install"] and not ({"--frozen-lockfile", "--immutable"} & set(low)):
+            hits.append(("floating install", "yarn install without --frozen-lockfile"))
+        if low[:2] == ["pnpm", "install"] and "--frozen-lockfile" not in low:
+            hits.append(("floating install", "pnpm install without --frozen-lockfile"))
+    return hits
+
+
+_DISABLED: dict[str, set[str]] | None = None
+
+
+def disabled_workflows() -> dict[str, set[str]]:
+    """Workflow file names Gitea has DISABLED per repo (lowercased repo name).
+
+    Deploy/release workflows are disabled on Windy Git: they run on the target
+    host, where a Docker daemon really exists, so "needs docker" must not flag
+    them. One bounded query per process; on any failure nothing is excused
+    (flag rather than hide).
+    """
+    global _DISABLED
+    if _DISABLED is not None:
+        return _DISABLED
+    _DISABLED = {}
+    query = ("select coalesce(json_object_agg(r.lower_name, u.config::json->'DisabledWorkflows'), '{}'::json)"
+             " from repo_unit u join repository r on r.id = u.repo_id"
+             " where u.type = 10 and u.config like '%DisabledWorkflows%';")
+    try:
+        out = subprocess.run(
+            ["docker", "exec", "-i", "windy-git-db-1", "sh", "-c",
+             'psql -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d gitea -At -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1'],
+            input=query, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True, timeout=30,
+        ).stdout.strip()
+        _DISABLED = {k: set(v or []) for k, v in json.loads(out or "{}").items()}
+    except (subprocess.SubprocessError, OSError, ValueError):
+        pass
+    return _DISABLED
+
+
+def _runs_here(repo: str, findings):
+    """Drop "needs docker" hits in workflows that never run on Windy Git."""
+    if findings is None:
+        return None
+    off = disabled_workflows().get(repo.lower(), set())
+    return [f for f in findings if not (f.kind == "needs docker" and Path(f.path).name in off)]
+
+
+def check(repo: str, sha: str, default_branch: str, is_default_head: bool):
+    return _runs_here(repo, _check(repo, sha, default_branch, is_default_head))
+
+
+def _check(repo: str, sha: str, default_branch: str, is_default_head: bool):
+    bare = cg.WORK / f"{repo}.git"
+    if not bare.is_dir() or not cg.fetched(bare, sha):  # pushed after the fetch: next cycle
+        return None
+    allow = cg.load_allow(ALLOW_FILE)
+    rules = hashlib.sha256((PREFILTER + INCLUDE.pattern + EXACT_PY.pattern + EXACT_NPM.pattern).encode()).hexdigest()[:8]
+    fp = cg._fingerprint(allow) + ":" + rules  # hashlib, not hash(): hash() is per-process random
+    kw = dict(line_fn=scan_line, path_ok=path_ok)
+    if is_default_head:
+        return cg.cached_scan(f"hyg-tree:{repo}:{sha}:{fp}",
+                              lambda: cg.scan_tree(repo, bare, sha, allow, prefilter=PREFILTER, **kw))
+    return cg.cached_scan(f"hyg-pr:{repo}:{sha}:{fp}",
+                          lambda: cg.scan_added(repo, bare, f"refs/heads/{default_branch}", sha, allow, **kw))
+
+
+def status_for(findings, whole_tree: bool, grant=()):
+    """Same contract as compute_guard.status_for: `grant` findings never block."""
+    scope = "in CI/Dockerfiles" if whole_tree else "added"
+    if not findings and grant:
+        g, n = grant[0], len(grant)
+        desc = f"⚠ WARN (Grant-owned, not blocking): {n} CI hygiene issue{'s' if n > 1 else ''} {scope}, e.g. {g.path}:{g.line} {g.match}"
+        return "success", desc[:140], g
+    if not findings:
+        return "success", f"OK: no floating install or host-port service {scope}", None
+    f = findings[0]
+    n = len(findings)
+    state = "failure" if MODE == "block" else "success"
+    lead = "BLOCKED" if MODE == "block" else "⚠ WARN (not blocking)"
+    return state, f"{lead}: {n} CI hygiene issue{'s' if n > 1 else ''} {scope}, e.g. {f.path}:{f.line} {f.match}"[:140], f
+
+
+def report(repos: list[str]) -> int:
+    allow = cg.load_allow(ALLOW_FILE)
+    total = 0
+    for repo in repos:
+        bare = cg.WORK / f"{repo}.git"
+        if not bare.is_dir():
+            print(f"## {repo}: no sync clone, skipped")
+            continue
+        head = cg._git(bare, "symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD").strip()
+        sha = cg._git(bare, "rev-parse", head).strip()
+        fs = _runs_here(repo, cg.scan_tree(repo, bare, sha, allow, line_fn=scan_line, path_ok=path_ok, prefilter=PREFILTER))
+        total += len(fs)
+        print(f"## {repo} ({head} {sha[:7]}): {len(fs)} issue(s)")
+        for f in fs:
+            print(f"  {f.path}:{f.line}  [{f.kind}]  {f.match}")
+    print(f"TOTAL {total}")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    if len(sys.argv) >= 2 and sys.argv[1] == "report":
+        default = os.environ.get("BRIDGE_REPOS", "").split() or sorted(
+            p.name.removesuffix(".git") for p in cg.WORK.glob("*.git"))
+        sys.exit(report(sys.argv[2:] or default))
+    sys.exit(__doc__)

scripts/compute_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Compute guard: Windy Mind is the ONLY door to AI compute (Grant, 2026-09-23).
+
+Flags code that talks to an AI provider directly instead of through Windy Mind:
+a provider API host, a provider SDK import or dependency, or a raw provider key
+name. Direct calls skip Mind's metering, caps and live-model routing, and they
+spend whichever key happens to be lying around (the audit found Grant's personal
+Max OAuth token inside a platform container).
+
+WARN-ONLY for now: the bridge posts `windy-git/compute-guard` as success with a
+"⚠ WARN" description, so nothing turns red. `COMPUTE_GUARD_MODE=block` flips
+findings to failure once the repos are clean (orchestrator's call).
+
+- PR heads: only lines the PR ADDS (vs its merge-base with the default branch).
+- Default-branch head: the whole tree (the baseline, and what `report` prints).
+
+Exceptions live in ONE file, ci/compute-guard-allow.yml, each with a reason.
+Tests, docs, lockfiles, vendored code and CI config are never scanned.
+Reads the sync's bare GitHub clones on Veron (no docker exec: IO-stall lesson).
+
+  python3 scripts/compute_guard.py report [repo ...]   # whole-tree findings on each default branch
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fnmatch
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import yaml
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+ALLOW_FILE = Path(os.environ.get("COMPUTE_GUARD_ALLOW", ROOT / "ci" / "compute-guard-allow.yml"))
+WORK = Path(os.environ.get("SYNC_WORK", "/srv/windygit/sync"))
+CACHE = Path(os.environ.get("COMPUTE_GUARD_CACHE", "/var/lib/windy-git/compute-guard-cache.json"))
+MODE = os.environ.get("COMPUTE_GUARD_MODE", "warn")  # warn | block
+
+HOSTS = [
+    "api.anthropic.com", "api.openai.com", "api.groq.com",
+    "generativelanguage.googleapis.com", "api.mistral.ai", "api.perplexity.ai",
+    "openrouter.ai", "api.together.xyz", "api.together.ai", "api.cerebras.ai",
+    "api.sambanova.ai", "api.deepseek.com", "api.x.ai", "api.cohere.ai",
+    "api.cohere.com", "api.fireworks.ai", "api.replicate.com",
+    "api-inference.huggingface.co",
+]
+KEYS = [
+    "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN", "ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN",
+    "OPENAI_API_KEY", "GROQ_API_KEY", "GEMINI_API_KEY", "GOOGLE_GENERATIVE_AI_API_KEY",
+    "GOOGLE_AI_API_KEY", "MISTRAL_API_KEY", "PERPLEXITY_API_KEY", "PPLX_API_KEY",
+    "OPENROUTER_API_KEY", "TOGETHER_API_KEY", "CEREBRAS_API_KEY", "SAMBANOVA_API_KEY",
+    "DEEPSEEK_API_KEY", "XAI_API_KEY", "COHERE_API_KEY", "FIREWORKS_API_KEY",
+    "REPLICATE_API_TOKEN",
+]
+PY_SDKS = r"anthropic|openai|groq|mistralai|cohere|google\.generativeai|google\.genai|together|cerebras|litellm"
+JS_SDKS = (r"@anthropic-ai/sdk|openai|groq-sdk|@google/generative-ai|@google/genai|@mistralai/mistralai"
+           r"|cohere-ai|together-ai|@ai-sdk/(?:anthropic|openai|groq|google|mistral)")
+
+RULES: list[tuple[str, re.Pattern]] = [
+    ("provider host", re.compile("|".join(re.escape(h) for h in HOSTS))),
+    # Grant via Boss 10-01: compute = Windy Mind. A NEW reference to an Ollama port (Veron's :11434) is a
+    # direct call around Mind's metering/caps. WARN-only, never red, and only for lines a PR ADDS.
+    ("veron ollama", re.compile(r"(?::|%3[aA])11434(?![0-9])")),
+    ("provider key", re.compile(r"\b(?:" + "|".join(KEYS) + r")\b")),
+    ("provider SDK", re.compile(rf"^\s*(?:from|import)\s+(?:{PY_SDKS})(?:\s|\.|$|,)")),
+    ("provider SDK", re.compile(rf"""(?:from\s+|require\(\s*|import\(\s*)['"](?:{JS_SDKS})(?:/[^'"]*)?['"]""")),
+    # dependency manifests: package.json keys, requirements / pyproject lines
+    ("provider SDK dep", re.compile(rf'''^\s*"(?:{JS_SDKS})"\s*:''')),
+    ("provider SDK dep", re.compile(rf'''^\s*["']?(?:{PY_SDKS.replace(chr(92) + ".", "-")})(?:\[[^\]]*\])?\s*(?:[<>=~!]=?|["',]|$)''')),
+]
+# Kinds that never block (even in MODE=block) and are only judged on ADDED lines, never the baseline tree.
+WARN_ONLY_KINDS = {"veron ollama"}
+OLLAMA_MSG = "compute = Windy Mind (endpoint + key); do not call Veron's Ollama directly"
+DEP_FILES = re.compile(r"(^|/)(package\.json|requirements[^/]*\.txt|pyproject\.toml|setup\.cfg|Pipfile)$")
+
+# Never scanned: tests, docs, lockfiles, vendored/built code, CI config.
+SKIP = re.compile(
+    r"(^|/)(tests?|__tests__|spec|docs?|node_modules|vendor|dist|build|\.github|\.gitea)/"
+    r"|(^|/)(test_[^/]*|[^/]*_test\.py|conftest\.py|[^/]*\.(test|spec)\.[cm]?[jt]sx?)$"
+    r"|\.(md|mdx|rst|txt|lock|snap|svg|png|jpg|pdf)$"
+    r"|(^|/)(package-lock\.json|pnpm-lock\.yaml|yarn\.lock|uv\.lock|poetry\.lock|Cargo\.lock)$"
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Finding:
+    path: str
+    line: int
+    kind: str
+    match: str
+
+
+def load_allow(path: Path = ALLOW_FILE) -> list[dict]:
+    data = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) or {}
+    entries = data.get("allow") or []
+    for e in entries:  # a reason per entry is the whole point of the file
+        if not (e.get("repo") and e.get("paths") and str(e.get("reason", "")).strip()):
+            raise ValueError(f"allow entry needs repo, paths and a reason: {e}")
+    return entries
+
+
+def allowed(repo: str, path: str, allow: list[dict], text: str | None = None) -> bool:
+    """An entry may carry `matches:` (regexes): then only lines matching one of
+    them are allowed, so an allowed file can't smuggle in a NEW call (e.g. an
+    OAuth sign-in endpoint is allowed, an inference endpoint in the same file
+    still flags). Entries without `matches` cover the whole path."""
+    for e in allow:
+        if e["repo"] != repo or not any(fnmatch.fnmatch(path, g) for g in e["paths"]):
+            continue
+        pats = e.get("matches")
+        if not pats:
+            return True
+        if text is not None and any(re.search(rx, text) for rx in pats):
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+COMMENT = re.compile(r"^\s*(?:#|//|/\*|\*|<!--)")
+
+
+def scan_line(path: str, text: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
+    # A comment is not a call: "the ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN setting was removed"
+    # (windy-search) must not count, nor a commented-out `# OPENAI_API_KEY=`.
+    if COMMENT.match(text):
+        return []
+    hits = []
+    for kind, rx in RULES:
+        if kind == "provider SDK dep" and not DEP_FILES.search(path):
+            continue
+        m = rx.search(text)
+        if m:
+            hits.append((kind, m.group(0).strip()[:60]))
+    return hits
+
+
+def _git(bare: Path, *args: str) -> str:
+    return subprocess.run(
+        ["git", "--git-dir", str(bare), *args],
+        capture_output=True, text=True, check=True, timeout=120,
+    ).stdout
+
+
+def _default_path_ok(path: str) -> bool:
+    return not SKIP.search(path)
+
+
+def scan_tree(repo: str, bare: Path, sha: str, allow: list[dict], *, line_fn=None,
+              path_ok=None, prefilter: str | None = None) -> list[Finding]:
+    """Every line in the tree at `sha` (default branch: the baseline)."""
+    # A cheap prefilter by git, then the real rules in Python.
+    # Other guards (ci_hygiene) reuse this walker with their own line rules.
+    line_fn = line_fn or scan_line
+    path_ok = path_ok or _default_path_ok
+    pre = prefilter or "|".join([re.escape(h) for h in HOSTS] + KEYS + [
+        "anthropic", "openai", "groq", "mistral", "generativeai", "genai", "cohere",
+        "together", "cerebras", "litellm"])
+    try:
+        out = _git(bare, "grep", "-nIE", "-e", pre, sha, "--", ".")
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
+        if e.returncode == 1:  # no matches
+            return []
+        raise
+    found = []
+    for raw in out.splitlines():
+        # <sha>:<path>:<line>:<text>
+        try:
+            _, path, line, text = raw.split(":", 3)
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+        if not path_ok(path) or allowed(repo, path, allow, text):
+            continue
+        for kind, match in line_fn(path, text):
+            found.append(Finding(path, int(line), kind, match))
+    return found
+
+
+def scan_added(repo: str, bare: Path, base_ref: str, sha: str, allow: list[dict], **kw) -> list[Finding]:
+    """Only the lines a PR adds, vs its merge-base with the default branch."""
+    mb = _git(bare, "merge-base", base_ref, sha).strip()
+    diff = _git(bare, "diff", "-U0", "--no-color", "--no-ext-diff", mb, sha)
+    return parse_added(repo, diff, allow, **kw)
+
+
+HUNK = re.compile(r"^@@ -\d+(?:,\d+)? \+(\d+)(?:,\d+)? @@")
+
+
+def parse_added(repo: str, diff: str, allow: list[dict], *, line_fn=None, path_ok=None) -> list[Finding]:
+    line_fn = line_fn or scan_line
+    path_ok = path_ok or _default_path_ok
+    found, path, line = [], None, 0
+    for raw in diff.splitlines():
+        if raw.startswith("+++ "):
+            p = raw[4:]
+            path = None if p == "/dev/null" else p[2:] if p.startswith("b/") else p
+            continue
+        m = HUNK.match(raw)
+        if m:
+            line = int(m.group(1))
+            continue
+        if path is None or raw.startswith("--- "):
+            continue
+        if raw.startswith("+"):
+            if path_ok(path) and not allowed(repo, path, allow, raw[1:]):
+                for kind, match in line_fn(path, raw[1:]):
+                    found.append(Finding(path, line, kind, match))
+            line += 1
+    return found
+
+
+# ---- cache: a tree scan runs once per (repo, sha, rules+allow) --------------
+def _fingerprint(allow: list[dict]) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(
+        json.dumps([HOSTS, KEYS, PY_SDKS, JS_SDKS, SKIP.pattern, allow], sort_keys=True).encode()
+    ).hexdigest()[:16]
+
+
+def cached_scan(key: str, fn) -> list[Finding]:
+    try:
+        cache = json.loads(CACHE.read_text())
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        cache = {}
+    if key in cache:
+        return [Finding(**f) for f in cache[key]]
+    result = fn()
+    cache[key] = [f.__dict__ for f in result]
+    if len(cache) > 2000:  # keep it small: newest entries win
+        cache = dict(list(cache.items())[-1000:])
+    try:
+        CACHE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        tmp = CACHE.with_suffix(".tmp")
+        tmp.write_text(json.dumps(cache))
+        tmp.replace(CACHE)
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+    return result
+
+
+def fetched(bare: Path, sha: str) -> bool:
+    """Is `sha` in the sync clone yet? The bridge learns PR / default heads from
+    GitHub's API AFTER the sync fetched, so a push in between is simply not here
+    until the next 5-min cycle. That is a race, not an error: skip quietly."""
+    try:
+        _git(bare, "cat-file", "-e", f"{sha}^{{commit}}")
+        return True
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError:
+        return False
+
+
+def check(repo: str, sha: str, default_branch: str, is_default_head: bool) -> list[Finding] | None:
+    """Findings for one commit, or None when the guard can't run (never a fake OK)."""
+    bare = WORK / f"{repo}.git"
+    if not bare.is_dir() or not fetched(bare, sha):
+        return None
+    allow = load_allow()
+    fp = _fingerprint(allow)
+    if is_default_head:
+        return cached_scan(f"tree:{repo}:{sha}:{fp}",
+                           lambda: [f for f in scan_tree(repo, bare, sha, allow) if f.kind not in WARN_ONLY_KINDS])
+    return cached_scan(
+        f"pr:{repo}:{sha}:{fp}",
+        lambda: scan_added(repo, bare, f"refs/heads/{default_branch}", sha, allow),
+    )
+
+
+def status_for(findings: list[Finding], whole_tree: bool,
+               grant: list[Finding] = ()) -> tuple[str, str, Finding | None]:
+    """(state, description, first finding) for the GitHub commit status.
+
+    `findings` = lane-owned (these block in MODE=block); `grant` = findings in
+    Grant-owned code (ci/grant-owned.yml): always WARN, never red (orchestrator
+    09-23: his desktop work is never blocked by us)."""
+    scope = "in tree" if whole_tree else "added"
+    soft = [f for f in findings if f.kind in WARN_ONLY_KINDS]
+    findings = [f for f in findings if f.kind not in WARN_ONLY_KINDS]
+    if not findings and not grant and soft:
+        f = soft[0]
+        return "success", f"⚠ WARN: new Veron Ollama ref {f.path}:{f.line}. {OLLAMA_MSG}"[:140], f
+    if not findings and grant:
+        g, n = grant[0], len(grant)
+        desc = (f"⚠ WARN (Grant-owned, not blocking): {n} direct AI-provider use{'s' if n > 1 else ''} "
+                f"{scope}, e.g. {g.path}:{g.line} {g.match}")
+        return "success", desc[:140], g
+    if not findings:
+        what = "no direct AI-provider use in tree" if whole_tree else "no direct AI-provider use added"
+        return "success", f"OK: {what} (Windy Mind is the only door)", None
+    f = findings[0]
+    n = len(findings)
+    state = "failure" if MODE == "block" else "success"
+    lead = "BLOCKED" if MODE == "block" else "⚠ WARN (not blocking)"
+    desc = f"{lead}: {n} direct AI-provider use{'s' if n > 1 else ''} {scope}, e.g. {f.path}:{f.line} {f.match}"
+    return state, desc[:140], f
+
+
+def report(repos: list[str]) -> int:
+    allow = load_allow()
+    total = 0
+    for repo in repos:
+        bare = WORK / f"{repo}.git"
+        if not bare.is_dir():
+            print(f"## {repo}: no sync clone, skipped")
+            continue
+        head = _git(bare, "symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD").strip()
+        sha = _git(bare, "rev-parse", head).strip()
+        fs = scan_tree(repo, bare, sha, allow)
+        total += len(fs)
+        print(f"## {repo} ({head} {sha[:7]}): {len(fs)} finding(s)")
+        for f in fs:
+            print(f"  {f.path}:{f.line}  [{f.kind}]  {f.match}")
+    print(f"TOTAL {total}")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    if len(sys.argv) >= 2 and sys.argv[1] == "report":
+        default = os.environ.get("BRIDGE_REPOS", "").split() or sorted(
+            p.name.removesuffix(".git") for p in WORK.glob("*.git"))
+        sys.exit(report(sys.argv[2:] or default))
+    sys.exit(__doc__)

scripts/drill_cross_host.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Cross-host restore drill on Windy 0: ONLY lockbox + R2, nothing from Veron. Values never printed.
+# Usage: bash drill_cross_host.sh   (needs lockbox keys RESTIC_WINDYGIT_PASSWORD, WINDYGIT_R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID, WINDYGIT_R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, WINDYGIT_R2_ENDPOINT)
+set -euo pipefail
+umask 077; W=$(mktemp -d ~/.cache/wg-xdrill.XXXXXX)
+trap 'docker rm -f wg-xdrill-pg >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; rm -rf "$W"' EXIT
+lockbox-get RESTIC_WINDYGIT_PASSWORD "$W/pw" >/dev/null
+lockbox-get WINDYGIT_R2_ACCESS_KEY_ID "$W/ak" >/dev/null; lockbox-get WINDYGIT_R2_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY "$W/sk" >/dev/null; lockbox-get WINDYGIT_R2_ENDPOINT "$W/ep" >/dev/null
+export RESTIC_PASSWORD_FILE="$W/pw" AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="$(cat "$W/ak")" AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="$(cat "$W/sk")"
+export RESTIC_REPOSITORY="s3:$(cat "$W/ep")/windy-git-backups/restic"
+restic snapshots --tag windygit-state --compact | tail -3
+restic restore latest --tag windygit-state --target "$W/r" --include /var/backups/windygit-state --include /srv/windygit/git/gitea/conf --quiet
+ls -l "$W/r/var/backups/windygit-state" | awk 'NR>1{print $5, $NF}'
+docker run -d --name wg-xdrill-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD="$(python3 -c 'import secrets;print(secrets.token_hex(12))')" -e POSTGRES_USER=drill postgres:16-alpine >/dev/null
+for i in $(seq 1 30); do docker exec wg-xdrill-pg pg_isready -U drill >/dev/null 2>&1 && break; sleep 2; done
+for db in gitea windygit; do
+  docker exec wg-xdrill-pg psql -U drill -d postgres -qc "create database $db"
+  docker exec -i wg-xdrill-pg pg_restore -U drill -d $db --no-owner --no-privileges < "$W/r/var/backups/windygit-state/$db.dump" 2>&1 | grep -v "already exists" | head -2 || true
+done
+for t in repository issue pull_request '"user"' external_login_user action_run action_run_job; do
+  echo "$t restored=$(docker exec wg-xdrill-pg psql -U drill -d gitea -Atc "select count(*) from $t")"
+done
+echo "cross-host drill OK (cleaned up)"

scripts/env_names.py

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""env-names: list environment variable NAMES only (Boss ruling 10-01, house rule 10).
+
+  env-names <docker container | systemd unit | env file> [--host H] [--sudo] [--hash]
+  env-names A --compare B [--host H] [--host2 H2]
+
+Prints NAME, set|empty, and value LENGTH. Never a value or fragment. --hash adds sha256[:8]
+(compare two places for equality; a hash of a weak value can be guessed, so use it for
+real secrets only). --compare prints SAME / DIFFERENT / only-in-A / only-in-B per name
+(equality by full-value hash, nothing else shown). Values live in memory only.
+Targets: an existing file (dotenv style) | a docker container name | a systemd unit
+(Environment= + EnvironmentFile=; --sudo to read root-only files). --host runs the docker /
+systemctl / file read over ssh (alias from ~/.ssh/config).
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import json
+import os
+import shlex
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+KV = ("=",)
+
+
+def run(cmd: list[str], host: str | None, sudo: bool = False) -> tuple[int, str]:
+    if sudo:
+        cmd = ["sudo", "-n", *cmd]
+    if host:
+        cmd = ["ssh", "-o", "BatchMode=yes", "-o", "ConnectTimeout=10", host, shlex.join(cmd)]
+    r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, errors="ignore", timeout=60)
+    return r.returncode, r.stdout
+
+
+def parse_dotenv(text: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    out: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for raw in text.splitlines():
+        line = raw.strip()
+        if not line or line.startswith("#") or "=" not in line:
+            continue
+        if line.startswith("export "):
+            line = line[7:].lstrip()
+        k, v = line.split("=", 1)
+        k = k.strip()
+        v = v.strip()
+        if len(v) >= 2 and v[0] == v[-1] and v[0] in "\"'":
+            v = v[1:-1]
+        if k.replace("_", "").isalnum() and not k[0].isdigit():
+            out[k] = v
+    return out
+
+
+def from_file(path: str, host: str | None, sudo: bool) -> dict[str, str] | None:
+    if host or sudo:
+        rc, out = run(["cat", path], host, sudo)
+        return parse_dotenv(out) if rc == 0 else None
+    try:
+        with open(path, errors="ignore") as fh:
+            return parse_dotenv(fh.read())
+    except OSError:
+        return None
+
+
+def from_docker(name: str, host: str | None, sudo: bool) -> dict[str, str] | None:
+    rc, out = run(["docker", "inspect", "-f", "{{json .Config.Env}}", name], host, sudo)
+    if rc != 0 or not out.strip():
+        return None
+    try:
+        items = json.loads(out)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    return {k: v for k, _, v in (i.partition("=") for i in (items or []))}
+
+
+def from_systemd(unit: str, host: str | None, sudo: bool) -> dict[str, str] | None:
+    rc, out = run(["systemctl", "show", unit, "-p", "Environment", "-p", "EnvironmentFiles"], host)
+    if rc != 0 or "LoadState=not-found" in out:
+        return None
+    env: dict[str, str] = {}
+    files: list[str] = []
+    for line in out.splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("Environment="):
+            for tok in shlex.split(line[len("Environment="):]):
+                k, _, v = tok.partition("=")
+                env[k] = v
+        elif line.startswith("EnvironmentFiles="):
+            f = line[len("EnvironmentFiles="):].split(" (")[0].strip().lstrip("-")
+            if f:
+                files.append(f)
+    for f in files:  # later files override earlier, like systemd
+        d = from_file(f, host, sudo)
+        if d is None:
+            print(f"# note: EnvironmentFile {f} unreadable (try --sudo)", file=sys.stderr)
+        else:
+            env.update(d)
+    return env
+
+
+def load(target: str, host: str | None, sudo: bool) -> dict[str, str] | None:
+    if (not host and os.path.isfile(target)) or target.startswith(("/", "./", "~")):
+        return from_file(os.path.expanduser(target), host, sudo)
+    if target.endswith((".service", ".timer", ".socket")):
+        return from_systemd(target, host, sudo)
+    return from_docker(target, host, sudo) or from_systemd(target, host, sudo)
+
+
+def sh(v: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(v.encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def main(argv=None) -> int:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="env-names", description="env var NAMES only")
+    ap.add_argument("target")
+    ap.add_argument("--host")
+    ap.add_argument("--host2", help="ssh host for the --compare target")
+    ap.add_argument("--sudo", action="store_true")
+    ap.add_argument("--hash", action="store_true", help="add sha256[:8] per variable")
+    ap.add_argument("--compare", metavar="TARGET2")
+    a = ap.parse_args(argv)
+    env = load(a.target, a.host, a.sudo)
+    if env is None:
+        print(f"error: could not read {a.target!r} (file, docker container or systemd unit)")
+        return 2
+    if a.compare:
+        env2 = load(a.compare, a.host2 or a.host, a.sudo)
+        if env2 is None:
+            print(f"error: could not read {a.compare!r}")
+            return 2
+        for k in sorted(set(env) | set(env2)):
+            if k not in env2:
+                print(f"{k:<40} only-in-A")
+            elif k not in env:
+                print(f"{k:<40} only-in-B")
+            else:
+                print(f"{k:<40} {'SAME' if sh(env[k]) == sh(env2[k]) else 'DIFFERENT'}"
+                      f"  (len {len(env[k])} vs {len(env2[k])})")
+        return 0
+    for k in sorted(env):
+        v = env[k]
+        extra = f"  sha256:{sh(v)[:8]}" if a.hash and v else ""
+        print(f"{k:<40} {'set  ' if v else 'empty'}  len={len(v)}{extra}")
+    print(f"# {len(env)} variable(s); values never printed")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        sys.exit(main())
+    except Exception as e:  # never a traceback
+        print(f"error: {type(e).__name__}")
+        sys.exit(2)

scripts/guards_report.py

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Live status of the repo guards (compute-guard + ci-hygiene + secret-guard) as one markdown page.
+
+Scans every bridged repo's DEFAULT branch with both guards and renders what is
+left, per repo and owner lane. Findings in code Grant owns (ci/grant-owned.yml:
+windy-pro's desktop app and its build jobs) are listed in their OWN section and
+do not count against "ready to block": those are proposals for Grant, not a
+lane's fix (orchestrator, 09-23).
+
+  sudo python3 scripts/guards_report.py > GUARDS_STATUS.md
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fnmatch
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import yaml
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+import ci_hygiene as hy  # noqa: E402
+import compute_guard as cg  # noqa: E402
+import secret_guard as sgd  # noqa: E402
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+OWNED = Path(os.environ.get("GRANT_OWNED", ROOT / "ci" / "grant-owned.yml"))
+REPOS = os.environ.get("BRIDGE_REPOS", "").split() or [
+    "windy-chat", "windy-mail", "windy-calendar", "Windy-Clone", "WindyCloud", "windy-search",
+    "windy-connect", "windy-drops", "windy-code-web", "windy-code", "windy-traveler",
+    "windy-registry", "eternitas", "windy-translate", "windytranslate-site", "windytraveler-site",
+    "windy-hand", "windy-cloud-sites", "windy-cloud-domains", "windy-cloud-vps", "windytalk",
+    "windy-pro", "windy-mind", "windy-git", "windy-inbox"]
+# Owner lane per repo = the session name to message (orchestrator routing, 09-23 ~22:45Z:
+# hub/account-server/dashboard/site -> "Windy Hub"; windy-calendar only -> "Windy Calender";
+# windy-admin/telemetry -> "Windy Admin"). windy-pro here = its server/web side; the desktop
+# app is Grant-owned and listed in its own section below.
+OWNERS = {
+    "windy-chat": "Windy Chat", "windy-mail": "Windy Mail", "windy-calendar": "Windy Calender",
+    "Windy-Clone": "Windy Clone", "WindyCloud": "Windy Cloud", "windy-cloud-sites": "Windy Cloud",
+    "windy-cloud-domains": "Windy Cloud", "windy-cloud-vps": "Windy Cloud", "windy-search": "Windy Search",
+    "windy-connect": "Windy Connect", "windy-drops": "Windy Drops", "windy-registry": "Windy Drops",
+    "windy-code-web": "Windy Code", "windy-code": "Windy Code", "windy-traveler": "Windy Traveler",
+    "windytraveler-site": "Windy Traveler", "eternitas": "Eternitas", "windy-translate": "Windy Translate",
+    "windytranslate-site": "Windy Translate", "windy-hand": "Windy Hand", "windytalk": "Windy Talk",
+    "windy-pro": "Windy Hub", "windy-mind": "WIndy Mind", "windy-git": "Windy Git",
+    "windy-inbox": "Windy Drops"}  # Windy Inbox build lead (09-24)
+JOB = re.compile(r"^  ([A-Za-z0-9_-]+):\s*$")
+
+
+def job_of(text: str, line: int) -> str | None:
+    """The workflow job a line belongs to (2-space keys under `jobs:`)."""
+    in_jobs, job = False, None
+    for i, raw in enumerate(text.splitlines(), 1):
+        if raw.startswith("jobs:"):
+            in_jobs = True
+        elif in_jobs and JOB.match(raw):
+            job = JOB.match(raw).group(1)
+        elif raw and not raw[0].isspace() and not raw.startswith("jobs:"):
+            in_jobs = False
+        if i == line:
+            return job if in_jobs else None
+    return None
+
+
+def grant_owned(repo: str, path: str, job: str | None, owned: list[dict]) -> bool:
+    for e in owned:
+        if e["repo"] != repo:
+            continue
+        if any(fnmatch.fnmatch(path, g) for g in e.get("paths") or []):
+            return True
+        if job and job in (e.get("jobs") or {}).get(path, []):
+            return True
+    return False
+
+
+def split_grant(repo: str, sha: str, findings: list) -> tuple[list, list]:
+    """(lane-owned, Grant-owned) findings at `sha`, by ci/grant-owned.yml, with
+    workflow lines attributed to their job exactly as the status page does."""
+    owned = (yaml.safe_load(OWNED.read_text()) or {}).get("grant_owned") or []
+    if not any(e["repo"] == repo for e in owned):
+        return list(findings), []
+    bare = cg.WORK / f"{repo}.git"
+    texts: dict[str, str] = {}
+    lane, grant = [], []
+    for f in findings:
+        job = None
+        if "/workflows/" in f.path:
+            if f.path not in texts:
+                texts[f.path] = cg._git(bare, "show", f"{sha}:{f.path}")
+            job = job_of(texts[f.path], f.line)
+        (grant if grant_owned(repo, f.path, job, owned) else lane).append(f)
+    return lane, grant
+
+
+def scan(repo: str, owned: list[dict]):
+    bare = cg.WORK / f"{repo}.git"
+    if not bare.is_dir():
+        return None
+    head = cg._git(bare, "symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD").strip()
+    sha = cg._git(bare, "rev-parse", head).strip()
+    out = {"sha": sha, "compute": [], "hygiene": [], "secrets": []}
+    texts: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for key, fs in (("compute", cg.check(repo, sha, head, True) or []),
+                    ("hygiene", hy.check(repo, sha, head, True) or []),
+                    ("secrets", sgd.check(repo, sha, head, True) or [])):
+        for f in fs:
+            job = None
+            if "/workflows/" in f.path:
+                if f.path not in texts:
+                    texts[f.path] = cg._git(bare, "show", f"{sha}:{f.path}")
+                job = job_of(texts[f.path], f.line)
+            out[key].append((f, job, grant_owned(repo, f.path, job, owned)))
+    return out
+
+
+def render(results: dict) -> str:
+    now = time.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%MZ", time.gmtime())
+    lane = {k: 0 for k in ("compute", "hygiene", "secrets")}
+    grant = {k: 0 for k in ("compute", "hygiene", "secrets")}
+    for r in results.values():
+        for k in lane:
+            lane[k] += sum(1 for _, _, g in r.get(k, []) if not g)
+            grant[k] += sum(1 for _, _, g in r.get(k, []) if g)
+    L = [f"# Repo guards: live status (generated {now}; windy-git scripts/guards_report.py)",
+         "_Default branches only. WARN-only today; the orchestrator says \"block\" per guard when its LANE column is 0. "
+         "Grant-owned code (ci/grant-owned.yml) is listed separately and never holds up a block._", "",
+         "| Guard | Lane-owned findings | Grant-owned (proposals) | Ready to block? |", "|---|---|---|---|",
+         f"| compute-guard (Mind is the only door) | {lane['compute']} | {grant['compute']} | {'✅ YES' if lane['compute'] == 0 else '❌ not yet'} |",
+         f"| ci-hygiene (house rule 6) | {lane['hygiene']} | {grant['hygiene']} | {'✅ YES' if lane['hygiene'] == 0 else '❌ not yet'} |",
+         f"| secret-guard (no credentials in repos; hash only) | {lane['secrets']} | {grant['secrets']} | {'✅ YES' if lane['secrets'] == 0 else '❌ not yet'} |",
+         "", "## By repo (lane-owned)", "| Repo | owner | head | compute | hygiene | secrets | first items |", "|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|"]
+    for repo, r in sorted(results.items()):
+        c = [x for x in r["compute"] if not x[2]]
+        h = [x for x in r["hygiene"] if not x[2]]
+        s = [x for x in r.get("secrets", []) if not x[2]]
+        items = "; ".join(f"`{f.path}:{f.line}` {f.match}" for f, _, _ in (s + c + h)[:3]) or "clean ✅"
+        L.append(f"| {repo} | {OWNERS.get(repo, '?')} | {r['sha'][:7]} | {len(c)} | {len(h)} | {len(s)} | {items} |")
+    L += ["", "## Grant-owned (windy-pro desktop app + its build jobs): proposals only, not blocking"]
+    g = [(repo, f, job) for repo, r in sorted(results.items()) for k in ("compute", "hygiene", "secrets")
+         for f, job, own in r.get(k, []) if own]
+    L += [f"- {repo} `{f.path}:{f.line}`{f' (job {job})' if job else ''}: {f.match}" for repo, f, job in g] or ["- none"]
+    return "\n".join(L) + "\n"
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    owned = (yaml.safe_load(OWNED.read_text()) or {}).get("grant_owned") or []
+    results = {}
+    for repo in REPOS:
+        r = scan(repo, owned)
+        if r is not None:
+            results[repo] = r
+    sys.stdout.write(render(results))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

scripts/install_secret_tools.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Install the shared hash-only secret tools on THIS machine (Windy 0): secret-scan + env-names.
+# Source of truth is this repo (scripts/); re-run after a pull to update.
+set -euo pipefail
+here=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
+dest="$HOME/.local/share/secret-tools"
+mkdir -p "$dest" "$HOME/.local/bin"
+cp "$here/secret_shapes.py" "$here/secret_scan.py" "$here/env_names.py" "$here/lockbox_put.py" "$dest/"
+for pair in "secret-scan:secret_scan.py" "env-names:env_names.py" "lockbox-put:lockbox_put.py"; do
+  n=${pair%%:*}; f=${pair##*:}
+  printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexec python3 "%s/%s" "$@"\n' "$dest" "$f" > "$HOME/.local/bin/$n"
+  chmod 755 "$HOME/.local/bin/$n"
+done
+echo "installed secret-scan, env-names and lockbox-put (shapes from secret_shapes.py, same as secret-guard)"

scripts/lockbox_put.py

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""lockbox-put: add ONE secret to the lockbox by PR, without anyone reading, printing or
+grepping the lockbox (Boss rule 10-01; Windy Hub ruling).
+
+  lockbox-put KEY FILE [--lane NAME] [--note TEXT]
+
+KEY  exact name, ^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,63}$ . FILE a 0600 file you own (not a symlink) whose
+content is the value (one line). Appends ONE line `- **`KEY`**: `<value>`` (the format
+lockbox-get reads) under a new heading at the END of ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md in a fresh temp clone,
+on a new branch, and opens a kit-army-config PR. Append-only: the diff is verified to be one
+file, additions only, before pushing. REFUSES if KEY already exists (a bool computed in
+memory; no line, value or location is ever printed). Reviewers see the KEY NAME + lane only
+if they look at the diff; the PR body never carries the value. Never echoes the value.
+Env (tests): LOCKBOX_PUT_REPO=<clone url/path>, LOCKBOX_PUT_NO_PR=1.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import datetime as dt
+import os
+import re
+import shutil
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+REPO = os.environ.get("LOCKBOX_PUT_REPO", "https://github.com/sneakyfree/kit-army-config.git")
+SLUG = "sneakyfree/kit-army-config"
+KEY_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,63}$")
+VAL_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=:@%,-]{8,512}$")  # no backtick, quote, space or newline
+
+
+def die(msg: str, code: int = 2):
+    print(f"lockbox-put: {msg}")
+    sys.exit(code)
+
+
+def git(cwd: str, *a: str, quiet=True) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
+    # stderr is dropped: git/gh errors can echo URLs; stdout only when we need it.
+    return subprocess.run(["git", "-C", cwd, *a], capture_output=True, text=True, errors="ignore")
+
+
+def key_exists(clone: str, key: str) -> bool:
+    """True if KEY is already defined anywhere lockbox-get reads. Bool only, nothing printed."""
+    pat_env = re.compile(r"^" + re.escape(key) + r"=")
+    pat_md = re.compile(r"^\s*[-*]?\s*\*\*`" + re.escape(key) + r"`\*\*\s*:")
+    paths = [Path(clone, "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md")] + [
+        Path(dp, f) for dp, _d, fs in os.walk(Path(clone, "secrets")) for f in fs if f.endswith(".env")]
+    for p in paths:
+        try:
+            with open(p, errors="ignore") as fh:
+                for line in fh:
+                    if pat_env.match(line) or pat_md.match(line):
+                        return True
+        except OSError:
+            continue
+    return False
+
+
+def main(argv=None) -> int:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="lockbox-put")
+    ap.add_argument("key")
+    ap.add_argument("file")
+    ap.add_argument("--lane", default=os.environ.get("LOCKBOX_LANE", "a lane"))
+    ap.add_argument("--note", default="")
+    a = ap.parse_args(argv)
+    if not KEY_RE.match(a.key):
+        die("KEY must match ^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,63}$")
+    try:
+        st = os.lstat(a.file)
+    except OSError:
+        die("FILE not found")
+    if stat.S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) or not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
+        die("FILE must be a regular file (not a symlink)")
+    if st.st_uid != os.getuid() or (st.st_mode & 0o077):
+        die("FILE must be owned by you and mode 0600")
+    with open(a.file) as fh:
+        value = fh.read().strip()
+    if not VAL_RE.match(value):
+        die("value must be one line of 8-512 chars from [A-Za-z0-9._~+/=:@%,-] (no spaces, quotes, backticks)")
+    note = re.sub(r"[`\n\r]", " ", a.note)[:160]
+    lane = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9 ._-]", "", a.lane)[:40]
+    tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="lockbox-put-", dir=str(Path.home() / ".cache") if (Path.home() / ".cache").is_dir() else None)
+    os.chmod(tmp, 0o700)
+    clone = os.path.join(tmp, "k")
+    try:
+        if subprocess.run(["git", "clone", "-q", "--depth", "1", REPO, clone],
+                          stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).returncode != 0:
+            die("clone failed (details withheld: URLs can carry tokens)")
+        if key_exists(clone, a.key):
+            die(f"{a.key} already exists: refusing to overwrite (append-only; pick a new KEY)", 3)
+        lb = Path(clone, "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md")
+        if not lb.is_file():
+            die("ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md not found in the repo")
+        today = dt.date.today().isoformat()
+        stamp = dt.datetime.now(dt.UTC).strftime("%Y%m%d%H%M")
+        branch = f"lockbox-put/{a.key.lower()}-{stamp}"
+        with open(lb, "a") as fh:
+            fh.write(f"\n## 🗝️ {a.key} (added {today} by {lane} via lockbox-put)\n")
+            fh.write(f"- **`{a.key}`**: `{value}`\n")
+            if note:
+                fh.write(f"- **Note:** {note}\n")
+        git(clone, "checkout", "-q", "-b", branch)
+        git(clone, "add", "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md")
+        ns = git(clone, "diff", "--cached", "--numstat").stdout.split()
+        # numstat: <added> <deleted> <path>; exactly one file, no deletions
+        if len(ns) != 3 or ns[1] != "0" or ns[2] != "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md":
+            die("diff is not a pure append to ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md: aborting, nothing pushed")
+        msg = f"lockbox: add {a.key} (via lockbox-put, {lane})\n\nCo-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>"
+        if git(clone, "-c", "user.name=lockbox-put", "-c", "user.email=lockbox-put@windy.invalid",
+               "commit", "-q", "-m", msg).returncode != 0:
+            die("commit failed")
+        if git(clone, "push", "-q", "origin", branch).returncode != 0:
+            die("push failed (details withheld)")
+        if os.environ.get("LOCKBOX_PUT_NO_PR"):
+            print(f"ok: pushed branch {branch} ({a.key}); PR skipped")
+            return 0
+        body = (f"Adds exactly one key: `{a.key}` (by {lane}). Append-only, one file, no deletions "
+                f"(verified before push). Review by KEY NAME only; do not paste the value anywhere.\n\n"
+                f"{note}\n\n🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)")
+        r = subprocess.run(["gh", "pr", "create", "-R", SLUG, "--head", branch, "--base", "main",
+                            "--title", f"lockbox: add {a.key} ({lane})", "--body", body],
+                           capture_output=True, text=True)
+        if r.returncode != 0:
+            die("branch pushed but `gh pr create` failed; open the PR for the branch by hand")
+        print(f"ok: {a.key} added via PR {r.stdout.strip().splitlines()[-1]}")
+        return 0
+    finally:
+        shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        sys.exit(main())
+    except SystemExit:
+        raise
+    except Exception as e:  # never a traceback: it could carry data
+        print(f"lockbox-put: error: {type(e).__name__}")
+        sys.exit(2)

scripts/pr_status_bridge.py

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import base64
 import json
 import os
 import re
+import subprocess
 import sys
 import time
 import urllib.error
@@ -52,7 +53,8 @@ REPOS = os.environ.get(
     "windy-chat windy-mail windy-calendar Windy-Clone WindyCloud windy-search windy-connect"
     " windy-drops windy-code-web windy-code windy-traveler windy-registry eternitas"
     " windy-translate windytranslate-site windytraveler-site windy-hand"
-    " windy-cloud-sites windy-cloud-domains windy-cloud-vps windytalk windy-pro windy-mind",
+    " windy-cloud-sites windy-cloud-domains windy-cloud-vps windytalk windy-pro windy-mind"
+    " windy-inbox windy-text windy-call windy-cell",
 ).split()
 
 # Gitea run status -> GitHub status state. `skipped` is deliberately absent: a
@@ -73,7 +75,23 @@ MIRROR_TAG = "[GH#"
 # Posting them would put a permanent red X on every commit, and a signal that is
 # always red trains everyone to ignore red. Not posted until a rootless builder
 # exists; that is a decision, recorded in docs/CUTOVER.md, not a failure.
-NO_DAEMON_JOB = re.compile(r"docker", re.IGNORECASE)
+# ...but NOT the no-Docker smoke jobs that replaced them (option A, 09-23):
+# windy-search's "Boot smoke (no Docker)" matched plain `docker` and was hidden.
+NO_DAEMON_JOB = re.compile(r"(?<!no )(?<!no-)(?<!without )docker", re.IGNORECASE)
+# Image-build jobs whose NAME doesn't say docker (orchestrator 09-23, option A:
+# each lane converts the job to a no-Docker smoke test; until then it is not
+# posted). Format: "repo:workflow/job,...;repo2:...".
+NO_DAEMON_NAMED: dict[str, set[str]] = {}
+# eternitas:ci/build dropped 09-23: converted to a no-Docker ci/smoke (#179).
+for _entry in os.environ.get("BRIDGE_NO_DAEMON", "").split(";"):
+    if ":" in _entry:
+        _repo, _jobs = _entry.split(":", 1)
+        NO_DAEMON_NAMED[_repo.strip()] = {j.strip() for j in _jobs.split(",") if j.strip()}
+
+
+def needs_daemon(repo: str, wf: str, job: str) -> bool:
+    """True for image-build jobs, which cannot run here (no Docker daemon, I-5)."""
+    return bool(NO_DAEMON_JOB.search(job)) or f"{wf}/{job}" in NO_DAEMON_NAMED.get(repo, ())
 
 # Jobs Grant ruled NON-BLOCKING (GRANT_DECISIONS_2026-09-23): still run on
 # Windy Git and visible there, but not posted to GitHub, so they cannot turn a
@@ -201,7 +219,17 @@ def sync_prs(repo: str) -> list[str]:
         wanted.add(tag)
         heads.append(pr["head"]["sha"])
         if tag in ours:
-            continue
+            cur = (ours[tag].get("base") or {}).get("ref")
+            if cur is None or cur == pr["base"]["ref"]:  # unknown base: never guess, leave it
+                continue
+            # Retargeted on GitHub (e.g. a stacked PR moved to main after its
+            # parent merged). The mirror kept the OLD base, so workflows filtered
+            # on the base (`pull_request: branches: [main]`) silently stopped
+            # running: eternitas #167, 09-23. Replace the mirror: an "edited"
+            # event triggers nothing, a freshly opened PR runs CI at once.
+            gitea("PATCH", f"/repos/{WG_OWNER}/{repo}/pulls/{ours[tag]['number']}", {"state": "closed"})
+            print(f"  {repo}: GH#{pr['number']} retargeted {cur} -> "
+                  f"{pr['base']['ref']}: replacing its mirror PR")
         st, _ = gitea(
             "POST",
             f"/repos/{WG_OWNER}/{repo}/pulls",
@@ -222,6 +250,54 @@ def sync_prs(repo: str) -> list[str]:
     return heads
 
 
+SAFE_NAME = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$")
+SAFE_SHA = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$")
+
+
+def queued_jobs(repo: str, sha: str) -> list[dict]:
+    """Jobs at `sha` that are waiting for a runner and that a runner CAN take.
+
+    Gitea 1.24's API lists only PICKED-UP jobs (/actions/tasks), so a queued PR
+    showed nothing on GitHub and people asked whether the push was lost. The
+    truth is in the gitea DB. Bounded + non-fatal: during the 09-23 IO stall
+    `docker exec` hung for an hour and must never wedge the bridge again.
+
+    Only status 5 (waiting) with labels some live runner has. A `pending` we
+    post must end in a verdict we will also see, or it sits yellow forever:
+    blocked jobs (7) often end SKIPPED, and jobs for labels no runner has
+    (macos-/windows-/ubuntu-latest) are cancelled by the janitor unpicked;
+    neither ever appears in /actions/tasks.
+    """
+    if not (SAFE_NAME.match(repo) and SAFE_NAME.match(WG_OWNER) and SAFE_SHA.match(sha)):
+        return []
+    query = (
+        "select json_build_object("
+        " 'jobs', (select coalesce(json_agg(t), '[]'::json) from ("
+        "  select ar.index as run_number, ar.workflow_id, j.name, j.runs_on"
+        "  from action_run_job j join action_run ar on ar.id = j.run_id"
+        "  join repository r on r.id = j.repo_id join \"user\" o on o.id = r.owner_id"
+        f"  where o.lower_name = '{WG_OWNER.lower()}' and r.lower_name = '{repo.lower()}'"
+        f"  and ar.commit_sha = '{sha}' and j.status = 5) t),"
+        " 'labels', (select coalesce(json_agg(agent_labels), '[]'::json)"
+        "  from action_runner where coalesce(deleted, 0) = 0));"
+    )
+    try:
+        out = subprocess.run(
+            ["docker", "exec", "-i", "windy-git-db-1", "sh", "-c",
+             'psql -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d gitea -At -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1'],
+            input=query, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True, timeout=30,
+        ).stdout.strip()
+        got = json.loads(out or "{}")
+        runners = [set(json.loads(x or "[]")) for x in got.get("labels") or []]
+        return [
+            j for j in got.get("jobs") or []
+            if any(set(json.loads(j.get("runs_on") or "[]")) <= r for r in runners)
+        ]
+    except (subprocess.SubprocessError, OSError, ValueError) as e:
+        print(f"  {repo}: queued-job lookup skipped ({type(e).__name__})")
+        return []
+
+
 def post_statuses(repo: str, sha: str) -> None:
     # Gitea caps a page at 50 (MAX_RESPONSE_ITEMS) whatever `limit` says, and a
     # daily scheduled workflow can push a quiet main's runs off page 1.
@@ -235,13 +311,24 @@ def post_statuses(repo: str, sha: str) -> None:
             break
     latest: dict[str, dict] = {}
     for r in runs:
-        if r["head_sha"] != sha or NO_DAEMON_JOB.search(r["name"]):
+        if r["head_sha"] != sha or needs_daemon(repo, r["workflow_id"].removesuffix(".yml"), r["name"]):
             continue
         if f"{r['workflow_id'].removesuffix('.yml')}/{r['name']}" in NON_BLOCKING.get(repo, ()):
             continue
         ctx = f"windy-git/{r['workflow_id'].removesuffix('.yml')}/{r['name']}"
         if ctx not in latest or r["id"] > latest[ctx]["id"]:
             latest[ctx] = r
+    # Queued jobs: `pending` where nothing newer has been picked up. A re-run
+    # queued behind an old failure must read pending, not the stale red.
+    for q in queued_jobs(repo, sha):
+        wf = q["workflow_id"].removesuffix(".yml")
+        if needs_daemon(repo, wf, q["name"]):
+            continue
+        if f"{wf}/{q['name']}" in NON_BLOCKING.get(repo, ()):
+            continue
+        ctx = f"windy-git/{wf}/{q['name']}"
+        if ctx not in latest or q["run_number"] > latest[ctx]["run_number"]:
+            latest[ctx] = {"id": 0, "status": "waiting", "run_number": q["run_number"]}
     bad = invalid_workflows(repo, sha)
     if not (latest or bad):
         return
@@ -283,6 +370,61 @@ def post_statuses(repo: str, sha: str) -> None:
         print(f"  {repo}@{sha[:7]} {ctx} = {state} -> {st}")
 
 
+GUARD_CTX = "windy-git/compute-guard"
+HYGIENE_CTX = "windy-git/ci-hygiene"
+SECRET_CTX = "windy-git/secret-guard"
+
+
+def post_compute_guard(repo: str, sha: str, default_branch: str, is_default_head: bool) -> None:
+    """Windy Mind is the only door to AI compute: flag direct provider use (warn-only)."""
+    _post_guard("compute_guard", GUARD_CTX, repo, sha, default_branch, is_default_head)
+
+
+def post_secret_guard(repo: str, sha: str, default_branch: str, is_default_head: bool) -> None:
+    """No live credential in a bridged repo (leak hunt 09-24). Findings carry sha256[:8] only."""
+    _post_guard("secret_guard", SECRET_CTX, repo, sha, default_branch, is_default_head)
+
+
+def post_ci_hygiene(repo: str, sha: str, default_branch: str, is_default_head: bool) -> None:
+    """House rule 6: lockfile-only installs, pinned images, no host-port services (warn-only)."""
+    _post_guard("ci_hygiene", HYGIENE_CTX, repo, sha, default_branch, is_default_head)
+
+
+def _post_guard(modname: str, ctx: str, repo: str, sha: str, default_branch: str,
+                is_default_head: bool) -> None:
+    """One code path for every repo-scanning guard. Non-fatal and never a fake OK:
+    if the guard can't run, nothing is posted."""
+    try:
+        import importlib
+
+        g = importlib.import_module(modname)  # same directory; lazy so the bridge never depends on it
+        findings = g.check(repo, sha, default_branch, is_default_head)
+    except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001 — a guard must never break CI signals
+        print(f"  {repo}@{sha[:7]} {ctx} skipped ({type(e).__name__}: {str(e)[:80]})")
+        return
+    if findings is None:
+        return
+    try:  # Grant-owned code never blocks (orchestrator 09-23); lazy like the guards
+        import importlib
+
+        lane, grant = importlib.import_module("guards_report").split_grant(repo, sha, findings)
+    except Exception as e:  # noqa: BLE001 — can't tell whose code: warn, never block
+        print(f"  {repo}@{sha[:7]} {ctx}: Grant-owned split failed ({type(e).__name__}); WARN only")
+        lane, grant = [], list(findings)
+    state, desc, first = g.status_for(lane, whole_tree=is_default_head, grant=grant)
+    st, existing = github("GET", f"/repos/{GH_OWNER}/{repo}/commits/{sha}/statuses?per_page=100")
+    for s in existing or []:  # newest first: compare the latest guard status only
+        if s["context"] == ctx:
+            if (s["state"], s.get("description")) == (state, desc):
+                return
+            break
+    url = (f"{PUBLIC}/{WG_OWNER}/{repo}/src/commit/{sha}/{first.path}#L{first.line}"
+           if first else f"{PUBLIC}/{WG_OWNER}/{repo}/src/commit/{sha}")
+    st, _ = github("POST", f"/repos/{GH_OWNER}/{repo}/statuses/{sha}",
+                   {"state": state, "context": ctx, "description": desc, "target_url": url})
+    print(f"  {repo}@{sha[:7]} {ctx} = {state} ({len(findings)} finding(s)) -> {st}")
+
+
 def main() -> int:
     if not (GITEA_TOKEN and GITHUB_TOKEN):
         sys.exit("GITEA_ADMIN_TOKEN and GITHUB_TOKEN are required")
@@ -290,13 +432,19 @@ def main() -> int:
     for repo in REPOS:
         try:
             shas = sync_prs(repo)
+            default_branch, default_head = "main", None
             st, br = github("GET", f"/repos/{GH_OWNER}/{repo}")
             if st == 200:
-                st, b = github("GET", f"/repos/{GH_OWNER}/{repo}/branches/{br['default_branch']}")
+                default_branch = br["default_branch"]
+                st, b = github("GET", f"/repos/{GH_OWNER}/{repo}/branches/{default_branch}")
                 if st == 200:
-                    shas.append(b["commit"]["sha"])
+                    default_head = b["commit"]["sha"]
+                    shas.append(default_head)
             for sha in dict.fromkeys(shas):
                 post_statuses(repo, sha)
+                post_compute_guard(repo, sha, default_branch, sha == default_head)
+                post_ci_hygiene(repo, sha, default_branch, sha == default_head)
+                post_secret_guard(repo, sha, default_branch, sha == default_head)
         except Exception as e:  # one repo's failure must not hide the others'
             print(f"  FAILED {repo}: {e}")
             failed = 1

scripts/public_secret_scan.py

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Weekly: every PUBLIC repo in Grant's GitHub accounts, full history (every object,
+reachable or not, incl. PR refs), for secret-shaped strings. Leak hunt 09-24: a
+real bot token sat in a public test fixture for five months.
+
+Output is hash + location only, never a value (house rule 10). Known fakes are
+excused by ci/secret-guard-allow.yml (same file as secret-guard; the repo NAME is
+matched across accounts). Runs on Veron as user1-gpu (gh is logged in there):
+
+  python3 scripts/public_secret_scan.py [--out FILE] [--owners a,b,...]
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import fnmatch
+import json
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+import secret_shapes as ss  # noqa: E402
+
+OWNERS = ["sneakyfree", "VERONTECH", "Windstorm-Institute", "Windstorm-Labs", "Public-Streamer"]
+WORK = Path.home() / "leakscan" / "public"
+MAX_BLOB = 20_000_000
+
+
+def _run(*a: str) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
+    return subprocess.run(a, capture_output=True)
+
+
+def blob_hits(bare: Path) -> dict[str, list[tuple[str, str]]]:
+    """{blob: [(kind, hash8)]} over every blob object in the repo."""
+    chk = _run("git", "-C", str(bare), "cat-file", "--batch-all-objects",
+               "--batch-check=%(objectname) %(objecttype) %(objectsize)")
+    blobs = [p[0] for p in (ln.split() for ln in chk.stdout.decode().splitlines())
+             if len(p) == 3 and p[1] == "blob" and int(p[2]) < MAX_BLOB]
+    if not blobs:
+        return {}
+    import threading
+    p = subprocess.Popen(["git", "-C", str(bare), "cat-file", "--batch"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
+
+    def feed() -> None:  # separate thread: writing everything first deadlocks (both pipes fill)
+        p.stdin.write(("\n".join(blobs) + "\n").encode())
+        p.stdin.close()
+    threading.Thread(target=feed, daemon=True).start()
+    out: dict[str, list[tuple[str, str]]] = {}
+    for _ in blobs:
+        hdr = p.stdout.readline().split()
+        data = p.stdout.read(int(hdr[2]))
+        p.stdout.read(1)
+        found = ss.find(data.decode("utf-8", "ignore"))
+        if found:
+            out[hdr[0].decode()] = found
+    p.wait()
+    return out
+
+
+def locate(bare: Path, blob: str) -> dict:
+    lg = _run("git", "-C", str(bare), "log", "--all", "--format=@@%H %cI", "--name-only",
+              f"--find-object={blob}").stdout.decode()
+    commits, paths = [], set()
+    for line in lg.splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("@@"):
+            commits.append(line[2:].split())
+        elif line.strip():
+            paths.add(line.strip())
+    head = _run("git", "-C", str(bare), "ls-tree", "-r", "HEAD").stdout.decode()
+    first = commits[-1] if commits else ["unreachable", "-"]
+    return {"paths": sorted(paths), "first_commit": first[0][:10], "first_date": first[1],
+            "in_head": blob in head}
+
+
+def excused(repo: str, kind: str, h: str, paths: list[str], allow: dict) -> bool:
+    a = allow.get(repo) or {"hashes": set(), "paths": []}
+    if kind in {"private key block"}:
+        return bool(paths) and all(any(kind in k and fnmatch.fnmatch(p, g) for g, k in a["paths"]) for p in paths)
+    return h in a["hashes"]
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    ap.add_argument("--out", default=str(WORK / "latest.json"))
+    ap.add_argument("--owners", default=",".join(OWNERS))
+    args = ap.parse_args()
+    import secret_guard as sg
+    allow = sg.load_allow()
+    WORK.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    rows, scanned, errors = [], [], []
+    for owner in args.owners.split(","):
+        lst = _run("gh", "repo", "list", owner, "--limit", "1000", "--visibility", "public", "--json", "name")
+        for r in json.loads(lst.stdout or b"[]"):
+            name = r["name"]
+            bare = WORK / owner / f"{name}.git"
+            if bare.exists():
+                c = _run("git", "-C", str(bare), "remote", "update", "--prune")
+            else:
+                bare.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+                c = _run("gh", "repo", "clone", f"{owner}/{name}", str(bare), "--", "--mirror", "-q")
+            if c.returncode:
+                errors.append(f"{owner}/{name}")
+                continue
+            scanned.append(f"{owner}/{name}")
+            for blob, found in blob_hits(bare).items():
+                loc = locate(bare, blob)
+                for kind, h in sorted(set(found)):
+                    rows.append({"repo": f"{owner}/{name}", "kind": kind, "hash8": h, **loc,
+                                 "excused": excused(name, kind, h, loc["paths"], allow)})
+    Path(args.out).write_text(json.dumps({"scanned": scanned, "errors": errors, "rows": rows}, indent=1))
+    new = [r for r in rows if not r["excused"]]
+    print(f"scanned {len(scanned)} public repos, {len(errors)} errors, {len(rows)} secret-shaped, {len(new)} NOT excused")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

scripts/rerun_ci.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Re-run a PR's (or branch's) CI on Windy Git. Runs ON Veron 1.
+#
+#   bash scripts/rerun_ci.sh <repo> <branch> <sha-prefix>
+#
+# Gitea 1.24 has NO rerun API; the web button needs a hub-SSO session as
+# windyadmin, which is Grant's identity, so we don't use it. Instead: move the
+# Windy Git branch back one commit, let the next sync force-push the GitHub head
+# again, and Gitea fires an ordinary push / pull_request_sync event on the SAME
+# commit. Every workflow on that event re-runs, not only the failed one.
+#
+# Safety: refuses unless the branch is exactly at <sha-prefix> (GitHub's head),
+# never rewinds while a sync is running (a run already past this repo would
+# not push it back), waits for a sync that STARTS after the rewind, and if the
+# branch is not verifiably back at <sha-prefix> by the deadline, restores it
+# itself, so Windy Git is never left behind GitHub.
+set -euo pipefail
+repo="${1:?repo}"; branch="${2:?branch}"; want="${3:?sha prefix}"
+# wg-q lives in the INVOKING user's ~/bin; under sudo, ~ is /root.
+WGQ="${WGQ:-$(getent passwd "${SUDO_USER:-$USER}" | cut -d: -f6)/bin/wg-q}"
+# Gitea stores repositories LOWERCASED on disk (WindyCloud -> windycloud.git).
+G="sudo docker exec -u git windy-git-gitea-1 git -C /data/git/repositories/windyadmin/${repo,,}.git"
+
+head=$($G rev-parse "refs/heads/${branch}")
+[[ "$head" == "$want"* ]] || { echo "refusing: ${branch} is at ${head:0:7}, not ${want}"; exit 1; }
+parent=$($G rev-parse "${head}^")
+
+# NOT `systemctl is-active`: the sync is Type=oneshot, which reads "activating"
+# (exit 3) for its whole run, so is-active says "idle" mid-run.
+busy() { case "$(systemctl show windygit-sync -p ActiveState --value)" in
+  activating|active|deactivating|reloading) return 0;; esac; return 1; }
+while busy; do sleep 5; done
+$G update-ref "refs/heads/${branch}" "$parent" "$head"
+mark=$(awk '{print int($1*1000000)}' /proc/uptime)
+echo "rewound ${repo}:${branch} ${head:0:7} -> ${parent:0:7}"
+
+deadline=$(( $(date +%s) + 900 ))
+until [ "$(systemctl show windygit-sync -p ExecMainStartTimestampMonotonic --value)" -gt "$mark" ] \
+      && [ "$($G rev-parse "refs/heads/${branch}")" = "$head" ]; do
+  if [ "$(date +%s)" -ge "$deadline" ]; then
+    $G update-ref "refs/heads/${branch}" "$head" "$($G rev-parse "refs/heads/${branch}")" || true
+    echo "TIMEOUT: restored ${branch} to ${head:0:7} by hand; NO new run fired"; exit 1
+  fi
+  sleep 10
+done
+echo "restored by sync: ${branch} = ${head:0:7}"
+sleep 5
+"$WGQ" <<SQL
+select ar.index, ar.workflow_id, ar.event, ar.status, to_char(to_timestamp(ar.created),'HH24:MI:SS')
+  from action_run ar join repository r on r.id = ar.repo_id
+ where r.name = '${repo}' and ar.commit_sha = '${head}' order by ar.id desc limit 6;
+SQL

scripts/secret_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Secret guard: no live credential lands in a bridged repo (leak hunt 09-24).
+
+Same walker, cache and GitHub posting as compute_guard / ci_hygiene
+(`windy-git/secret-guard`), but over EVERY text file, and a finding carries only
+"<kind> #<sha256[:8]>", never the value (house rule 10). Known fakes are allowed
+BY HASH in ci/secret-guard-allow.yml (repo + hashes + reason).
+
+  sudo python3 scripts/secret_guard.py report [repo ...]
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import fnmatch
+import hashlib
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import yaml
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+import compute_guard as cg  # noqa: E402  (shared walker, cache)
+import secret_shapes as ss  # noqa: E402
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+ALLOW_FILE = Path(os.environ.get("SECRET_GUARD_ALLOW", ROOT / "ci" / "secret-guard-allow.yml"))
+MODE = os.environ.get("SECRET_GUARD_MODE", "warn")
+# Kinds that only WARN (rolled out warn-first); empty = every kind blocks in block mode.
+WARN_KINDS = {k for k in os.environ.get("SECRET_GUARD_WARN_KINDS", "").split(",") if k}
+NEVER = re.compile(r"(^|/)(node_modules|vendor|third_party)/")
+
+
+def path_ok(path: str) -> bool:
+    return not NEVER.search(path)
+
+
+# A private-key match is only its BEGIN line, so its hash is the same everywhere:
+# those are allowed by PATH (entries with `paths` + `kinds`), everything else by HASH.
+PATH_ONLY_KINDS = {"private key block"}
+
+
+def load_allow(path: Path = ALLOW_FILE) -> dict[str, dict]:
+    """{repo: {"hashes": {hash8}, "paths": [(glob, {kind})]}}; every entry needs a reason."""
+    data = yaml.safe_load(path.read_text()) if path.exists() else {}
+    out: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    for e in (data or {}).get("allow") or []:
+        if not (e.get("repo") and (e.get("hashes") or (e.get("paths") and e.get("kinds")))
+                and str(e.get("reason", "")).strip()):
+            raise ValueError(f"allow entry needs repo, hashes (or paths + kinds) and a reason: {e}")
+        if e.get("paths") and not set(e["kinds"]) <= PATH_ONLY_KINDS:
+            raise ValueError(f"path allows are only for {sorted(PATH_ONLY_KINDS)}: {e}")
+        r = out.setdefault(e["repo"], {"hashes": set(), "paths": []})
+        r["hashes"].update(str(h) for h in e.get("hashes") or [])
+        r["paths"] += [(g, set(e["kinds"])) for g in e.get("paths") or []]
+    return out
+
+
+def scan_line(path: str, text: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
+    return [(kind, f"{kind} #{h}") for kind, h in ss.find(text)]
+
+
+def _drop_allowed(repo: str, findings, allow: dict[str, dict]):
+    a = allow.get(repo) or {"hashes": set(), "paths": []}
+
+    def ok(f) -> bool:
+        if f.kind in PATH_ONLY_KINDS:
+            return any(f.kind in kinds and fnmatch.fnmatch(f.path, g) for g, kinds in a["paths"])
+        return f.match.rsplit("#", 1)[-1] in a["hashes"]
+    return [f for f in findings if not ok(f)]
+
+
+def check(repo: str, sha: str, default_branch: str, is_default_head: bool):
+    bare = cg.WORK / f"{repo}.git"
+    if not bare.is_dir() or not cg.fetched(bare, sha):  # pushed after the fetch: next cycle
+        return None
+    allow = load_allow()
+    rules = hashlib.sha256(("|".join(rx.pattern for _, rx in ss.PATTERNS) + ss.PREFILTER).encode()).hexdigest()[:8]
+    kw = dict(line_fn=scan_line, path_ok=path_ok)
+    if is_default_head:
+        fs = cg.cached_scan(f"sec-tree:{repo}:{sha}:{rules}",
+                            lambda: cg.scan_tree(repo, bare, sha, [], prefilter=ss.PREFILTER, **kw))
+    else:
+        fs = cg.cached_scan(f"sec-pr:{repo}:{sha}:{rules}",
+                            lambda: cg.scan_added(repo, bare, f"refs/heads/{default_branch}", sha, [], **kw))
+    return _drop_allowed(repo, fs, allow)
+
+
+def status_for(findings, whole_tree: bool, grant=()):
+    """Same contract as the other guards. `grant` findings never block."""
+    scope = "in tree" if whole_tree else "added"
+    if not findings and grant:
+        g, n = grant[0], len(grant)
+        return "success", f"⚠ WARN (Grant-owned, not blocking): {n} secret-shaped string{'s' if n > 1 else ''} {scope}, e.g. {g.path}:{g.line} {g.match}"[:140], g
+    if not findings:
+        return "success", f"OK: no secret-shaped strings {scope}", None
+    f, n = findings[0], len(findings)
+    soft = MODE != "block" or all(x.kind in WARN_KINDS for x in findings)
+    state = "success" if soft else "failure"
+    lead = "⚠ WARN (not blocking)" if soft else "BLOCKED"
+    if not soft:
+        f = next(x for x in findings if x.kind not in WARN_KINDS)
+    return state, f"{lead}: {n} secret-shaped string{'s' if n > 1 else ''} {scope}, e.g. {f.path}:{f.line} {f.match}"[:140], f
+
+
+def report(repos: list[str]) -> int:
+    allow = load_allow()
+    total = 0
+    for repo in repos:
+        bare = cg.WORK / f"{repo}.git"
+        if not bare.is_dir():
+            continue
+        head = cg._git(bare, "symbolic-ref", "--short", "HEAD").strip()
+        sha = cg._git(bare, "rev-parse", head).strip()
+        fs = _drop_allowed(repo, cg.scan_tree(repo, bare, sha, [], line_fn=scan_line, path_ok=path_ok,
+                                               prefilter=ss.PREFILTER), allow)
+        total += len(fs)
+        print(f"## {repo} ({head} {sha[:7]}): {len(fs)} finding(s)")
+        for f in fs:
+            print(f"  {f.path}:{f.line}  {f.match}")
+    print(f"TOTAL {total}")
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    if len(sys.argv) >= 2 and sys.argv[1] == "report":
+        default = os.environ.get("BRIDGE_REPOS", "").split() or sorted(
+            p.name.removesuffix(".git") for p in cg.WORK.glob("*.git"))
+        sys.exit(report(sys.argv[2:] or default))
+    sys.exit(__doc__)

scripts/secret_scan.py

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""secret-scan: hash-only secret finder. Boss ruling 10-01 after three lanes printed secrets
+into their own transcripts while hunting secrets (house rule 10).
+
+  secret-scan <path> [--history] [--repo <git url or path>] [--no-lockbox]
+
+Reports `file:line` (and the commit with --history), WHICH lockbox entry matched (the KEY
+NAME only) or which secret SHAPE matched (twilio, zai, aws, ...), plus a sha256[:8] of the
+token for allow-listing. It NEVER prints, logs or writes a value or any fragment of one
+(no context line, no masking). The lockbox is loaded in memory only. stdout only.
+Exit 0 = clean, 1 = findings, 2 = usage/error.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import os
+import re
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+import secret_shapes as ss  # noqa: E402  (the SAME shapes as secret-guard)
+
+HOME = Path.home()
+LOCKBOX_PATHS = [p for p in os.environ.get("SECRET_SCAN_LOCKBOX_PATHS", "").split(":") if p] or [
+    str(HOME / "kit-army-config" / "secrets"), str(HOME / "kit-army-config" / "ACCESS_LOCKBOX.md")]
+# Extra shapes that are scan-only (not in the blocking guard): label, regex.
+EXTRA = [("zai key", re.compile(r"(?<![0-9a-f])[0-9a-f]{32}\.[A-Za-z0-9]{16}(?![A-Za-z0-9])"))]
+SKIP_DIRS = {".git", "node_modules", "vendor", "third_party", "__pycache__", ".venv"}
+MAX_BYTES = 5_000_000
+
+RUN = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_\-]{15,199}")
+UUID = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$")
+NAME = re.compile(r"[\s>*`|-]*([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]{2,60})\s*[=:|]")
+
+
+def h16(t: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(t.encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
+
+
+def cands(line: str):
+    """Token candidates: runs >=16 chars with a digit and a letter; git shas/uuids excluded."""
+    for chunk in re.split(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_\-.]+", line):
+        parts = [chunk, *chunk.split(".")] if "." in chunk else [chunk]
+        for p in parts:
+            for m in RUN.finditer(p):
+                t = m.group(0)
+                if not (re.search(r"\d", t) and re.search(r"[A-Za-z]", t)):
+                    continue
+                if re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}|[0-9a-fA-F]{64}", t) or UUID.match(t.lower()):
+                    continue
+                yield t
+
+
+def load_lockbox() -> dict[str, set[str]]:
+    """{hash16: {key-name labels}}; values never leave this dict."""
+    out: dict[str, set[str]] = {}
+    files: list[str] = []
+    for p in LOCKBOX_PATHS:
+        if os.path.isdir(p):
+            for root, _d, fs in os.walk(p):
+                files += [os.path.join(root, f) for f in fs]
+        elif os.path.isfile(p):
+            files.append(p)
+    for f in files:
+        try:
+            with open(f, errors="ignore") as fh:
+                for line in fh:
+                    m = NAME.match(line)
+                    label = m.group(1) if m else "?"
+                    for t in cands(line):
+                        out.setdefault(h16(t), set()).add(label)
+        except OSError:
+            continue
+    return out
+
+
+def scan_line(line: str, lockbox: dict[str, set[str]]) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
+    """[(label, hash8)]: `shape:<kind>` and/or `lockbox:<NAMES>`. No value escapes."""
+    res: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
+    for kind, h in ss.find(line):
+        res.append((f"shape:{kind}", h))
+    for kind, rx in EXTRA:
+        for m in rx.finditer(line):
+            res.append((f"shape:{kind}", ss.h8(m.group(0))))
+    for t in cands(line):
+        k = h16(t)
+        if k in lockbox:
+            names = sorted(n for n in lockbox[k])
+            res.append(("lockbox:" + ",".join(names)[:70], k[:8]))
+    return sorted(set(res))
+
+
+def is_text(path: Path) -> bool:
+    try:
+        with open(path, "rb") as fh:
+            return b"\0" not in fh.read(4096)
+    except OSError:
+        return False
+
+
+def scan_tree(root: Path, lockbox):
+    files = [root] if root.is_file() else [
+        Path(dp) / f for dp, dn, fn in os.walk(root) for f in fn
+        if not set(Path(dp).relative_to(root).parts) & SKIP_DIRS]
+    for p in sorted(files):
+        try:
+            if p.stat().st_size > MAX_BYTES or not is_text(p):
+                continue
+            with open(p, errors="ignore") as fh:
+                for n, line in enumerate(fh, 1):
+                    for label, h in scan_line(line, lockbox):
+                        yield (str(p), n, None, label, h)
+        except OSError:
+            continue
+
+
+def git(repo: str, *a: str) -> subprocess.Popen:
+    return subprocess.Popen(["git", "--git-dir", repo, *a], stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+                            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, text=True, errors="ignore")
+
+
+def scan_history(gitdir: str, lockbox):
+    """Every ADDED line on every ref (incl. PR refs). Oldest commit per (hash, file, line)."""
+    seen: dict[tuple, str] = {}
+    p = git(gitdir, "log", "--all", "-p", "-U0", "--no-color", "--format=@@C %h", "-a")
+    commit = path = None
+    ln = 0
+    for row in p.stdout:  # type: ignore[union-attr]
+        if row.startswith("@@C "):
+            commit = row[4:].strip()
+        elif row.startswith("+++ "):
+            path = row[6:].strip() if row.startswith("+++ b/") else None
+        elif row.startswith("@@ "):
+            m = re.search(r"\+(\d+)", row)
+            ln = int(m.group(1)) - 1 if m else 0
+        elif row.startswith("+") and path:
+            ln += 1
+            for label, h in scan_line(row[1:], lockbox):
+                seen[(label, h, path, ln)] = commit or "?"
+    p.wait()
+    for (label, h, path, ln), c in sorted(seen.items(), key=lambda x: (x[0][2], x[0][3])):
+        yield (path, ln, c, label, h)
+
+
+def resolve_gitdir(p: Path) -> str | None:
+    for cand in (p / ".git", p):
+        if (cand / "HEAD").exists() and ((cand / "objects").exists()):
+            return str(cand)
+    return None
+
+
+def main(argv=None) -> int:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="secret-scan", description=__doc__.split("\n\n")[1] if __doc__ else "")
+    ap.add_argument("path", nargs="?", help="file, directory, or git repo (with --history)")
+    ap.add_argument("--history", action="store_true", help="scan every added line in all git history")
+    ap.add_argument("--repo", help="git URL or path to scan (mirror-cloned to a temp dir, then deleted)")
+    ap.add_argument("--no-lockbox", action="store_true", help="shapes only")
+    a = ap.parse_args(argv)
+    if not (a.path or a.repo):
+        ap.print_usage()
+        return 2
+    lockbox = {} if a.no_lockbox else load_lockbox()
+    print(f"# secret-scan: {len(lockbox)} lockbox tokens in memory, values never printed", flush=True)
+    tmp = None
+    findings = 0
+    try:
+        if a.repo:
+            tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="secret-scan-", dir=str(HOME / ".cache") if (HOME / ".cache").is_dir() else None)
+            os.chmod(tmp, 0o700)
+            target = os.path.join(tmp, "r.git")
+            rc = subprocess.run(["git", "clone", "-q", "--mirror", a.repo, target],
+                                stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL).returncode
+            if rc != 0:
+                print("error: clone failed (details withheld: URLs can carry tokens)")
+                return 2
+            a.history = True
+            gitdir = target
+        elif a.history:
+            gitdir = resolve_gitdir(Path(a.path))
+            if not gitdir:
+                print("error: --history needs a git repo path")
+                return 2
+        if a.history:
+            for path, ln, c, label, h in scan_history(gitdir, lockbox):
+                findings += 1
+                print(f"{path}:{ln}  commit={c}  {label} #{h}")
+        else:
+            for path, ln, _c, label, h in scan_tree(Path(a.path), lockbox):
+                findings += 1
+                print(f"{path}:{ln}  {label} #{h}")
+    finally:
+        if tmp:
+            shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)
+    print(f"# {findings} finding(s)")
+    return 1 if findings else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    try:
+        sys.exit(main())
+    except KeyboardInterrupt:
+        sys.exit(130)
+    except Exception as e:  # never a traceback: it could carry data
+        print(f"error: {type(e).__name__}")
+        sys.exit(2)

scripts/secret_shapes.py

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+"""Secret-shaped strings, shared by secret_guard (bridged repos) and
+public_secret_scan (weekly, every public repo). A finding NEVER carries the value:
+only its kind and sha256[:8] (house rule 10). Leak hunt 09-24: @Windy_0_bot's
+token sat in a public repo's test fixture for five months."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import re
+
+# (kind, regex). Order matters only for readability; each match is reported once.
+PATTERNS: list[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]]] = [
+    ("telegram bot token", re.compile(r"(?<![0-9])[0-9]{8,10}:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}(?![A-Za-z0-9_-])")),
+    ("github token", re.compile(r"\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82})\b")),
+    ("aws access key", re.compile(r"\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b")),
+    ("slack token", re.compile(r"\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}")),
+    ("anthropic key", re.compile(r"\bsk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}")),
+    ("openai key", re.compile(r"\bsk-(?:proj-|svcacct-)?(?!ant-)[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}")),
+    ("stripe live key", re.compile(r"\b[rs]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}")),
+    ("google api key", re.compile(r"\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}(?![0-9A-Za-z_-])")),
+    # Twilio (Windy Text 10-01: a live auth token sat in test files for months). An auth token
+    # is a bare 32-hex with no prefix, so it is only caught when ASSIGNED to a secret-ish name.
+    ("twilio sid/api key", re.compile(r"\b(?:AC|SK)[0-9a-f]{32}\b")),
+    ("32-hex secret assignment", re.compile(
+        r"(?i)\b[a-z0-9_.-]*(?:token|secret|key|password)[a-z0-9_.-]*[\"']?\s*[:=]\s*[\"']?(?P<v>(?<![0-9a-f])[0-9a-f]{32}(?![0-9a-f]))")),
+    ("pypi token", re.compile(r"\bpypi-AgE[A-Za-z0-9_-]{50,}")),
+    ("private key block", re.compile(r"-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |ENCRYPTED )?PRIVATE KEY-----")),
+]
+
+# git grep -E (POSIX ERE) prefilter: cheap superset of PATTERNS.
+PREFILTER = ("[0-9]{8,10}:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}|gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|github_pat_|(AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}"
+             "|xox[abprs]-|sk-ant-|sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32}|sk-proj-|[rs]k_live_|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}"
+             "|-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|(AC|SK)[0-9a-f]{32}|[0-9a-fA-F]{32}|pypi-AgE")
+
+
+def h8(value: str | bytes) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(value.encode() if isinstance(value, str) else value).hexdigest()[:8]
+
+
+def find(text: str) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
+    """[(kind, hash8)] for every secret-shaped string in `text`. Values never leave."""
+    out = []
+    for kind, rx in PATTERNS:
+        for m in rx.finditer(text):
+            out.append((kind, h8(m.group('v') if 'v' in rx.groupindex else m.group(0))))
+    return out

scripts/sync_from_github.sh

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ FAILED=0
 
 # Repos Windy Git tracks FROM GitHub. Remove a repo from this list at the moment
 # it flips to Windy-Git-first, or the sync will fight its authors and win.
-REPOS="${SYNC_REPOS:-windy-calendar windy-search windy-registry Windy-Clone WindyCloud windy-cloud-sites windy-mind eternitas windy-agent windy-git windy-chat windy-mail windy-connect windy-drops windy-code-web windy-code windy-traveler windy-translate windytranslate-site windytraveler-site windy-hand windy-cloud-domains windy-cloud-vps windytalk windy-pro}"
+REPOS="${SYNC_REPOS:-windy-calendar windy-search windy-registry Windy-Clone WindyCloud windy-cloud-sites windy-mind eternitas windy-agent windy-git windy-chat windy-mail windy-connect windy-drops windy-code-web windy-code windy-traveler windy-translate windytranslate-site windytraveler-site windy-hand windy-cloud-domains windy-cloud-vps windytalk windy-pro windy-inbox windy-text windy-call windy-cell}"
 
 # Repos whose TAGS must not reach Windy Git. A tag push fires `on: push: tags`
 # workflows; windy-pro's build-electron is a matrix over ubuntu/macos/windows-
@@ -82,7 +82,11 @@ done
 
 # Jobs that name labels no runner has (ubuntu/macos/windows-latest) would wait
 # forever and invisibly; cancel them after 30 min. Never fails the sync.
-bash "$(dirname "$0")/cancel_unrunnable.sh" || log "janitor failed (non-fatal)"
+# Both DB steps go through `docker exec`, which hangs outright while the host
+# is in an IO stall (09-23: data2 SMR cliff wedged this sync for 10+ min and
+# stopped mirroring + the bridge for every lane). They are optional; mirroring
+# and the bridge are not. Bound them so a stuck exec costs one step, not the run.
+timeout -k 10 120 bash "$(dirname "$0")/cancel_unrunnable.sh" || log "janitor failed or timed out (non-fatal)"
 
 # Private repos can't run GitHub Actions; mirror their open PRs here so CI
 # fires, and post the verdicts back to GitHub as commit statuses.
@@ -92,7 +96,7 @@ fi
 
 # CI telemetry -> admin.windyword.ai (shapes declared with Windy Telemetry 40).
 # Sends nothing until WINDYGIT_TELEMETRY_TOKEN is set; never fails the sync.
-python3 "$(dirname "$0")/telemetry_emit.py" || log "telemetry emit failed (non-fatal)"
+timeout -k 10 180 python3 "$(dirname "$0")/telemetry_emit.py" || log "telemetry emit failed or timed out (non-fatal)"
 
 [[ "$FAILED" -ne 0 ]] && { log "COMPLETED WITH FAILURES"; exit 1; }
 log "all repos in step with GitHub"

scripts/telemetry_emit.py

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import json
 import os
+import re
 import subprocess
 import sys
 import time
@@ -69,6 +70,100 @@ def iso(epoch: float) -> str:
     return datetime.fromtimestamp(epoch, UTC).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
 
 
+# ---- push velocity: DETECT + ALERT ONLY (G3.4, 2026-09-23) -----------------
+# `git push` goes straight to Gitea and never touches our API, so throttle.py
+# cannot see it (NOT_ENFORCED_HERE). Gitea's own `action` table does record
+# every push, so we read it here, emit `forge.push_velocity` when an account
+# crosses a threshold, and let Telemetry Boss's detector page. Nothing here sits
+# in the push path; nothing is ever refused (orchestrator, 09-23).
+#
+# Thresholds = the STANDARD-band bases from config.py (500 pushes/day; the
+# force-push base of 10/day is used for ref deletes, the closest thing we can
+# see). EI band multipliers are NOT applied: a platinum agent over 500/day is
+# still flagged, for a human to look at, not blocked. Gitea records no
+# "forced" flag, so force pushes cannot be told apart from pushes: named, not
+# guessed.
+PV_RULES = (  # (rule, row key, window_s, threshold)
+    ("pushes_1h", "p1h", 3600, 60),
+    ("pushes_24h", "p24h", 86400, 500),
+    ("ref_deletes_24h", "d24h", 86400, 10),
+)
+# The GitHub -> Windy Git sync pushes as windyadmin every 5 min, by design.
+PV_EXEMPT = {"windyadmin"}
+# Gitea op_type: 5 commit push, 9 tag push, 16 tag delete, 17 branch delete.
+# One action row per WATCHER is written for each push; user_id = act_user_id
+# keeps exactly the actor's own copy.
+PV_QUERY = """
+    select a.act_user_id as uid, u.lower_name as login,
+           (select el.external_id from external_login_user el
+             where el.user_id = a.act_user_id order by el.external_id limit 1) as wid,
+           count(*) filter (where a.op_type in (5, 9) and a.created_unix > {h1}) as p1h,
+           count(*) filter (where a.op_type in (5, 9)) as p24h,
+           count(*) filter (where a.op_type in (16, 17)) as d24h,
+           count(distinct a.repo_id) as repos
+      from action a join "user" u on u.id = a.act_user_id
+     where a.created_unix > {h24} and a.user_id = a.act_user_id
+       and a.op_type in (5, 9, 16, 17)
+     group by 1, 2"""
+
+
+def passport_from_login(login: str) -> str | None:
+    """agent-et26abcd1234 -> ET26-ABCD-1234 (repos.py _owner_login, reversed)."""
+    m = re.fullmatch(r"agent-([a-z0-9]{4})([a-z0-9]{4})([a-z0-9]{4})", login)
+    return "-".join(g.upper() for g in m.groups()) if m else None
+
+
+def push_velocity_events(rows: list[dict], now: float, alerted: dict) -> tuple[list[dict], dict]:
+    """(events, alerted') — one row per account per rule per window while over.
+
+    `alerted` maps "<uid>:<rule>" -> epoch of the last row. An account still over
+    the line is re-reported once per window, not every 5 minutes; one that drops
+    back under is forgotten, so a later burst reports again.
+    """
+    events, keep = [], {}
+    for r in rows:
+        login = str(r["login"])
+        if login in PV_EXEMPT:
+            continue
+        agent = login.startswith("agent-")
+        for rule, key, window, limit in PV_RULES:
+            n = int(r[key])
+            if n <= limit:
+                continue
+            k = f"{r['uid']}:{rule}"
+            last = alerted.get(k)
+            if last is not None and now - float(last) < window:
+                keep[k] = last
+                continue
+            keep[k] = now
+            ev = {
+                "ts": iso(now),
+                "platform": PLATFORM,
+                "service": "forge",
+                "event_type": "forge.push_velocity",
+                "metadata": {
+                    "rule": rule,
+                    "window_s": window,
+                    "count": n,
+                    "threshold": limit,
+                    "repos": int(r["repos"]),
+                    "gitea_user_id": int(r["uid"]),
+                },
+            }
+            # Actor rule (telemetry UPDATE 2): agent/human rows MUST carry an
+            # actor_id. Humans sign in to the forge only via Windy SSO, so the
+            # external login id IS their windy_identity_id. No id we can prove
+            # -> actor_type system + metadata.caller, never an invented id (I-12).
+            actor_id = passport_from_login(login) if agent else (r.get("wid") or None)
+            if actor_id:
+                ev["actor_type"], ev["actor_id"] = ("agent" if agent else "human"), str(actor_id)
+            else:
+                ev["actor_type"] = "system"
+                ev["metadata"]["caller"] = "unknown"
+            events.append(ev)
+    return events, keep
+
+
 def main() -> int:
     dry = "--dry-run" in sys.argv
     state = load_state()
@@ -182,6 +277,20 @@ def main() -> int:
         }
     )
 
+    # Isolated: a failing push-velocity query must never cost the ci.run rows.
+    pv_alerted = state.get("pv_alerted", {})
+    try:
+        pv_rows = sql(PV_QUERY.format(h1=int(now) - 3600, h24=int(now) - 86400))
+        pv_events, pv_alerted = push_velocity_events(pv_rows, now, pv_alerted)
+    except (subprocess.CalledProcessError, ValueError, KeyError) as e:
+        print(f"[telemetry] push velocity check FAILED (non-fatal): {type(e).__name__}")
+        pv_events = []
+    for e in pv_events:
+        m = e["metadata"]
+        print(f"[telemetry] WARNING push velocity: gitea user {m['gitea_user_id']} "
+              f"{m['rule']} = {m['count']} > {m['threshold']}")
+    events += pv_events
+
     # ci.job_cancelled: spooled by the janitor (cancel_unrunnable.sh), one JSON per job.
     spool = os.environ.get("JANITOR_SPOOL", "/var/lib/windy-git/janitor-cancelled.jsonl")
     spooled = 0
@@ -264,7 +373,7 @@ def main() -> int:
     with open(STATE + ".tmp", "w") as f:
         json.dump(
             {"last_fin": new_fin, "last_id": new_id, "last_ts": now,
-             "quarantined_unreported": quarantined},
+             "quarantined_unreported": quarantined, "pv_alerted": pv_alerted},
             f,
         )
     os.replace(STATE + ".tmp", STATE)